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A lot was on my mind when I made opening remarks at a workshop held 
at University of the Free State: ‘Poor, Precarious, White? Rethinking white 
societies in Southern Africa, 1930s–1990s.’ The gathering of scholars there 
and the ideas discussed and exchanged provide the basis for this impressive 
book. The hope here is that some of those thoughts will help frame the book 
and, especially, help us think about how critical studies of whiteness do and 
ought to travel. Of all my positive impressions from the conference – from 
Neil Roos’s brilliant welcoming lecture to the important work being done 
by junior scholars – what perhaps struck me most was the inclusion of such 
great and varied work from beyond South Africa itself. Indeed, the confer-
ence and this book represent the fullest flowering of a study of whiteness 
based in workplaces, unions, and everyday life yet produced. The implicit 
lesson, that taking white society beyond a particular national framework leads 
to new questions and new answers, pervaded the conference and shapes my 
remarks here.
I taught at University of the Western Cape in 1991, a heady time in which 
that institution sometimes billed itself as UWC, the University of the Working 
Class. Its modestly named Marxist Theory Seminar sometimes drew upward of 
a thousand participants. I had not returned to South Africa in the intervening 
27 years. My glib remark in explaining this absence professed a fear of being 
overcome by sadness for the fate of the South African revolution. But actually, 
we in the USA can’t be judgmental about the state of anyone else’s social move-
ments or forget how much our failures condition what is possible everywhere. 
The truth is that I felt I had too little to say about South African struggles and 
regretted not opening and pursuing conversations regarding the white workers 
in both societies while there.
My most read book on whiteness, The Wages of Whiteness, came out during 
that stay in 1991, but I hardly spoke about it during my visit. There were good 
reasons. I arrived in South Africa, invited by a movement organization, near 
the end of the academic boycott. They and I very much saw the trip as focused 
on a local initiative – a people’s history project at UWC, not a speaking or 
book-selling junket. I spoke in public very little and never outside the Western 
Cape. When I did speak, it was to (re)introduce C.L.R. James to South African 
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audiences through Tariq Ali’s obituary tribute film – which, I felt, was not a bad 
choice of priority.
But partly I felt overmatched speaking about whiteness in that time and 
place. One of my mentors, George Fredrickson, had set a high bar for learning 
much before writing and speaking to the comparative history of race in South 
Africa and the USA. If, through the work of Toni Morrison, Alexander, Saxton, 
Ted Allen, and James Baldwin, the explicit study of whiteness as a problem 
was finding a footing in US universities, the movement in South Africa had 
confronted sharply posed problems of race and class in such sophisticated and 
grounded ways that it seemed better for me to simply listen.
What I learned was critical. The insights of Luli Callinicos, for example, on 
the place of fiercely exploited European immigrant newcomers to South Afri-
can mines generated ideas that would find their ways into my much later work 
on immigrants, whiteness, and “race management,” which was done in concert 
with Elizabeth Esch. At one private but pivotal moment during the visit I tried 
out the term “so-called whites.” Doing so was a reaction to widespread move-
ment use of the term “so-called Coloured,” a phrasing designed to underline 
the constructed and state-sponsored nature of such a category. From the time 
I had first heard it used by my friend and colleague Dennis Brutus, the late 
poet and activist, “so-called Coloured” seemed to get at something that also ran 
through the history of whiteness as a category. But veteran activists in the Cape 
urged caution. They rightly worried that to see a dominant social position as 
constructed would lead some to conclude that it was “merely constructed” at 
the very moment when it was crucial to emphasize that “the way to nonracial-
ism was through race.” The situated clarity of such an insight probably con-
firmed my reticence to speak in public about my (at that time) new work on 
whiteness. It was worth it.
And in general the stepping outside national, familiar frameworks is worth 
it. We see this in the first words of this book, which the editors use to address 
the vogue for explaining all manners of things from Brexit to Trump around 
the supposed existence and perfidy of a “white working class.” The most force-
ful analyses of why this is a cul-de-sac and of how much whiteness operates to 
keep those whom its hails as white from joining working class mobilizations 
comes predictably from the USA and the UK. It is also the UK and its moment 
of danger that give us the recent work of Satnam Virdee, with its theorizing and 
historicizing of the “racialized outsider,” a powerful contribution to the study of 
whiteness. That is to say that the critical study of whiteness turns on the making 
of claims of whiteness into a set of problems that is at once historical, moral, 
and political. Therefore, it is often in settings in which whiteness most urgently 
presents itself as a problem that analyses of it are sharpest and most energetic. 
It is no small wonder, then, that the most fully realized study of a movement 
of white workers and its limits, Jeremy Krikler’s White Rising: The 1922 Rand 
Revolt and Racial Killing in South Africa, had the setting and timing that it did.
The best recent examples of a not only national but also transnational story 
that defamiliarizes the ways that whiteness is constructed comes in the work of 
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Australian, especially those who are indigenous, scholars. In 2017, I attended a 
conference that convened in Queensland, “Race, Whiteness, and Indigeneity.” 
That long and large event was conducted by the National Indigenous Research 
and Knowledges Network, which, alongside the Australian Critical Race 
and Whiteness Studies Association, has produced a critical whiteness studies 
uniquely shaped by the thought of racialized people for whom whiteness is 
an urgent problem. We in the USA – and, I think, scholars in South Africa – 
imagine whiteness both as formed over and against a “Black” other and as 
rooted in enslavement, such that the Australian example should rightly arrest 
us. Without a large African presence or mass slavery, Australia has managed to 
(sadly) approximate the USA both in the depth of its commitment to white 
supremacy and, now again, in its brutality toward racialized outsiders. To think, 
as the indigenous Australian philosopher Aileen Moreton Robinson urges us 
to do so, of the indigenous peoples and their reverence for land as the equally 
important “Other” in the formation of whiteness is changing the face of US 
and Canadian scholarship.
It has potential to do so in other places. Fredrickson, for example, empha-
sized that race-makers in South Africa studied as models not only Jim Crow 
but also US reservation policies toward indigenous peoples. Fanon’s searing 
insights in Black Skins, White Masks make the settler a focus. Such an emphasis 
perhaps maps awkwardly onto those in the white societies described in much 
of the present book – late-coming; separated in time both from conquest and, 
sometimes, even from the nationalities of original white settlers; and working 
alongside Africans who are themselves not necessarily local. But it repays con-
sideration in a broader story, especially since, both in the USA and in South 
Africa, it so lurks in the dream work of collective white identities.
David Roediger
Introduction
Rethinking white societies in Southern 
Africa, 1930s–1990s
Duncan Money and Danelle van Zyl-Hermann
White workers and the white underclass are (back) in the spotlight. The emer-
gence and success of right-wing populist movements across Europe and North 
America are provoking debate and discussion about the attitudes and role of 
the “white working class”, and all manner of political outcomes are attributed 
to this group. While definitions of this class are often unclear, it is generally 
regarded as a dynamic and reactionary force, largely motivated by hostility to 
“non-white” migrants, and when mobilised, it pushes politics and society to 
the right.1 For historians of Southern Africa, this contemporary discourse has 
unerring parallels with the historical experiences of white settler societies in 
the region, where working-class and poor whites have been regarded as the 
most ardent supporters and beneficiaries of the white minority regimes which 
were, one by one, overthrown during the latter part of the twentieth century.
Despite its recent prominence, the idea of a racialised working class is not a 
new one. Race and class have animated historians of Southern Africa perhaps 
more than any other issue. Yet in the literature on the region’s history and in 
popular understanding, race and class are often treated as synonymous. Whites 
are regarded as a homogenous group which is uniformly wealthy and comfort-
able and atop a binary power structure, especially for later decades in the twen-
tieth century. Indeed, as will be discussed in this book, existing scholarship on 
white workers and the white poor is overwhelmingly concentrated in the early 
twentieth century, with the implicit assumption that these categories of analysis 
are no longer valid for white societies in later periods. This book challenges 
this assumption and demonstrates its inaccuracy through new research on non-
hegemonic whites in Southern Africa – that is, those whites who, due to their 
class position, were not firmly established in the dominant political, economic 
and social structures of the racial state from the 1930s to the 1990s. In this, we 
draw on the work of Ann Stoler, who argued that whites in colonial societies 
‘were neither by nature unified nor did they inevitably share common interests 
and fears’, and that, far from being unimportant, internal divisions amongst 
whites shaped the practice and intensity of racial policies in different colonial 
settings.2 As the case studies in this book show, social class remained a salient 
and tension-producing element within white society throughout the century. 
Homogenising understandings of white societies not only are unconvincing 
2 Duncan Money and Danelle van Zyl-Hermann
and unhelpful for understanding race in the region but also actively obscure 
many of the social, political and economic complexities which animated the 
regimes in question. Moreover, the assumption that there were no real class 
divisions within white societies inadvertently reproduces the propaganda and 
myths propagated by white minority regimes: e.g. the classless volk of apartheid 
South Africa or the supposed egalitarianism of white Rhodesia.
In this book, early career and established historians offer a reassessment of 
Southern Africa’s white societies as being often divided, fraught with tension 
and subject to constant state surveillance and intervention. This, we argue, reveals 
the workings and constructions of race and class in a wider sense. Indeed, there 
has been a lack of interest in the everyday experiences and agency of ordinary 
whites, how they lived, the jobs they performed, their relations with other 
whites, as well as with other “non-white” Africans, and how this was viewed by 
states.3 Similarly, the empirical grounding of much of the literature on white 
identity and power has been insufficient.4 Scattered work has been produced 
on this topic since the late 1990s, but it has not previously coalesced, and it has 
mostly been within a national framework with little scope for comparison.5 Yet 
as Jonathan Hyslop notes in this book, the economic integration of the South-
ern African region has long been established and recognised – not least by vari-
ous moves towards and efforts at political integration since 1910. It is curious, 
then, that beyond the economic, historians have continued to approach states in 
the region as individual entities with hard and fast borders.6 This book argues 
for a regional approach and demonstrates how the history of white workers and 
the white poor reveal the social, political and cultural connections which, in 
addition to the economic, characterise the Southern African past.
In this book, class emerges in a variety of guises. Some authors – particularly 
those studying white labour movements – employ the concept in a material-
ist sense to identify those bound together by their position within workplace 
relations of production and by the organisational forms and the consciousness 
and collective action this engendered. Other contributors use class to refer 
to socio-economic indicators such as education, income and associated life 
chances – or the lack thereof. Still other authors adopt a cultural approach, 
attending to issues of taste, values, traditions and everyday life. In the various 
contributions, these different conceptions or emphases are seldom clear-cut; 
rather, they intersect with each other, producing a striking synergy both within 
and between chapters which would have been unthinkable some 30 years ago, 
when debates about class were last en vogue. This, we contend, is the result of 
two premises – the first has now become established; the second is what we are 
seeking to establish in this book. Firstly, it is now well established that class – 
like race – is constructed and relational, and that for historians, the challenge 
is to examine what this meant in practice in various temporal and geographi-
cal contexts. The different approaches in this book all conceive of class in this 
relational sense. They also share, indeed demonstrate, a second premise: race and 
class cannot be considered independently – we cannot talk about race with-
out talking about class. Path-breaking scholarship on “whiteness” and racialised 
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class identities emerging in the American academy in the 1990s established this 
understanding in the United States. David Roediger, a central figure in this 
‘new labour history’, argued that, for the USA, ‘working class formation and the 
systematic development of a sense of whiteness went hand in hand’.7 Drawing 
on these insights, this book seeks to establish this claim for the Southern African 
context. By concentrating on white workers and the white poor, it seeks to 
counter the tendency in existing literature which unproblematically associates 
white skin with privilege or even defines white identity as power and privi-
lege.8 The societies considered in this book were all organised along racial lines, 
and those living in them who were racialised as white certainly enjoyed related 
privileges. Yet as the case studies presented here clearly show, whites were not 
always privileged in the same way. The social histories of whites presented in 
these chapters reveal that there were multiple and different kinds of whiteness 
across the region, and these were inextricably connected to the manner in 
which different whites were classed. In parallel to familiar representations of 
colonial- and apartheid-era Southern Africa’s bourgeois white societies, living 
in the lap of luxury on the back of black exploitation, there remained elements 
of a white underclass, a working poor and a consciously blue-collar contingent. 
Within these groups, too, there were important variations. As will be shown, 
the white copper miners in Northern Rhodesia buying yachts with hefty pay 
cheques lived very different kinds of lives from those of recently transplanted 
Portuguese peasants eking out an existence as subsistence farmers in Angola 
and Mozambique.
Despite such variations, there were important points of commonality within 
the region. In contrast to the emphasis placed on the invisible or unmarked 
nature of whiteness in white majority contexts such as North America or 
Europe, different classes of whites in Southern Africa were all subject to what 
has been termed the ‘hypervisibility of white skin in Africa’.9 In all the societies 
considered in this book, whites were minorities, often small minorities, making 
their presence glaringly obvious. Yet power and privilege did not always auto-
matically follow from the presence of white skin. As Deborah Posel has shown, 
for instance, South Africa’s 1950 Population Registration Act defined a white 
person through appearance, as well as through markers pertaining to lifestyle 
and social acceptance.10 We argue here that the meanings and consequences 
accompanying white skin were always historically contingent, constructed, 
contextual and entangled with class. In other words, in order to move beyond 
a one-dimensional understanding of white settler society and the interracial 
dynamics which underlie white minority rule, we need to consider that power, 
status and hegemony were not necessarily fixed, secure or self-evident for all 
those raced as white. While in the context of a racially organised society white 
skin certainly bestowed a significant measure of dominance and privilege, it 
could also attract the disciplinary power of the state in ways which resonated 
with state attitudes towards and regulation of the black majority. As this book 
shows, the manner in which historical subjects were raced was very much con-
tingent on how they were classed.
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The research presented here investigates how race was made and sustained in 
practice. The case studies presented here are drawn from the former Southern 
African territories of the British Empire, most prominently South Africa and 
Rhodesia, as well as Portugal’s African colonies. Of course, these are not exhaus-
tive, and the absence of scholarship on Botswana, Katanga or Namibia reflects 
the state of this field of historical inquiry and points to crucial future avenues 
of inquiry. We hope that the present book will encourage further research and 
test the validity of the arguments advanced here against case studies drawn from 
elsewhere in the region.
Centrally, the new research presented in this book demonstrates the per-
sistence of class amongst Southern African whites and how this was entan-
gled with the ways race was made and sustained in practice. In contrast to 
established understandings, white workers and poor whites were features of 
the colonial landscape throughout the twentieth century, right up to the last 
days of minority rule, and, indeed, beyond. Where they were less visible due to 
the privileges, protection and opportunities afforded within these racist con-
texts, they remained present nonetheless, and their upwards social mobility was 
typically much less solid than has been assumed. Social distinctions within the 
white population – whether based on status, ethnicity or income – therefore 
remained a feature of Southern African society throughout the colonial period. 
Minority rule did not produce a solid block of equal, race-based privilege. And 
as the next section shows, white colonial regimes were ambiguous at best and 
hostile at worst to the subaltern whites it perceived to lurk and loiter around 
the edges of race-based societies.
Social history and suitable subjects in Southern Africa
Southern Africa, and South Africa in particular, has a rich tradition of social 
history. This scholarship emerged in a particular politicised context, namely the 
revival of black trade unionism, student revolts and the great upsurge in resist-
ance to apartheid in the 1970s. As a result, many historians at the time pursued 
an openly, entirely justifiable political aim to link historical research with these 
movements and make it available to those engaged in these struggles.11 As a 
result, their work had relatively little to say about whites beyond highlight-
ing the racialised power blocs produced by the capitalist political economy of 
the Southern African region. Other scholars, similarly observing the grassroots 
activism of the liberation struggle, sought to incorporate the agency of ordi-
nary people in analyses of the development of racial capitalism. This gave rise 
to a tradition of social history scholarship which included important work on 
white societies focused on the turn of the twentieth century. The tumultuous 
clashes between the white labour movement and the South African state, cul-
minating in a full-blown armed insurrection in 1922; industrial diseases that 
decimated the ranks of the first generation of white mineworkers; rural poverty 
that forced Afrikaners from the land and into the cities; and the ferment of 
radical and revolutionary politics amongst working-class whites offered rich 
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subjects for historians.12 Particularly noteworthy is Robert Morrell’s White but 
Poor, an edited collection which is very much a predecessor to this present 
book. In his introduction to Morrell’s book, Bill Freund (also a contributor to 
this book) argues that white society in South Africa ‘consists and consisted of 
deeply differentiated, sometimes antagonistic classes whose fragile unity under 
a segregated society represented a difficult political achievement’.13
This argument is taken up and extended in this book. In doing so, we seek 
to amend two interrelated limitations suffered by the existing scholarship: one 
chronological and the other geographic. The first is that it is largely concen-
trated in the late nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century 
in the context of the mineral revolution and associated processes of industri-
alisation and urbanisation.14 There are only a handful of studies which extend 
our knowledge on the topic beyond this period.15 The neglect of white labour 
and the white poor as historical subjects in South Africa after the 1940s can be 
attributed to assumptions about the “solving” of the poor white problem fol-
lowing the so-called civilised labour policy enacted by the Nationalist-Labour 
Pact government from 1924 and the success of the National Party’s (NP) apart-
heid policies in bringing about the embourgeoisement of the white population 
after 1948.16 State intervention in the form of racialised employment protec-
tion, social security, and the harnessing of the post-war economic boom pri-
marily for the benefit of whites has given rise to the implicit assumption in the 
literature that white workers and the white poor effectively ceased to exist after 
the mid-twentieth century. One corollary of this was that scholars no longer 
deemed the analysis of white societies in these terms valid. Scholarly atten-
tion for the period following the 1940s, therefore, turns elsewhere, and little 
attention is paid to the lives of ordinary whites in these societies until the post-
apartheid period. Since the 1990s there has been a flurry of work, primarily 
by anthropologists and sociologists, on poor whites and interest, bordering on 
fascination, in the media with the so-called re-emergence of white poverty – 
mostly in South Africa but also in Zimbabwe.17 This demands the historicisa-
tion of white precarity and the probing of the fragility of race-based privilege.
This is not to deny that the lives of whites across Southern Africa underwent 
significant changes in the twentieth century. Developmentalist, interventionist 
states did improve the living standards of their white inhabitants. In South Africa, 
many of those regarded as poor whites and unskilled white workers enjoyed 
greater material prosperity and higher incomes, along with attendant shifts in 
status and consumption patterns. The numbers of whites also rose markedly, as 
the economic boom drew hundreds of thousands of European immigrants to 
Angola, Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. The vari-
ous political regimes also sought to attract new settlers in the post-war period 
to bolster their position. This period, therefore, also saw shifts in the nature of 
white societies. With the exception of white workers on the Northern Rho-
desian Copperbelt, the powerful white labour movement of the early twentieth 
century was either repressed or co-opted by the state. In South Africa, following 
the bloody suppression of the Rand Revolt, the 1924 Industrial Conciliation 
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Act incorporated white trade unions into state structures and ‘marked the end 
of effective white labour militance’. The same occurred in Southern Rhode-
sia following the passing of the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which was 
closely modelled on South African legislation.18 Repression predominated else-
where. The army was used to break the 1923 strike by white railway workers 
in Angola, while in Mozambique the combative white workers’ movement was 
crushed after a military coup in 1926 installed a dictatorship in Portugal, and 
the last major strike by white workers there took place in 1932.19 In Belgian 
Congo’s Katanga province, Union Minière du Haut Katanga, the mining com-
pany which dominated the region, successfully suppressed the nascent white 
labour movement on the mines in the early 1920s.20
In much of the existing scholarship, it appears as though white labour move-
ments’ transformation from militancy to quiescence during the 1920s resulted 
in the assumption that whites ceased to be workers, as they no longer offered 
a serious or sustained challenge to capital. One account, of Wankie Colliery in 
Southern Rhodesia, for instance, argued that although white miners had taken 
serious strike action in the 1920s, by the 1950s there was no industrial unrest 
as ‘almost all settlers saw themselves as whites rather than workers’.21 This argu-
ment bears more than a passing resemblance to the historical orientation of the 
South African Communist Party. The Communist Party had initially drawn its 
support from white male workers, which it regarded as the only real proletar-
ians in South Africa. Yet following the 1922 Rand Revolt and the subsequent 
shift of white working-class loyalties to the Pact Government, the party reo-
rientated itself towards African workers and their organisations.22 Historians 
seem to have followed suit, and the historiography on the period after the 
1940s discusses a working class that is uniformly black.23 This perspective – 
characteristic of traditional or ‘old’ labour history writing – conflates the 
history of white workers’ organisations with the history of white workers 
themselves.24 Beyond developments in labour specifically, the long post-war 
economic boom is understood to have fundamentally altered the nature of 
white societies. Scholarship emerging in the 1970s, therefore, not only advo-
cated a focus on black labour but also debated the role and questioned the very 
existence of the white working class in South Africa beyond the early decades 
of labour militancy. Scholars in this debate – in which white miners generally 
stood in as proxies for the wider white working class – placed a heavy emphasis 
on class structure and concluded that most, if not all, white workers should be 
regarded as part of the middle class; thus, they were best categorised as ‘white 
wage earners’, according to Robert Davies, or the ‘new middle class’, according 
to Harold Wolpe.25 These designations were regarded as more appropriate both 
because whites predominately performed supervisory jobs and because the 
high wages paid to white workers were dependent on low wages for African 
workers, with the former extracting surplus value from the latter. The number 
of whites still employed as productive workers, these scholars argued, were so 
few that they could usefully be considered part of a broader white group out-
side the working class.26
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The second limitation of the existing scholarship is geographical: it concen-
trates overwhelmingly on South Africa and, within South Africa, on the Wit-
watersrand. White communities in Angola, Katanga, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia have received comparatively little 
attention. Only two of the nine chapters in White but Poor, for instance, are not 
on South Africa. Morrell notes that he unsuccessfully tried to solicit chapters 
on the white poor elsewhere in the region to generate comparative insights.27 
What scholarship does exist largely conforms to the chronological limitations 
described earlier in this section.28 One noteworthy exception is the relatively 
substantial scholarship on whites and whiteness in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 
despite the comparatively small size of this population.29 Here, however, the 
focus has overwhelmingly been on white farmers, and issues of white self- 
representation and notions of belonging. The catalyst for this literature was 
Zimbabwe’s chaotic and often violent land reform programme in the 2000s, 
which seized control of white-owned land and thrust the country’s white 
farmers into international prominence as easily the most discussed white popu-
lation in the entire region.30 The experiences of white farmers are typically 
taken to be characteristic of whites in the country – though they constituted 
only a small proportion of a white population that has long been predominately 
urban31 – and there is little in this literature on white workers and the white 
poor. Indeed, discussions of divisions within the white population largely focus 
on attitudes towards and integration with black Africans.32
One reason why South Africa has attracted by far the most scholarly attention 
is that it contained the bulk of the region’s white population. To be sure, num-
bers of whites elsewhere were not insubstantial. At the peak of their respective 
white populations, in the mid-1970s, there were 280,000 whites in Southern 
Rhodesia, an estimated 335,000 whites in Angola and some 200,000 whites in 
Mozambique, though whites never constituted more than about 5 per cent of 
the total population in any of these states.33 Yet South Africa’s white population 
exceeded these by far, with over 4.1 million in 1974, an estimated 17 per cent 
of the total population.34 The white population continued to grow until the 
early 1990s.
Although South Africa had by far the largest white population, the num-
bers do not tell the full story. Whites in Southern Africa were highly mobile, 
both within and beyond the region. South Africa’s large white population 
did not remain within the country’s borders. Afrikaners were to be found in 
Angola, Namibia, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia.35 Many whites 
in Southern Rhodesia were born in South Africa, while others had spent time 
living there, and large numbers of whites came into Rhodesia from Angola and 
Mozambique when Portuguese colonial rule collapsed in 1975.36 Consider-
ably larger numbers of Portuguese whites arrived in South Africa via Angola 
and Mozambique.37 Many white workers also habitually crossed borders in 
search of work. It was not unusual for a white miner working on the Rand to 
also have worked on the Northern Rhodesian Copperbelt and vice versa, and 
white railway workers often worked across the railway network linking South 
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Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. One consequence 
of constant movement is that the figures for the total white population in any 
given territory do not accurately reflect the numbers of whites who had actu-
ally lived there, as beyond South Africa these relatively low figures masked high 
rates of immigration and emigration. For instance, an average of 10,207 whites 
arrived in Southern Rhodesia every year between 1955 and 1979 (255,175 in 
total), but the total white population in 1979 was only 228,583.38 Clearly, white 
settlers across Southern Africa were often not settled at all. In some ways, physi-
cal mobility constituted another form of race-based privilege, and this mobility 
of whites in the post-war period contrasted sharply with the intensifying con-
trol to which Africans were being subjected. At the same time, contributions to 
this book show that for many whites, physical mobility represented a precarious 
and unstable unsettledness.
Debates surrounding the role and position of white labour and scholarship 
on early-twentieth-century white working-class lives took place in a context 
in which white labour formed an important political constituency in Southern 
Africa. While this is no longer the case today – for either this specific class or 
this race – the arguments offered by scholars such as Davies and Wolpe remain 
unsatisfactory, and the contributions in this book forcefully demonstrate how 
and why class remained a salient feature within white society. White miners in 
South Africa, who featured so prominently in scholarly debates, saw their wages 
increase markedly during the early apartheid period. Indeed, the gap between 
white and African wages widened significantly in the course of the 1950s and 
1960s.39 Yet whatever upwards mobility these workers enjoyed as a result of 
their inflated wages, their material and subjective privilege remained depend-
ent on state patronage. This became clear in the late 1970s, when labour unrest 
and economic instability forced the apartheid government to consider reform-
ing race-based labour legislation. As Danelle van Zyl-Hermann shows in this 
book, white workers vehemently resisted reform efforts. Blue-collar workers 
in both the mining and the steel industries consciously defined their collective 
identities and interests in this regard as being rooted in the workplace, and they 
articulated this as being opposed not only to the African workers whose labour 
competition they feared, but also to white employers and the capitalist exploi-
tation from which they demanded state protection. Even in the hey-day of 
apartheid, white identities remained classed and closely linked to work. Similar 
arguments are made in Nicola Ginsburgh’s chapter on white railway workers 
in Southern Rhodesia and Duncan Money’s chapter on white mineworkers 
in Northern Rhodesia, two groups whose identities and defence of their per-
ceived interests were based on the work they performed. Both these chap-
ters and Bill Freund’s chapter on white workers in South Africa’s state-owned 
industrial enterprises point to the continued recruitment of skilled white work-
ers from Europe. Clearly, a demand for such workers and their skills remained in 
the region’s economies. Most of these workers continued to perform the same 
kinds of jobs in Southern Africa that they had done on mines, railways and steel 
plants in the UK and elsewhere.
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The most obvious form of subordination and marginalisation which strati-
fied white societies in the region was the continued presence of poor whites. 
Typically, stratification in white societies is examined along national and ethnic 
lines – for instance, in South Africa, marginalised whites are almost exclusively 
cast as Afrikaners40 – but this book moves beyond such conceptualisations.41 
Contributions from Cláudia Castelo and Caio Simões De Araújo detail the 
rural settlement schemes whereby poor and often illiterate peasants from met-
ropolitan Portugal were moved to newly-created, isolated agricultural com-
munities in Angola and Mozambique to bolster Portuguese colonial rule. There 
was little materially that distinguished these white peasant farmers, disliked 
and mistrusted by other whites and the colonial authorities, from the Afri-
cans alongside whom they lived. George Bishi’s chapter on “undesirable” white 
immigrants in Southern Rhodesia shows how the state regarded the mainte-
nance of a certain level of material prosperity as a core component of white 
identity and continually intervened to remove those who failed to meet the 
proscribed and shifting material standards of white “desirability”. Indeed, per-
sistent state intervention directed at whites is an important indication that the 
perceived problem of “poor whiteism” endured. In Southern Rhodesia, fears 
that children of impoverished white families would “degenerate” prompted 
extensive state control over white families that, as Ivo Mhike’s chapter explains, 
undermined the state’s guiding ideology of white supremacy. Similarly, Neil 
Roos’s chapter on white public servants in South Africa explores how a huge 
expansion of the public service sought to provide jobs for lower-class whites, 
but these same public servants were mistrusted by white elites and hence were 
carefully monitored, disciplined and subjected to intrusive scientific manage-
ment techniques.
Together, these chapters demonstrate the class dimensions of racial power: 
despite their considerable privileges, many whites lacked much of the mastery 
and dominance associated with white power in colonial Africa. Their fate was 
largely decided, and their agency limited, by others. Both white workers and 
the white poor occupied a position within white society which was often an 
ambiguous or uneasy one, and their actions, individually or collectively, could 
upset established racial boundaries or destabilise white societies.
It should be apparent from this section that there is an important distinction 
to be made between white workers and the white poor, which are too read-
ily conflated in the existing literature. Many white workers, for instance, were 
relatively wealthy, and as will be seen, the kinds of histories that can be written 
about these two groups are often very different. At the same time, boundaries 
between the two groups were not hard and fast, and there are some instances 
where a certain historical trajectory might connect the two groups. For one, 
as a result of sustained state intervention, the white poor often became white 
workers. Freund, for instance, explores how racially preferential employment 
in new state-owned industries in South Africa was seen as a solution to white 
poverty. Many white workers themselves feared not only that this process of 
upwards mobility could be reversed but also that they would once again slip 
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into the indignity of being “poor whites”. This was the case, for instance, for the 
semi-skilled white mineworkers discussed by Van Zyl-Hermann, who saw the 
spectre of white poverty lurking menacingly about the discussions surrounding 
labour reform in late-apartheid South Africa.
Despite these historical connections, it is helpful to maintain a distinction 
between white workers and the white poor, not least because they appear in the 
historical record in different ways. Sources produced by the former, especially 
material relating to work, are relatively easy to discover. White workers often 
gave evidence to government enquiries, were quoted regularly in newspaper 
articles and formed organisations which generated their own, often substantial, 
archives. Ginsburgh, then, can draw upon publications produced by the whites-
only Rhodesia Railway Workers’ Union along with newspaper interviews with 
white trade unionists. Money, similarly, utilises documents produced by striking 
white mineworkers, along with records of negotiations in which white mine-
workers made their demands forcefully clear. The white poor, on the other 
hand, only infrequently produced sources about themselves – Will Jackson has 
noted, ‘the voices of poor whites in their own words’ have been ‘elusive’.42 This 
was a category of people which others wrote about – usually in a disapproving, 
interventionist manner. Mhike, for instance, provides rich information on state 
efforts to discipline and rehabilitate indigent whites, but there is little surviving 
information on how the white poor themselves regarded such state interven-
tions. Castelo’s chapter presents a similar reality, where there is abundant evi-
dence on how state officials and institutions regarded Portuguese peasants, but 
these peasants left few impressions about how they saw themselves and their 
place in this new setting. Unlike white workers, the white poor were scattered 
and atomised in this period and did not form their own organisations. Where 
the white poor gathered in any numbers – or, more often, where they were 
gathered by state intervention, such as in Angola’s colonatos – they were subject 
to close supervision and control, which generated a different kind of documen-
tary record than that produced by white workers.
The kinds of sources which are available has consequences for the kind of 
histories which appear in this book. Our contributions focus on the relation-
ships between whites and the state, to the unavoidable neglect of histories of 
personal spaces, families, intimacies and emotions, though Mhike’s chapter 
touches on some of these. The main regrettable absence is an in-depth con-
sideration of gender. Roos’s chapter describes how the patriarchy of Afrikaner 
nationalism both enlarged and limited employment opportunities available 
to white women, in a manner resembling the employment of black workers, 
where white labour shortages were evident – but closer attention needs to be 
paid to the experiences and agency of white female workers in their relations to 
the state.43 These important histories would reveal much about the internal life 
of Southern Africa’s white societies. It would, however, entail a very different 
project from the one we have attempted here and would have to grapple with 
the problem of sources. It is possible that historical biography, which Hyslop 
utilises in his contribution, could be a way forward for these kinds of histories.
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Emerging themes
The following chapters present new scholarship on white societies in colonial-
era Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The chapters 
are arranged chronologically, rather than by country, in order to facilitate the 
regional conversation and render visible continuities and discordances through-
out the period under investigation which have otherwise been overlooked. 
The first chapter sees Jonathan Hyslop suggesting a trinity of analytical axes for 
approaching the history of white workers and impoverished whites in South-
ern Africa. Historians would do well, Hyslop argues, to employ comparison 
between states, seek connections across the region and consider contempora-
neous global ideologies and events. This would serve to revise existing under-
standings of and reveal new insights into white society in Southern Africa. 
These methodological propositions are born out in a number of the empirical 
case studies presented in the remainder of the book. In this regard, a number of 
themes come into focus.
1 Class-based disruption in white societies: Indocility and transgression
In Southern Africa, as in other settler colonial contexts, white rule depended 
on a sharply delineated boundary between colonisers and colonised. This was 
upheld by the mythology of fixed racial categories, a fiction maintained only by 
conscious and determined interventions on the part of political and social elites. 
Existing scholarship has demonstrated how, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, poor and working-class whites were the main objects of 
elite anxieties. Their poverty as well as their proximity to black Africans – living 
alongside, performing the same kinds of work, maintaining social relations with 
or, perhaps more than anything, having sex with – provoked acute fears of racial 
degeneration and the disruption of the carefully constructed racial boundaries 
on which white rule depended.44 But these themes fade from scholarship on 
the latter part of the twentieth century. As Southern Africa basked in the glow 
of the post-war economic boom, its white societies are generally considered to 
have attained uniform wealth and displayed unvarying support for state policies. 
White societies, it seemed, had settled into comfortable homogeneity, without 
significant subsections causing concern and requiring intervention.
Yet a number of contributions in this book demonstrate the persistence of 
class-based racial disruption throughout the century and across the region. 
Whether this persistence related to perception (the gaze of the state and elite 
anxieties) or to reality (the agency of nonhegemonic whites) is not always 
clearly distinguishable in the available sources. But both clearly continued to 
characterise the region and saw class and race intersect with age, ethnicity and 
gender. Social interaction between white and black continued to raise con-
cerns. Ivo Mhike’s chapter tracks the manner in which white working-class 
children playing with their African counterparts, or young white petty crimi-
nals consorting with blacks, attracted the attention of police and welfare officers 
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in inter- and post-war Southern Rhodesia and marked these white youths out 
for state intervention. The financial insecurity and hence assumed moral falli-
bility of their home lives was often blamed for their disruptive behaviour. Many 
were placed in single-sex corrective institutions. But these were not guaranteed 
to turn out model white citizens. As Mhike shows, white youths resisted state 
intervention, often absconding from rehabilitative schools to return to their 
previous ways of life. George Bishi identifies workers of Italian, Greek and Por-
tuguese origins as another section of Southern Rhodesian society which was 
marked out as potentially threatening racial boundaries. In the post-war con-
text, the proximity in which these immigrants lived and worked with Africans 
was identified as disruptive by the state. Revealingly, this was compounded by 
their non-British origins – their ethnicity, evidently, identified them as poten-
tially racially nonconformist, amplifying the threat they posed.
In direct contrast to fears aroused by multiracial mixing and congenial-
ity, however, there was another, seemingly contradictory way in which white 
workers and the white poor were seen to threaten the established racial order. 
This was revealed in the course of the century. As local imperatives and interna-
tional pressures shifted, white authorities became increasingly concerned about 
lower-class whites’ ostensible propensity for hostility towards Africans. While 
earlier colonial histories readily provide an abundance of examples of crude 
and violent racism amongst political and social elites, racial prejudice – at least 
in public life – became more subtle in Southern Africa by the mid-twentieth 
century. For Southern Rhodesia, for instance, Alison Shutt has shown how 
perceived manners and social etiquette became an important part of white 
identity.45 Politicians in the Central African Federation stressed the policy of 
“partnership” between whites and Africans, Portugal championed the idea of a 
multiracial empire, and South Africans reformulated apartheid as the ostensibly 
equal but distinctly separate development of the country’s different “nations”. 
White elites across the region came to regard open expressions of racism as 
impolite and uncivilised – and potentially dangerous to political arrangements 
which cloaked continued white power in a veneer of nonracialism.
In this context, racial tensions were blamed on the actions of white work-
ers and the white poor. These lower-class whites were seen to inflame racial 
friction by their proximity to Africans, whom they were thought to abuse, be 
violent towards and compete with economically, thereby frustrating Africans’ 
aspirations. One contemporary apologist for the Central African Federation 
claimed racial tensions arose because ‘the attitude of the British artisan towards 
the black people is very much less liberal than that of other grades of [white] 
society’ and due to the behaviour of white women like ‘the mechanics’ wife, 
who has never had a servant’ and so treated servants with ‘downright con-
tempt’.46 In this book, Caio Simões de Araújo details similar complaints by 
white settler elites in Portuguese Mozambique that poor whites mistreated 
and antagonised Africans, disrupting the colony’s supposedly harmonious race 
relations. Here, the colonial vision of whites as a superior race guiding Africans 
towards civilisation and development was seen to be imperilled by those whites 
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who lived and worked alongside Africans. Similarly, in South Africa, the intran-
sigence of the white workers described by Van Zyl-Hermann and their hostility 
towards Africans was blamed for slowing economic growth and antagonising 
African workers.
The idea that both sociable contacts as well as overt hostility by poor and 
working-class whites disrupted racial hierarchies reveals the manner in which 
social distance from racial others was a necessary component of white identity 
throughout this period, even if the manner in which this was demonstrated or 
lived changed over time. Throughout, however, white workers and the white 
poor were regarded as unable to maintain proper relations with Africans. As one 
“liberal” colonial civil servant in Northern Rhodesia put it:
The basic difference between us and the settlers is probably that we feel 
that Europeans, as rulers and with their more absolute moral standards, 
have, by the principles of their own religion and culture, a responsibility 
towards the under-privileged.47
This is not to say that these nonhegemonic whites jettisoned their privileged 
position in the racial state. The disruption they caused was more in the line of 
indocility than transgression. This argument is most clearly advanced in the 
chapter by Bill Freund. The South African parastatals Iscor and Sasol formed a 
key part of the “civilised labour” policy first championed by the Pact Govern-
ment in the 1920s, and continued by the National Party after 1948. But civi-
lised labour was not simply a matter of employing white workers and paying 
them higher wages to maintain a certain standard of living. The workers them-
selves, Freund contends, needed to be “civilised” – disciplined and regulated to 
adopt certain ideas of productivity, temperance and respectability suited to the 
interests of the racial state and urban industrial capitalism. The company towns 
of the Vaal built to accommodate blue-collar families reflected such top-down 
efforts to create civilised white labour. But ‘regimentation bred rebelliousness’, 
Freund argues, and many white workers sought to escape the ‘dictates of civi-
lised labour’ by living outside the parastatal towns in peri-urban spaces, sup-
plementing their incomes with small-scale farming or illegal business activities, 
both of which involved employing or working with Africans. These disruptions 
did not, however, amount to actually transgressing social boundaries upholding 
the racial state. Rather than transgression, Freund argues, such white working-
class practices may be more accurately described as indolence. In other words, 
the decision of some – although hardly all – white workers to forsake the world 
of “civilised” working-class living for the physical and racial borderlands did 
not necessarily amount to a forsaking of their racial privilege and power, but a 
choice for exercising it on their own terms.
Indeed, throughout this book, there is really only one example of an individual 
who transgressed the boundaries of whiteness – Charles Taylor, the militant trade 
unionist who was deported from Southern Rhodesia in 1954 for instigating a 
strike on the Rhodesian Railways. As Nicola Ginsburgh relates, Taylor openly 
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criticised the treatment of coloured prisoners by the South African authorities, 
defended African workers’ right to strike, and expressed his lack of concern at 
borrowing money from an African or allowing his daughter to enter into an 
inter-racial marriage. In the eyes of the colonial authorities, these views demon-
strated a dangerous lack of racial propriety on Taylor’s part. Yet Taylor is clearly 
an exception – one of a handful of transgressions recorded in existing scholar-
ship on white racial states of working-class individuals rejecting or renouncing 
whiteness.48
As this book demonstrates, indocility was much more widespread than exist-
ing literature recognises. Duncan Money shows that the Copperbelt’s white 
mineworkers were a truculent, disruptive presence on the mines, quick to 
defend their autonomy against white managers. Yet even at their most militant, 
they did not question or transgress racial boundaries, and sought to maintain 
their status as a racially bound class. Neil Roos similarly highlights instances 
of indocility and even occasional defiance amongst lower-class Afrikaner civil 
servants, despite their superiors’ efforts to subject them to disciplinary inter-
ventions designed to eliminate dissidence, tighten ideological adherence and 
produce conformity. Roos offers examples of low-level officials acting com-
passionately across the colour line, of nurturing relationships of trust and even 
accepting support from blacks. Such instances demonstrate the limits of state’s 
capacity to manage whites lower down the public service hierarchy, and reveal 
the agency of white subalterns in a manner which challenges existing certain-
ties about apartheid society. At the same time, there is no evidence that such 
moments of indocility and defiance ever amounted to outright opposition to 
the racial state. In fact, Roos argues, the public service simultaneously provides 
a lens unto the complicity of lower-class whites in the production and main-
tenance of apartheid society through their participation in the institutions of 
the state.
White workers and poor whites therefore continued to threaten racial hier-
archies throughout the twentieth century. The fact that this involved perceived 
disruption as well as real indocility, but not actual transgression or sustained 
opposition to reigning racist practices, codes and behaviours, opens up the pos-
sibility of rethinking racial interaction and identities in the racial state. A focus 
on lower-class white agency reveals race as functioning not in terms of clear 
dividing lines or borders, as the mythology held, but in terms of zones or spaces 
in which working-class realities produced room for manoeuvre and space for 
ambiguity.
2 Discipline, rehabilitation – and the failure of state interventions
From the preceding discussion on class-based disruption, it is clear that both 
analytically and methodologically, nonhegemonic white agency cannot be 
examined without attention to the role and nature of the racial state. A sig-
nificant body of literature on Southern Africa’s white-ruled states around the 
turn of the twentieth century has focused on efforts to demolish racially mixed 
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urban areas, provide work or welfare for whites, assign children to their sup-
posed proper racial group, prevent Africans from owning property, and prohibit 
interracial intercourse – all motivated by the desire to uphold white power.49 
This revealed official uneasiness about whether whites’ ostensibly innate racial 
superiority – the legitimising basis for white minority rule – was indeed 
grounded in biological fact. But existing literature suggests that, by the middle 
of the century, unruly white elements within Southern Africa had been suc-
cessfully uplifted and co-opted into racial capitalism, and state attention could 
shift more intently to the suppression or appeasement of African demands. As 
already indicated, a number of contributions in this book challenge this view by 
tracking continued state efforts to discipline and rehabilitate lower-class whites 
perceived to be disrupting, or threatening to disrupt, the racial order. These 
continuities reveal the constructed, and historically and contextually contingent 
nature of race, even during the heyday of colonial power: “whites” in Southern 
Africa were not a natural category – they were only white in as far as they were 
socially constructed as such. The process of drawing racial boundaries, Hyslop 
argues, was crucial to how states constituted themselves. White workers and the 
white poor disrupted ostensibly self-evident racial hierarchies and categories, 
and states’ responses to such disruptions reveal the variety of forms the constitu-
tion of the racial state took.
Welfare and punitive measures such as those discussed by Mhike in the 
Southern Rhodesian context were part of a broader repertoire of intervention-
ist racial disciplining. In South Africa, the apartheid state had vast resources at 
its disposal. Roos directly links the dramatic expansion of white public sector 
employment during the 1950s to Afrikaner elites’ fears of the risk which poor, 
disabled or delinquent whites posed to the ideological and racial purity of 
the volk. The material upliftment of lower-class whites was driven not by the 
elite’s altruism but by nationalist fervour born of racial fear and by distrust and 
disdain resulting from class prejudice.50 Demonstrating one of the many con-
tradictions inherent in the apartheid project, efforts to absorb large numbers 
of relatively unskilled whites into the public service led to uneconomic forms 
of employment which clashed with reigning ideas about scientific manage-
ment and workplace efficiency. Politically and ideologically, too, the process 
was hardly watertight. Afrikaner elites apparently had little faith in their more 
humble brethren’s ability to provide the productive and ideological labour their 
project required off their own accord. Thus white civil servants were routinely 
subjected to often invasive and intimate forms of regulation and surveillance. 
The accommodation of lower-class whites into the apartheid state was clearly 
viewed as a necessary, if uncomfortable, requirement if white minority rule was 
to survive.
A number of chapters reveal the manner in which European settlers were 
perceived by the colonial state and by more established settlers as either waver-
ing in or even failing to be white. While this related to familiar colonial taboos 
of, for instance, fraternising with Africans or engaging in politics which chal-
lenged the racial status quo, it also extended beyond intentional behaviour – that 
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is, beyond those who, as it were, did not behave white. Recently settled Euro-
peans in particular – those whose racial status might have been expected to 
be most secure, having so recently arrived from Europe – could fall into racial 
ambiguity by virtue of circumstances beyond their control. The lack of agency 
inherent in such shifts highlights the manner in which dominant definitions 
of what constituted acceptable whiteness was inherently fluent and historically 
contingent. George Bishi shows how, in mid-century Southern Rhodesia, amid 
a massive state-led immigration campaign, this perceived failure was indexed by 
the notion of “undesirability”. The appearance of this term in contemporary 
sources may come as a surprise to historians of this region with its characteristic 
racial demography: surely, within the context of white minority rule, the force 
of numbers would dictate that no white could ever have been undesirable? Yet 
different colonies upheld different entry requirements depending on the kind 
of settler they sought to attract, even within the same empire. Requirements 
for prospective white settlers in Kenya were, for instance, more stringent than 
British colonies in Southern Africa.51 Bishi’s case study demonstrates that both 
standards of morality – ranging from respectability to outright criminality – as 
well as economic position shaped assessments of a person’s commitment to 
“colonial virtues” and hence their desirability within the settler community. 
Bishi notes several individual instances in which white settlers – all men – were 
deported on account of engaging in socially or morally unacceptable practices, 
including homosexuality, laziness, insubordination in the workplace, and paren-
tal neglect.
In the Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, too, Simões de 
Araújo shows how, in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘class inequality within white settler 
society informed understandings of race relations and was crucial in defining 
what counted as proper, civilized, or racist behaviour’. In this context, ethnicity 
played little role in defining ways of being white – new settlers were, after all, 
themselves Portuguese citizens, transplanted from the metropole to the colonial 
territories in an effort to bolster the colonial project amid advancing decol-
onisation on the continent. In this context, official discourses formulated in 
the metropole sought to reconceptualise the Portuguese empire as consciously, 
proudly and harmoniously racially integrated. The Salazar regime, with its pri-
orities of rural colonial development, regarded Portuguese peasants as the most 
suited agents of this “civilising” mission. Indeed, Simões de Araújo and Castelo 
both show how white settlers were regarded as agents of progress, harbingers of 
European civilisation and conservative Catholic virtue who would bring about 
economic development of the colonies.
But such efforts to obfuscate race by reformulating the Portuguese colonial 
project as a ‘Luso-tropical civilisation’ nevertheless saw culture or civilisation 
understood in racial terms. This was vividly demonstrated in the newly estab-
lished peasant colonatos, where established settlers and colonial officials soon 
objected to the manner in which the ignorance and poverty of the new immi-
grants threatened to disrupt the colony’s established racial hierarchy. Continuing 
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the discourse of “civilisation”, but with seeming disregard for that of “multicul-
turalism”, they argued that it was whites’ vocation to simultaneously instruct 
and rule over Africans, who should themselves pursue civilisation, but remain 
respectful and obedient. In the context of such discourses, “civilisation” and 
engaging in behaviour and practices deemed “civilising” in nature, became the 
way to be white, and peasant immigrants’ poverty and lack of education saw 
them fail to live up to this vocation. It emerges that both in the Portuguese 
and British colonial contexts, rural life and agricultural activity was regarded as 
particularly suited to or even rehabilitative for struggling whites. In Southern 
Rhodesia, rehabilitation schemes aimed to turn recalcitrant white youths into 
productive farmers. It was the failures on the part of some white settlers to 
live up to their vocation as bearers of superior civilisation which evoked state 
efforts to supervise, discipline and rehabilitate problematic whites. As the vari-
ous instances of subaltern white indocility discussed in this section demonstrate, 
such efforts, too, often failed.
3  The opportunities and limitations of physical and social mobility for 
nonhegemonic whites
Physical mobility has been a key focus of work about whites in earlier peri-
ods,52 and a number of contributions in this book demonstrate that it remained 
a central feature of many white working-class lives and communities through-
out the century, even in colonies generally regarded as established settler states. 
Hyslop’s chapter demonstrates this reality in three colourful and remarkable 
vignettes which follow the lives of individual working-class or poor white 
figures across the region. The physical mobility visible in these border-crossing 
lives is mirrored in a number of the subsequent chapters and runs against 
much of the accepted wisdom in existing literature. Global mobility was a 
crucial formative factor in the white working-class identities of miners in 
Northern Rhodesia. As Duncan Money shows, white mineworkers stayed on 
the Copperbelt for an average of less than six years before moving on to other 
workplaces in the imperial network. Effectively labour migrants, they were 
by definition transient and transitory. This shaped the very nature of white 
working-class mobilisation on the Copperbelt, and Money shows how in the 
context of the rising tide of African independence struggles, these white work-
ers showed little interest in propping up the white-run state in which they lived. 
To be sure, Copperbelt miners were no less racist than their counterparts to 
the south – but in contrast to the South African labour movement, their trade 
unions had remained largely autonomous from the state, and, as highly mobile 
workers, they were to a great degree detached from local political and citizen-
ship arrangements. Copperbelt miners’ white privilege was mainly determined 
by their relationship with management and resulting workplace arrangements. 
This resulted in a particular way of being white. Hence, during the 1963 strike, 
white workers emphasised their position as workers rather than whites, and 
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unperturbed by the challenge of black nationalist demands, even appealed to 
African labour and politicians. Yet they remained a racially delineated class, 
committed to white supremacy in the workplace, if not in the political sphere.
Mobility was also a necessary feature of the job and identity of the railway 
workers discussed by Nicola Ginsburgh. Ginsburgh contends that the fractures 
and divisions created by the arrival of working-class immigrants during this 
period remains a blind spot in the existing literature. As hers and a number 
of other chapters demonstrate, European immigration to settler colonies did 
not unproblematically strengthen the hand of the racial state. In labour terms, 
states struggled with the high attrition rates of immigrant European workers. 
Insufficiently committed to the colony and unsatisfied with what it had to 
offer, many workers resigned or simply absconded. Employers bemoaned the 
“wandering” tendency of white workers. And Ginsburgh shows that the physi-
cal mobility of its white labour force could pose further problems to the racial 
state. Unaccustomed to the racialised practices of the colonies, new arrivals 
were routinely ignorant of or resistant to the racialised behaviours they were 
expected to perform. Those who did not fall into line threatened to attract the 
ire of the state, trade union officials or fellow white workers. This could lead to 
cases of such whites being deported. Physical mobility and returning to Europe 
was, therefore, not always a matter of choice. Bishi’s chapter similarly shows 
that whites deemed “undesirable” by the colonial state ran the risk of being 
expelled, returning them to the often dire prospects they faced in their home 
countries.
Indeed, the socialisation of newly arrived white settlers was clearly a central 
concern for established white communities and racial states alike. Contempo-
rary observers in Rhodesia stressed the role of “old hands” in explaining the 
acceptable boundaries of behaviour to new settlers and enforcing those bound-
aries through social ostracism rather than state intervention.53 Labour disputes 
such as the 1954 firemen’s strike on the Rhodesia railways provide a helpful 
window onto the challenges the transient European workforce posed to the 
settler state in terms of their unfamiliarity with or potential hostility towards 
the racialised behaviours and practices of colonial life. Ginsburgh argues that 
the existing literature’s concentration on either rural or middle-class whites 
results in an overstatement of the degree of social cohesion and successful 
socialisation which characterised white society. A focus on the urban work-
ing class offers new insights. It reveals the contradictions inherent in the settler 
project – the colonial state’s dependence on white working-class immigrants 
to maintain racial labour hierarchies and ameliorate skills deficits, when these 
very immigrants held the potential of importing radical ideologies and non-
racialist sympathies into settler society. Arguably, scholars have been too quick 
to assume that immigrant workers rushed to embrace the wages of whiteness 
offered by the racial state. The acceleration of white immigration to the Central 
African Federation witnessed in the 1950s should therefore not unproblemati-
cally be assumed to have served the goal of strengthening white hegemony in 
the region.54
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White dominance in political, economic and social terms was an inter-
imperial concern, closely connected to prevailing conditions in Europe and 
colonial empires at large. It is therefore unsurprising that immigration featured 
as a central concern, despite the fact that the states under consideration here 
at times harboured very different understandings of themselves. As Simões de 
Araújo shows, the mid-century context of decolonisation saw the Portuguese 
empire under Salazar reconceptualise itself as an ostensibly multiracial unitary 
state variously consisting of European and overseas territories. This constitu-
tional and semantic effort at unifying the metropole and its colonial provinces 
came in the face of the rapid collapse of British and French imperial power. 
Simões de Araújo and Castelo’s chapters demonstrate the Portuguese state’s 
concern with promoting immigration to Mozambique and Angola in the con-
text of advancing African independence. Indeed, Simões de Araújo identifies 
an ‘explosion of efforts and debates’ on emigration from Portugal to its colo-
nies, to the extent that by the late 1950s, the Portuguese National Assembly 
viewed this as ‘the fundamental question’ dominating all other issues. The same 
period saw Southern Rhodesia, too, launch an immigration campaign in a bid 
to increase its white population and address skills shortages. Opportunities for 
physical mobility offered by transnational industrial and imperial connections 
were, therefore, not just pursued as an individual life choice. It was also actively 
promoted and driven by imperial states for whom white immigration formed 
a key part of strategies for political consolidation and economic development, 
both overseas and in the post-war metropole, and hence involved substantial 
public investment.
Physical mobility, crucially, created opportunities for social mobility and was 
often entered into for precisely this reason. As in the case of Portuguese Africa, 
many of the skilled workers who travelled to the Rhodesias were attracted by 
the upward social mobility which colonial employment promised, and which 
was embodied by prominent figures like railway fireman-turned-prime minis-
ter Roy Welensky. But material and social ascendance was neither universal nor 
automatic. Colonial newspapers reproached new arrivals for having too high 
expectations. Ginsburgh demonstrates the hardship suffered by many immi-
grant workers, with many in employment becoming reliant on relief funds – 
evidence that the colonial government recognised that some workers were 
struggling to maintain a European standard of living. When the railway worker 
Charles Taylor was deported, he lost no time informing the British working-
class public of the fallacy of social mobility in the colonies. In addition to insuf-
ficient pay, strikers complained of inadequate public services, housing shortages, 
and the disdain which they were treated by other classes of whites. Clearly, 
racial identity was not enough to ensure upwards social mobility or social cohe-
sion in the racial state.
Like “undesirable” whites being deported back to their European homelands, 
social mobility, too, could potentially be reversed. Van Zyl-Hermann’s chapter 
reveals the anxiety which labour reforms evoked amongst white workers in 
South Africa at a time when assertive African labour movements and economic 
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recession already posed threats to blue-collar whites’ status and material posi-
tion. Hyslop’s three vignettes, too, demonstrate that white workers’ upwards 
social mobility and the so-called “solving” of white poverty in South Africa was 
never as solid as scholars tend to assume.
This book demonstrates that an integrated history of white societies in 
Southern Africa is possible, and becomes particularly clear when the historian’s 
focus is broadened to include issues of class alongside race. In contrast to pre-
vailing understandings which cast the period of white minority rule in terms 
of a racialised binary power structure, the chapters presented here render vis-
ible the fact that racial identity was never the sole marker of social status and 
power in the region. In context of the racial state, individuals, communities and 
classes identified as workers and were conversely identified as poor, “undesir-
able” and deviant. For this hyper-visible, numerically small and – for most of 
the century – politically dominant group, class disrupted as much as race bound 
together in twentieth-century Southern Africa.
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By 1910, the countries of Southern Africa represented more than just geograph-
ical contiguity; they were coalescing into an economically connected region. 
In that year, the line of rail from the south reached the mines of Katanga in the 
southern Congo, joining Elisabethville to a steam-powered transport network 
stretching through the Rhodesias, to the South African ports and Lourenco 
Marques. Yet too often the history of the unified South African state, which 
was being established at the same time, has been dealt with in relative isolation 
from the region, in a kind of South African exceptionalism. And amongst the 
subjects that South African historiography treats of, that of the “white working 
class” and “poor whites” has been particularly strongly assumed to reflect the 
peculiarities of the country. In superficial accounts, the notoriously confused 
slogan of the Rand 1922 miners’ strike, ‘Workers of the World, Unite and Fight 
for a White South Africa’, is sometimes presented as a kind of emblem of the 
uniquely bizarre history of South African white labour. But the white labour 
question in South Africa was much less unique in its dynamics than is often 
assumed. What happened within the boundaries of the South African state was 
paralleled in, and connected to, a wider world. So how could the question of 
white workers in southern Africa look if we thought about it in a transnational, 
Southern African framework? Does the manner in which “subaltern” whites 
figured in the social order and politics of the South African racial state, between 
its formation in 1910 and its political democratisation in 1994, appear different 
if reconsidered in relation to what we know about similar groups in the other 
countries of the region?
There are two relatively obvious ways in which such a rethinking can pro-
ceed. The first is to take a comparative approach. There were for example some 
clear similarities and important differences in how political issues played out 
in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa. But this method has its limita-
tions. It tends to assume the existence of neatly separate entities which can be 
compared. This can lead to attributing greater coherence to what transpired 
within territorial boundaries than is necessarily warranted, and to ignore the 
way in which networks of power, and social struggles, spilled across national 
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or imperial borders. In Southern Africa, with its unfenced and often thinly 
patrolled borderlines, and its long-lasting flows of capital and labour across 
imperial boundaries, it is especially misleading. Both workers and those who 
sought to dominate them, cooperated and competed across borders to a far 
greater extent than a nationally constrained imagination allows for. So it is 
crucial to consider, as a second approach, the connections which contempo-
rary scholarship calls “transnational”. But I also want to pursue a third axis 
of inquiry. Workers, capitalists and state leaders responded not just to local or 
regional concerns, but to the great global ideological struggles over political 
and economic questions and to the economic conjunctures that accompanied 
them. I call this dimension “contemporaneity”: here one considers the way 
in which political actors framed what they were doing in relation to global-
scale ideologies and to events to which they may or may not have had direct 
connections. Actors read, or creatively misread, the wider world for their own 
purposes. White workers and white elites often made reactionary choices – but 
they were not parochial. They often had an astute awareness of the global politi-
cal contexts in which they operated.
This chapter then, uses the three methodological tools of comparison, the 
study of connections and the study of contemporaneity to reconsider the litera-
ture on the poor white and white working class in South Africa in a regional 
and a global context. What questions though are we attempting to answer? 
Three lives which cross regional boundaries provide a starting point for formu-
lating lines of inquiry.
E.J. Brown came from Australia to the Rand before the First World War. He 
participated in the leadership of the great New Kleinfontein strike of white 
workers in 1913, which resulted in a bloody general strike in Johannesburg 
and short-term victories for the miners. They were crushed by the imposition 
of martial law in the next year. Brown moved on to the Katanga mines of the 
Belgian Congo. There, in 1919 to 1920 he led an extraordinarily militant strike 
wave of the predominantly British and South African white miners around 
Elisabethville, which included a dynamite attack on the office of the attorney 
general and the blowing up of a trestle bridge and railway engine. Deported 
back to South Africa, Brown last shows up in the historical record in a 1921 
letter from the embryo South African Communist Party to the Comintern 
headquarters in Moscow, listing their leading militants.1
“Anna Prinsloo” was born in 1916 in the Afrikaner community of Humpata 
in Angola. These Boers lived in an only partially monetised economy, grazing 
their cattle and trading and bartering with the Portuguese, the Moemereya 
and the Ovambo. They were targeted for “saving” as “poor whites” by Afri-
kaner nationalist ideologues and in 1928 many, including Anna’s family, were 
persuaded to move to South African-ruled South West Africa. Anna’s father 
was allocated some land there, but it was inadequate to support the family. The 
teenage girl, who was not fully literate, was forced to seek work as a cleaner and 
washerwoman first in Gobabis, then in Windhoek. She had two children, pos-
sibly out of wedlock. Taking her daughter to Cape Town for medical treatment, 
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she was a domestic worker for a doctor in Rondebosch, before happily moving 
to a much better paid job in a garment factory. Returning to South West, she 
eked out a living making charcoal on her father’s farm. In 1945, Anna married 
a marginal Afrikaner farmer from Ghanzi in Bechuanaland and moved with 
him to the British territory. The struggling couple tried to break into small 
business: they set up a modest transport business and Anna borrowed money to 
run a café for African migrant workers. After her husband’s death left her deep 
in debt, Anna, who had acquired a heavy-duty license, went back to the trans-
port business. She drove her truck along the desert roads accompanied by four 
or five African employees, sleeping on the ground at the side of the vehicle by 
night. By 1973, she was planning to take out citizenship in the now independ-
ent Botswana.2
Born in 1930, Maria de Lurdes Delgado grew up in central Portugal’s Beira 
Baixa region. She emigrated to Mozambique in 1953 to marry a local man 
who had gone to work as a foreman on the railways. Maria, who had not 
completed primary school, took this step to escape a life of manual labour in 
her tyrannical father’s vegetable garden. Daniel however turned out to be a 
brutal and unfaithful husband. Maria spent fifteen miserable years in remote rail 
stops in the Mozambiquan interior, suffering illness, a sense of social isolation, 
and fear of the animals, snakes and scorpions. The couple had two children, 
but their daughter contracted polio. Maria took her to Johannesburg several 
times for treatment: there she felt humiliated by her lack of English and her 
struggle to pay the bills. By 1968, alarmed by the Frelimo insurgency, Maria 
and Daniel decided to move to South Africa. They had to evade the secret 
police in order to do so, as emigration was not permitted by the authoritarian 
Portuguese regime. In Johannesburg, Daniel found work as a welder. Maria’s 
daughter became pregnant by a relative, and Maria took on raising the child. 
Then Daniel and their son were in a terrible car accident. The boy survived, but 
Daniel died. Only now did Maria’s life change for the better. Her house was 
paid off by Daniel’s insurance, and she also received a small but significant cash 
payment. She found work and learned to drive. Maria then met a Portuguese 
refugee from Angola, a kind man called Fernando. They married and were 
happy together. The couple moved to East London and opened a restaurant, 
which was highly successful. For the first time in her life Maria experienced a 
modest prosperity, and her children also did well in South Africa, establishing 
middle-class careers for themselves.3
The by now very considerable social history literature on South Africa has 
paid a great deal of attention to the questions of the histories of poor and 
working-class whites. But the stories of E.J. Brown, “Anna Prinsloo” and Maria 
Delgado are striking because they run, if not exactly in contradiction, then at 
tangents, to the accepted wisdom. On the one hand work on the white work-
ing class in South Africa has largely concentrated on the labour movements 
created by in the early decades of the Twentieth Century. This literature has 
explored the vicious class conflicts between white unions and the Rand mine 
owners and other capitalists.4 It has emphasised the racial protectionist politics 
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of these unions, and has provided an understanding of how the leadership of a 
number of them were captured by Afrikaner nationalists in the 1940s.5 On the 
other hand scholarship has shown how poverty and unemployment amongst 
whites during the period of urbanisation in the first three decades of the cen-
tury, provided the context for the political construction by white, and especially 
Afrikaner, intellectuals of the “poor white question”.6 The gap between the 
racial status and the economic position of a white underclass was seen as a 
threat to white dominance. Across the range of work carried out in these fields, 
there has tended to be a belief that these social cleavages in white South African 
society were ultimately overcome by the action of the South African state. The 
1930s saw the mobilisation of the radical wing of Afrikaner nationalism under 
D.F. Malan around the poor white question. It is now widely assumed that the 
policies of the Apartheid government, initiated from 1948 by Malan as prime 
minister, eliminated white poverty and created mass-scale transformation of 
white workers and poor people – or at least their children – into the middle, 
professional and business classes. This view that the white working class ceased 
to be a significant social or political force in South Africa is what I would call 
the “thesis of incorporation”. But as will be shown, this is a mischaracterisation 
of the changes in the class structure of South Africa, and a misreading of its 
political dynamics. And it is equally misleading when it is applied to the other 
countries of the region.
The stories of these border-crossing lives provoke different kinds of questions 
from those which have conventionally been posed. Should not the migration 
of white workers across national boundaries in the region become a more cen-
tral part of our understanding of white labour questions? Does Brown’s career 
point to a white labour movement history which need to be read regionally? 
Does that career also not suggest the need to give greater weight to the influ-
ence of global forms of labour political radicalism on white workers Southern 
Africa? At the same time Anna and Maria’s lives remind us that the history of 
white workers cannot be conflated either with the histories of white labour 
organisation or of Afrikaner nationalism. Why have the histories of Portu-
guese workers and other continental European-origin ethnic groups not been 
much integrated into the stories we have told about white labour? Was the 
upwards mobility which many white working-class people – including Anna 
and Maria – certainly did experience across time actually as solid as is often 
assumed: or was it – as in Anna’s case – in reality somewhat tenuous? And if 
there was a transformation in the conditions of the white poor in South Africa, 
is the standard narrative about the role of Afrikaner nationalism in it really justi-
fied? Anna, after all, despite being the recipient of the beneficence of an early 
and energetic manifestation of the politics of poor-white-saving, and despite 
certainly partaking in some of the racial attitudes of white Southern Africans, 
seems to have been impervious to the appeals of Afrikaner nationalism. Turning 
her back on the considerable racialised social benefits she would have enjoyed 
in South West or South Africa, she saw her future in a now-independent black 
ruled state. Just how incorporated were the white working class?
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Artificial boundary-drawing and naturalised racial 
categories
We need to question the tendency to naturalise the very terms “white working 
class” and “poor white”. To be “white” was not of course to possess any particu-
lar biological attribute or national origin. To take a striking example the term 
“gens du couleur” (people of colour) was commonly and indeed legally used in 
the Belgian Congo’s Elisabethville to denote the marginal Italian, Greek and 
Portuguese traders who catered to African customers.7 Colour could, as it were, 
be acquired or lost. White people were simply people who the social order 
called white. Who was included or excluded from such a category was a matter 
of extremely arbitrary historical contingency.
There were important divergences in the racial ideologies of different colo-
nial states, which affected the way white identity was managed – and these 
techniques themselves varied across time. This made processes of drawing racial 
boundaries crucial to the way states constituted themselves. The existence of 
people called “white” whose standard of living was similar to or below that of 
colonial subjects, and the physical and cultural proximity to colonial subjects 
that this inherently involved, was almost universally seem by dominant groups 
as threatening the assumptions of superior white propensity to achievement.8 
But very different strategies were pursued to “solve” this problem.
“The Poor” has historically tended to be a category imposed from outside: 
through it, dominant classes constitute groups of people as objects of charity, or 
of coercion, or as targets for projects of social reform, and in the process rein-
force their own power. In Southern Africa category of “poor white” tended to 
be one imposed from above on working-class and lumpenproletarian people 
by elites, seeking both to name them as a problem for to be solved, and as a 
group to be mobilised around the imputed racial identity. This often – although 
not always – involved removing them from zones of social ambiguity in which 
they were living in boundary-blurring proximity to people designated as “non-
white”. The term “Poor White” seeks to displace a potential class identity with 
a racial identity by constituting poverty as an anomaly in racial status rather 
than a product of capitalist social relations.
The “white working class” on the other hand tended initially to be self-
designated, as white workers sought to leverage prevailing racial discourses to 
demand particular privileges on the basis of an assumed racial identity. This self-
identification was however often manipulated by elites, who, in the interests of 
increasing their own political advantage, sought to move white workers to more 
intense forms of boundary policing. One could thus say that poor whites were 
workers who were told from above that their racial identity was more important 
than their poverty, while the white working class were workers who demanded 
of capital and the state that their racial status should be specially protected in the 
labour market (sometimes with encouragement from more privileged strata).
The different ways in which racial boundaries were drawn in different states 
had real effects. There is a tendency to assume that because all the states we are 
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looking at here were racist – as indeed they were – the differences in the ways 
in which they operated can be regarded as minor. But this is an error – the dif-
ferences were real and significant. Perhaps the most important example arises in 
the case of the Portuguese colonies after the Second World War. As the Portu-
guese government turned towards the new colonial policy, it adopted an ideol-
ogy based in the writings of the Brazilian scholar Gilberto Freyre. His term, 
“Lusotropicalism” put forward a notion of the Portuguese colonial enterprise 
as based in a supposed natural genius of the nation for racial boundary-crossing. 
This was a blatant attempt to sell the Portuguese Empire to a world in which 
narratives of racial superiority were under attack. And it has consequently been 
rightly debunked by many scholars, who have correctly pointed out the racist 
nature of the imperial project.9 Yet this debunking can lead to a neglect of the 
ways in which Portuguese policies were actually at variance with those of South 
Africa or Southern Rhodesia. Boundaries were more porous in the Portuguese 
colonies and that created a set of different dynamics in the social situation of 
the white poor and working class. Schools and working-class residential areas 
were not rigidly segregated, whereas in the South Africa and Rhodesia of the 
time they were. All countries in the region were racially structured societies, but 
their racial structures worked in significantly different ways.
Nor were “whites” a solid bloc of equal status. There were also aspects of 
intra-white ethnic or status distinction which cut across the logic of a primary 
racial identification, such as the very intense Anglophone – Afrikaner divisions 
in the British empire countries. The Portuguese attempt to create a colonial 
community was bedevilled by the self-inflicted wound of a difference in sta-
tus between the Portuguese-born, referred to as “first class whites”, and the 
colonial-born descendants of settlers, known as “second class whites”.10 The 
latter were not eligible for significant positions in the colonial administration 
and had no automatic right to travel to Portugal. Although the legal distinction 
was set aside late in 1950, it was embedded in settler culture as a status distinc-
tion right to the end of Portuguese rule.11 Moreover, in South Africa and the 
Rhodesias, anti-Semitism and intense hostility to Portuguese, Greeks and other 
white minorities, often underpinned by racist ideologies, were quite common.
The persistence of class
The persistence of class amongst Southern African whites, and its continuing 
political effects are important to recognise. The South African white occupa-
tional structure remained strikingly pyramidal right to the end of apartheid. 
And intra-white class differentiation was even more strikingly the case in the 
Portuguese colonies, especially Angola, where there was a very substantial 
marginalised white underclass throughout the colonial period. Class divisions 
amongst whites continued to affect politics to the end of the racial states, in 
ways which cannot be understood purely by focusing on the racial politics side 
of the equation. This is not in any way to diminish the centrality of the racial 
systems, and the extent of the social advantages they gave to those identified 
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as white. But it is to say that we cannot assume class differentiation amongst 
whites declined into relative social and political insignificance. The thesis of 
incorporation is far from valid either for South Africa, or for other countries 
in the region.
Certainly there was at particular times, large scale white upwards social 
mobility or improvement in living standards. In South Africa, the white work-
ing class experienced remarkable levels of wage increases between the 1940s 
and the early 1970s. In that country, there was also a growth of the white mid-
dle class, in a halting and uneven way from the interwar years, and spectacularly 
in the 1940s to 1970s. In Southern Rhodesia there was also widespread growth 
in white affluence in the post-Second World War years. Portuguese colonists 
improved their economic and educational position in the same period com-
pared to the population in the home country (although not to the same extent 
as white South Africans or people in the richer west European countries).12 
However, it is important not to fall for the idea of a universal prosperity or 
the disappearance of class. Moreover, there was a clear economic decline of 
the working class in the region from the 1970s. The economic security of the 
white working class in Rhodesia faltered in the last decade of white rule. In 
South Africa, by the 1980s, with a turn to free marketisation, very visible white 
poverty had reappeared.
It is important to note though for all the relative prosperity and upwards 
social mobility of the 1940s to the 1970s, neither South African nor the Por-
tuguese colonial whites were predominantly middle class. In South Africa most 
white employees remained in working-class positions. In the mid-1960s whites 
occupied the vast majority of artisan and apprentice positions, three quarters of 
all routine white collar jobs and nearly half of the mostly low-skilled security 
jobs, as well as constituting significant minorities of semi-skilled operatives and 
low level service workers. Only at the lowest level of unskilled jobs, were whites 
more or less absent.13 In the Portuguese colonies class differentials were even 
more striking. In the Angolan cities of the 1950s there was a clear elite layer, 
living in almost exclusively white suburbs. But below that was a very modest 
middle stratum of artisans, clerks, minor civil servants, poor farmers and skilled 
transport workers. In stark contrast to the rigid social segregation prevailing in 
the South Africa and Rhodesia of the time, this group were somewhat socially 
integrated with the displaced descendants of the old, mixed-race and black 
trading elite and the assimilados (Africans granted Portuguese citizen status). 
The poorest whites – unskilled workers, struggling craftsmen, taxi drivers and 
the indigent, lived in the slums of Luanda, Lobito and other towns amongst 
black and mixed-race neighbours.14 In Mozambique during the 1970s, there is 
evidence of significant class distinction in white society; for example, in urban 
schools, white working-class pupils experienced a strong sense of social dis-
crimination, and unlike the white elite often had social links with black pupils.15
Even at the end of apartheid, it is important to note how large the section 
of South African whites who had not risen into the middle classes remained. 
Notwithstanding changes in production processes towards techniques such as 
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modularised concrete building, which did not require traditional artisan skills, 
white numbers in the artisan trades and apprenticeships remained steady. There 
were over half a million white clerical employees, with women occupying 
a significantly increasing proportion of the workforce. There were still large 
numbers of white semi-skilled operatives and the numbers of white security 
employees had actually grown.16
Working-class access to political power
Varying forms of white working-class access to political power and the differ-
ent levels of organization that allowed, was crucial to the political shaping of 
these societies. Participation in formal political systems and meaningful unions 
was central in white workers’ ability to shape politics, and the degree of power 
they exercised had real effects. This is demonstrated in a negative way by the 
direction of events in the Portuguese colonies. With the imposition of a dicta-
torship in metropolitan Portugal in 1926, which was to last for another nearly 
five decades, Portuguese-origin workers in the colonies lost the democratic 
rights that they had enjoyed and exercised during the liberal republic founded 
in 1910. In Lourenco Marques the substantial wage and benefit structure built 
up over previous decades by the port and railway workers was demolished.17 In 
1930–1 serious political disturbances in Angola by political deportees, provin-
cial autonomists and soldiers was crushed by the army, and troublesome white 
working-class radicals were repatriated to Portugal in significant numbers.18 
While it is possible to debate whether Antonio Salazar’s Estado Novo (New 
State), founded in 1934, was exactly fascist, it certainly belonged to the family 
of European authoritarian governments of the interwar years, and it outlasted 
all of them except Franco’s Spain.19 Although political activity was not entirely 
suppressed, white workers lacked any form of meaningful unionisation or polit-
ical representation. Bogus sindicatos substituted for labour organisation and local 
government was subordinated to the central state. Not only did this repression 
prevent workers from shaping the politics of the colonial era, but it also meant 
that they lacked the political resources to impose their demands in the moment 
of the collapse of the empire in 1974–5. In September 1974 a hopelessly bun-
gled settler coup in Mozambique against the Portuguese revolutionary govern-
ment’s political handover to Frelimo, crumbled rapidly. It precipitated a mass 
flight of whites to South Africa.20
Somewhat similarly, in the Congo, during the early 1920s, mine manage-
ment replaced white South African and British workers with Belgians, espe-
cially economically vulnerable miners from the depressed Hainaut region. On 
short-term contracts and cowed by the prospect of unemployment at home, 
they remained quiescent throughout the inter-war years. Elizabethville became 
a conservative Catholic-dominated enclave.21 There was some brief labour 
insurgency by Belgian workers at the start of the 1940s, precipitated by the 
special conditions of wartime, but by and large they had little opportunity to 
express themselves politically throughout the rest of the colonial period.
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By contrast, white workers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, having 
attained effective participation in the parliamentary system from 1910 and 1923 
respectively, were at times able to use it quite effectively to advance their per-
ceived interests. The South African Labour Party (SALP), a trade union based 
party rooted in the British immigrant working class was able to conclude an 
alliance with General Hertzog’s National Party to form a “Pact” government 
in 1924. The SALP’s influence on the policies of the Hertzog cabinet resulted 
in pro-white labour legislation that formed the template for the policies that 
were to prevail for over five decades. The creation of a parastatal electricity 
provider and iron and steel company was carried out with a special mission 
to provide jobs for working-class whites. The favouring of white workers on 
the state owned railway system drove out workers of colour from unskilled 
jobs on a huge scale. The “rate for the job” protecting white artisans against 
African labour competition was institutionalised. Wage boards were empow-
ered to uphold minimum wages, and this was used to push employers to hire 
more white labour, creating a considerable influx of white Afrikaner women 
into industrial work in this period. Most importantly of all, the Hertzogites 
implemented an extensive system of white pensions, disability grants and wel-
fare payments. This general approach was maintained and actually extended by 
the coalition of Hertzog with Smuts from 1933. The 1934 Slums Act created 
the basis for extensive social housing construction for whites. And when a now 
more socio-economically pragmatic Smuts took over in 1939 he continued 
in the same direction.22 The idea that the post-1948 Nationalist government 
“saved” the white working class is greatly exaggerated and owes a lot to its own 
propaganda. After 1948, Malan and his successors merely continued established 
social policies, with a somewhat higher level of spending and a greater emphasis 
on Afrikaner ethnic interests.
The Rhodesias represent an intermediate case, with an initial very hostile 
environment for the white working class later shifting to a more hospitable 
one – although never quite as favourable as in the South African case. In the 
1920s and 1930s, Southern Rhodesia was a particular bastion of rigidly free 
market politics. In these years white workers there suffered repeated wage cuts 
and retrenchments. State health care, pensions, housing and welfare services 
were almost entirely lacking. Management and government took a tough stance 
towards labour organisations, in the context of a generally depressed economy.23 
Unsuccessful white farmers also suffered economic devastation as commodity 
prices declined: experiences of absolute white rural indigence are recounted by 
Daphne Anderson in her autobiographical novel The Toerags.24 In response, the 
Rhodesian Labour Party became strong, capturing about a third of the seats 
in the legislature by 1939. The Second World War marked an important break, 
with Huggins absorbing some Labour leaders into his government and turning 
towards a more economically interventionist state.
Roy Welensky was able to use his position as an originally labour-based leader 
of the whites in Northern Rhodesia during the 1940s, to leverage a massive 
political transformation of the region. The son of a ne’er-do-well Jewish father 
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and an Afrikaner waitress mother, and famously, in his own description “100% 
British”, Welensky had grown up on the literal wrong side of the tracks in his 
parents’ seedy boarding house on Salisbury’s Pioneer Avenue. As a teenager he 
trained as engine driver and became a boxing champion. He was an activist in 
the railway union, where he became steeped in the classical literature of the 
British socialism. After being transferred to Broken Hill in Northern Rhodesia 
as a punishment for his union militancy, he applied his considerable political 
talents to become leader of the labour group in the legislature and from there 
was able to become dominant figure in Northern Rhodesia settler politics. It 
was from his base in the labour movement, and success in the legislature that 
Roy Welensky launched his bid for a Central African Federation.25 Welensky’s 
project was perhaps the most ambitious to emerge from the world of white 
labourism in the modern history of Southern Africa. His aim was, through the 
Federation, to unite the settler political power of Southern Rhodesia with the 
now fabulous copper-mining based wealth of Northern Rhodesia.26 It was 
the growing presence of Afrikaner workers in the Rhodesias that seems to have 
been crucial to the British government’s ultimate accession to the Federation. 
Particularly after Malan’s “Purified” Nationalists took power in 1948, the fear 
of both British Conservatives and British Labour was that rejection of the set-
tlers’ demands would drive the Rhodesian whites into the hands of the South 
Africans, creating a huge and aggressive white geopolitical bloc that would 
come into conflict with future independent African states, and impose South 
African – style policies internally. The misguided British conclusion that the 
Federal structure would allow Westminster to moderate racial policy, gradually 
create greater African representation and resist South African influence, pro-
vided Welensky with the gap in which he could pursue his policy.27
Regional working classes and global politics
White working-class political organisations need to be understood not just 
as local phenomena but as possessing specific links across the region, and into 
the outside world, which had important local effects. Before the First World 
War, there was a global British labour network, connecting the settler colonies 
and the empire, and it articulated an ideology of white labourism, in which 
colonised workers were seen as a “cheap labour” threat to white workers. This 
programme for protecting the position of white workers was crucial to the 
political development of South Africa and Australia especially, but was also 
largely accepted in Britain itself.28
In Southern Africa the period from 1910 to 1923 was one of harsh confron-
tation between, on the one hand, politically powerful capital and weak but vio-
lent states, and on the other militant white workers, most of whom supported 
racial protectionism. The great strikes of white workers on the Witwatersrand 
in 1913 and 1914 and the insurrectionary Rand general strike of 1922 were 
the high points of this movement. The South African Labour Party became 
a powerful embodiment of this politics. Because of the multiple connections 
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of British immigrant and white South African activists to other countries in 
the region, this militant mood spread. On the Rhodesian railways and mines, 
there were large scale strikes in 1919 and 1920. A Rhodesian Labour Party 
emerged with an anti-big business message.29 And as we have seen, the period 
also saw militant action by British and South African workers on the mines of 
Katanga. White Labourism never again returned to this level of mobilisation, 
but it continued to be a transnational force in the region. Their mobilisation of 
British and South African workers on the Northern Rhodesia mines in 1940, 
for example, laid the basis for the highly favourable post-war employment con-
ditions which they attained.30
But white labourism was not the only global trend to influence white 
labour in the region. There are four other important international networks 
that are notable in Southern Africa. The first is that of the syndicalism of 
the period of roughly 1910 to 1923. Small numbers of Syndicalists, with 
their brand of revolutionary trade unionism, emerging out of the British and 
Australasian movements of the early twentieth century were often in those 
years able to seize the leadership of significant numbers of workers, even 
though unionists were usually more conservative or white labourist than they. 
The Syndicalists’ effective organisational tactics – although not their relatively 
advanced views of racial politics – attracted broad support at moments of 
crisis. A number of key individuals in the Rhodesias had been exposed to 
international syndicalist militancy in Britain or South Africa in the pre-war 
years. For instance, Jack Keller, the leader of the Rhodesian railwaymen and 
founder of the Rhodesian Labour Party had participated in the 1911 British 
railway strike.31 Union militancy fed into a wave of white populism, as white 
workers played a prominent part in defeating a proposed unification with 
South Africa in the 1922 referendum, with activists viewing the Smuts gov-
ernments repression of the Rand miners’ strike as a manifestation of the fate 
that awaited Rhodesian workers.
There was also a strain of syndicalism in the Portuguese colonies, but on a 
more minor scale and inhabiting a different, Iberian cultural world. Syndical-
ist activism and industrial action was particularly strong amongst the railway 
workers of Angola (especially Lobito) and in the port and railway system of 
Lourenco Marques.32 The role of syndicalists – many of them after 1917 sym-
pathetic to the Russian Revolution – and the intensity of the labour struggles 
up to 1923, is crucial to understanding the intensity of upper class fear of the 
potential for white workers to be drawn into potentially dangerous political 
paths, across a very long subsequent period.
Secondly, partially but not entirely overlapping with white labourism, the 
mainstream of British social democratic politics and trade unionism had con-
siderable links to labour groupings and unions in Southern Africa into the 
1950s. Gradualist projects of social reform and Fabian attempts to moderate 
the harshness of the racial politics of empire had some impact in these circles. 
In the early 1940s, both South African and Rhodesian Labour Parties reflected 
the contemporary social policy radicalisation of the British Labour Party and 
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the shift in the progressive British intelligentsia towards a more critical view 
of “scientific” racism. The SALP Mayoress of Johannesburg, Jessie McPherson, 
and the labour-connected mayoress of Salisbury (Harare), Gladys Maasdorp, for 
instance, were leaders who sought to move their organisations away from racist 
policies and towards a full social democratic programme.33
Thirdly, there were international communist networks, which though thinly 
represented in the white labour movement, attained positions of considerable 
influence on white workers at particular moments. Particularly remarkable 
was the success of the communist led servicemen’s organisation, the Spring-
bok Legion, in winning support amongst white South African troops in the 
North Africa in 1941–3.34 The figure of Frank Maybank stands at the conflu-
ence of white labourist, social democratic and communist political strands: a 
British-born Australian Communist who led the crucially important, racially 
protectionist 1940 white miners’ strike in Northern Rhodesia, and who very 
successfully mobilised the leadership of the British Labour Party and trade 
unions to defend him.35 There was also a small scale level of underground 
activism of the Portuguese Communist Party in the Colonies. There was clan-
destine Portuguese communist labour activism in Angola and amongst white 
dockworkers in Lourenco Marques, which played a role in strikes there in the 
1940s and 1950s. Dissent also surfaced in the form of the particular popularity 
in Angola and Mozambique of the leftist General Humberto Delgado, whose 
opposition shook the regime, first from within, and later from exile, before his 
assassination in 1965.36
Fourthly, on the other side of the spectrum, the influence of international 
right-wing anti-communist trade unionism – strong especially in US, Australian 
and to a lesser extent British unionism in the late 1940s and 1950s – has perhaps 
been underestimated. Anti-Communism had a palpable effect on white trade 
unionists in the Rhodesias and South Africa between the 1940s and 1960s. 
Within the Afrikaner nationalists drive to take over the South African unions, 
Anti-communism was an ideological commitment of its own, and not just a 
cover for nationalism and racism. There was a genuine sense of fear that white 
workers were succumbing to the left-wing ideas of some of their union lead-
ers. Senator Jan De Klerk characterised the campaign as an attempt to ‘stem 
this wild flood of Communism’.37 Roy Welensky forms an interesting bridge, 
through anti-Communism, between the Southern African white labour tradi-
tion of the first half of the twentieth century and the rise of the international far 
right in the second half. By the early 1960s, Welensky attracted a significant sec-
tion of British Conservative parliamentarians for his last-ditch attempt to save 
the Central African Federation: they included the young Margaret Thatcher.38 
In Southern Rhodesia, in the late 1950s, white workers, reacting against the 
relatively liberal and paternalist racial policies of Prime Minister Garfield Todd, 
swung behind the populist racial protectionism. They ended up in the fold of Ian 
Smith’s Rhodesian Front, which was saturated with “anti-communist”ideology 
and became closely aligned with the British and American extreme right. 
Anti-Communism has often been assumed to have been simply a cover 
Workers called white, classes called poor 35
for racial ideology in the region, but it was also a force with a life and political 
dynamics of its own.39
The ambiguities of immigration
Fear of the white working class and the creation of a poor white stratum was 
a major brake on the immigration of Europeans to the region throughout 
this historical period. One would perhaps assume on logical grounds that the 
authorities of racially constituted states where the politically dominant group 
was a minority, would have wanted to boost their numbers. Yet for much of the 
period, elites held back because they saw incomers as potentially disruptive ele-
ments, political radicals, or as disturbers of racial boundaries. The view was put 
in extreme form in the early 1930s by Belgian Congo Governor Pierre Ryck-
mans, who opined that ‘the “poor whites”, blancs pauvres, are pariahs. . . . Send-
ing emigrants to the Congo in order for them to reconstruct their lives equals 
condemning them to the destiny of natives’.40 In Southern Rhodesia, the new 
state authorities took an extremely sceptical view of immigrants, driven by fears 
of the “poor white” problem. This was underpinned by concerns about the 
perennially depressed condition of the economy and thus the need to protect 
white Rhodesian unemployed. In the 1930s Rhodesian Prime Minister Hug-
gins quite explicitly articulated the view that Rhodesia could not absorb large 
numbers of white immigrants; settler society was not under immediate politi-
cal threat and Huggins’s view was that that a large white working class would, 
dangerously push for high wages and seek to exercise political power.41 Portu-
guese policy towards immigration to the colonies in the 1930s was focused on 
sending technical cadres, engineers, specialists and managers. Those wanting to 
emigrate to the colonies on a private basis had to show a high income or an 
invitation guaranteeing employment. This approach was driven by the fear of 
creating a stratum of unemployed and poor whites.42
Even when such policy was reversed, as it was in the Portuguese colonies 
from the late 1940s to the end of the colonial period, there was often dismay 
at the actual settlers who materialised. A Portuguese official report in 1970 
concluded that
The settler who comes to [Mozambique] . . . is of such a modest social and 
economic standing that he is frequently more of a disruptive element than 
a useful one. With a happy few exceptions [these settlers] show themselves 
completely lacking in any skills, and are largely difficult, if not impossible, 
to keep on the virtuous path (particularly those that arrive clandestinely). 
The majority lacks the mentality to secure their livelihood, much less to be 
attentive to their civilizing function with respect to the native population.43
It was only after the Second World War that Portuguese and Rhodesian leaders 
warmed towards immigration. Under new pressure in a decolonising world, 
and with more money to spend as a result of the post-war boom, they were 
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now ready to put racial demographics ahead of considerations of how to man-
age the white lower orders. There was a temporary explosion of the size of the 
white population in the region outside South Africa, from about 200,000 at the 
end of the Second World War, to approaching a million at the start of the 1970s. 
Southern Rhodesia moved from only 69,000 whites in 1940 to 27,100 in 1970, 
and Northern Rhodesia from a paltry 13,000 in 1940 to 75,000 in 1960. Most 
proportionately spectacular though was the growth of the white population of 
the Portuguese colonies. In 1940 there were under 100,000 whites in Mozam-
bique and Angola combined. By 1970, there were at about half a million and 
possibly more, roughly 60 per cent in Angola and 40 per cent in Mozambique.44 
In addition, by the early 1970s there well over 100,000 Portuguese troops in 
Angola and Mozambique.
In the future South Africa, the great inflow of British settler population 
occurred under the impetus of the gold mining expansion of 1890 to 1906. 
After the formation of the Union in 1910, state immigration policy was largely 
hostile to immigration. Afrikaner nationalists feared that British immigrants 
would oppose them at the ballot box, and elites in general feared the import of 
working-class radicalism. There were only two moments of large scale United 
Kingdom immigration. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, 
the Smuts government turned towards immigration from Britain and elsewhere 
in Europe, but the Nationalists quickly shut down this policy after coming to 
power in 1948. In the early 1960s, a shortage of white artisans led to a mod-
est opening to British immigrants. A large proportion of these were artisans. 
Stone’s study of this cohort suggested that contrary to stereotype, they were 
by and large not reactionaries attracted by apartheid, but rather were pursuing 
economic opportunities. He showed they tended to absorb South African racial 
attitudes fairly quickly, but that they were notably sympathetic to trade union-
ism, including for black workers.45
Intra-regional white migration is a phenomenon that needs to be better 
understood. As Robert Bickers usefully suggests, this “unsettled” dimension of 
supposed “settler” life is worth investigating.46 The world of the British Empire 
was often one of searches for short-term opportunity rather than long-term 
settlement. “Settler” is a misnomer for such a strikingly unstable social category 
of trans-imperial sojourners. Two instances of this are worth particular com-
ment. One is the peculiar turbulence of Rhodesian migration. Rhodesia always 
had a huge immigration turnover. South Africans and Britons especially, flowed 
in and out with remarkable velocity, throughout the life of the Rhodesian 
state.47 They appeared remarkably sensitive to the pushes and pulls of Rhodesia’s 
highly changeable economic and political prospects. Another is the history of 
Portuguese migration to South Africa, mainly via Mozambique.48 Starting with 
the flow of mainly very poor Madeirian workers, often working under condi-
tions of mutual exploitation in fellow-islanders’ market gardens that fed South 
African cities, it developed through a more gradual and socially differentiated 
migration of mainlanders through the post-Second World War period. It culmi-
nated in the mass migration following the collapse of the empire which made 
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a significant impact on South African cities. Portuguese immigrants formed 
a number of communities in South African cities, most notably in Johannes-
burg southern suburbs areas like Turffontein, La Rochelle and Rosettenville. 
Though many had lost everything in the collapse, over time they were able to 
get upwards social mobility through success as artisan skills and small business. 
Across the whole period, South African resistance to Portuguese migration was 
considerable, and certainly informed by anti-Catholic religious ideologies.
Struggles for cultural dominance
The white working classes of Southern Africa were a field of struggles for 
cultural dominance. In the British Empire countries there can be little doubt 
that, early in the twentieth century, imperial elites were determined to impose 
their cultural hegemony on whites and indeed to a considerable extent on 
blacks. However, British working-class immigrants also brought their subaltern 
cultural institutions, organisations and practices, from dog racing to fraternal 
organisations. And even by the 1920s, with the arrival of the silent movies and 
the spread of the gramophone, the challenge of American influence on white 
workers was bothering both Afrikaner and Anglophone elites.
In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the emerging enclave of white 
labour on the Northern Rhodesia Copperbelt, there was a stabilisation and 
quasi-indigenisation of the British models of working-class life that had been 
brought to the region by the mass migration of the 1890 to 1906. The appren-
ticeship system and the pivotal position of artisans in industry and services had 
become very firmly established. The artisan world was initially British domi-
nated to a massive extent, with a large majority of “skilled men” being immi-
grants as late as the 1920s. This created a tension between artisan unions and the 
new Afrikaner workforce. There were also quite a number of “Coloured” quali-
fied artisans, trained in the Cape. Over time however the system became both 
more racialised and more Afrikanerised. A specifically artisan culture stamped 
a number of the industrial towns of the area. Bulawayo, as the Rhodesian rail 
and industrial centre, was perhaps the classic example, with its white skilled 
workers clubs, communal activities and even a labour movement store, and the 
Rhodesian Labour Party dominating electoral politics in working-class areas.49 
The British artisan tradition had a last wave of reinforcement with the 1960s 
emigration to Southern Africa. In 1960s Johannesburg, British artisans were 
a visible presence; soccer and dirt track motorbike racing flourished, popular 
British television personalities made tours, and the Daily Mirror was the standard 
reading in Johannesburg barber shops.
The region saw two spectacular attempts to impose cultural autarky on the 
working class. These were the projects of the Portuguese Estado Novo and of 
Afrikaner nationalism. Both were anti-modernist at a cultural level, while at 
the same time being invested in the idea of technological modernity. And both 
had a particular emphasis on shielding subaltern whites from the supposedly 
disintegrating effects of cosmopolitan culture. Both offered workers a nostalgic 
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vision of an idealised rural world. In the long run the subaltern whites who 
they were intending to protect succumbed to external forces, in particular, the 
power of Americanised global consumer culture.
An extraordinary example of this cultural anti-modernism was the attempt 
by the Portuguese to establish model agricultural colonies in Angola. Based on 
a fantasy of the idealised virtues of the Portuguese peasantry, it aimed to set up 
villages which would not only embody Catholic and authoritarian political 
ideals, but also provide African peasants with a model of how farming should 
be carried out. In the areas of Cela and Cunene peasant families and extremely 
poor rural workers from the metropolis were settled. But they faced harsh 
conditions and the planning of the projects left much to be desired. Many of 
the farmers gave up, drifting into the towns, where they worked in low level 
civil service posts, office jobs or as petty traders.50 But the vast majority of set-
tlers came at their own initiative, albeit with state encouragement, and chose 
to settle in the cities, where the hegemony of Salazarism gradually weakened. 
In Angola, by 1970, 77 per cent were urban. In Mozambique, the influence 
of consumer culture on Lourenco Marques became very strong via the South 
African tourist presence and commercial connections to Johannesburg. And 
also cutting against cultural conservatism, the vast scale of Portuguese migration 
to France during the 1950s and 1960s diffused dissident ideas into the home 
country and thence into the colonial world.
During the 1950s and 1960s, amongst Afrikaners a high level of social dis-
cipline and cohesion was ensured through the incorporation of working-class 
and lower-middle-class Afrikaners into a network of organisations designed to 
regulate every sector of life, from women (Vrouefederasie) to youth (Voortrek-
kers). But these attempts to round up whites into a volk culture were constantly 
threatened. Already in the 1950s, the state was worried though about white 
working-class youth groups like the “Ducktails”, whose blend of British and 
American rocker youth styles, drug taking, blurring of racial boundaries in 
clubs and casual violence made them a prime example of what officials feared 
about cultural globalisation.51 While the degree of upwards class mobility in 
this period has probably been overstated, the size of the improvement in white 
working-class living standards had been underestimated. White real wages in 
manufacturing and construction doubled between 1948 and 1972, and in min-
ing by only a little less.52 The new consumption patterns this enabled changed 
white working-class life. Near-universal car ownership enabled families to 
enjoy new leisure activities like the drive-in cinema, roadhouse meals and sea-
side holidays.53 “Ag Pleez Daddy,” Jeremy Taylor’s famous song of the early 
1960s, reflected the contempt of Johannesburg’s Anglophone bourgeoisie for 
the new affluence of the white workers, sending up their outings to the “bio-
scope” (cinema), funfair, the wrestling and trips to Durban (‘only eight hours in 
the Chevrolet’). But such snobbish resentment was surely scarcely noticed by its 
targets. The Afrikaner cultural organisations and reformed churches, with their 
strong association with the political establishment, over time lost their appeal to 
the working class. By the 1980s the growing preferences of Afrikaner workers 
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for Country and Western over Boeremusiek and Pentecostalism over the Dutch 
Reformed Church were apparent. These were important and serious issues, 
because the viability of the political projects of state leaders and of activists to 
an important extent stood or fell by the ability to marshal political identities. 
And while in theory extreme white right wingers looked back to a golden 
age of ethnic identity, social unity and conservative discipline, in practice they 
were susceptible to the cosmopolitan attractions of casino gambling, American 
television sitcoms and videotape pornography.
Endings: workers between Racial Keynesianism and 
free marketism
In our contemporary global perspective, free market ideology is the favoured 
viewpoint of those who are indifferent or hostile to issues of racial and class 
equality, whereas more racially and economically egalitarian political actors 
tend to support interventionist policies. By contrast, in twentieth-century 
white-ruled Southern Africa, both free market and statist economic policy was 
harnessed in various ways to racial domination, with economic intervention-
ism being particularly favoured by white populists. One might characterise this 
phenomenon as Racial Keynesianism.
The Botha-Smuts governments of 1910 to 1924, the Estado Novo before 
1945, and the political regime of pre-Second World War Southern Rhode-
sia, did relatively little for the white working class. In contrast, as we have 
seen, South African governments from 1924 took an interventionist course, 
with favourable, racially discriminatory outcomes for the white workers. This 
lead was followed by settler governments in the Rhodesias and the Portuguese 
colonies after the Second World War. These regimes moved in an increasingly 
white-welfarist direction and poured money into employment-generating 
prestige projects, whether dam building, the development of airlines, road con-
struction or the establishment of new schools and universities.
However, in the end, the elites abandoned the white working class. In Portu-
gal, during 1974–5 the new, democratised state moved quickly to depart from 
Africa, leaving the colonial white workers to their own devices. From 1974 
to 1975, when Ian Smith began negotiating seriously with African nationalist 
leaders, Rhodesia rapidly moved away from white worker protectionism. The 
protests of extremist groups like the Rhodesia Action Party failed to prevent the 
ultimate transition of power.54 In South Africa, the growing Afrikaner middle 
class were increasingly uncomfortable in the embrace of the populism. They 
aspired to globalised patterns of consumption and acceptance by their metro-
politan peers. They gradually lost their social connections to the white work-
ing class. Moreover, white business was aware that the low black consumption 
levels and labour shortages which apartheid had produced were strangling the 
economy. The leaders of the National Party found the sacrifice of the special 
privileges of the white working class increasingly easy to contemplate as part 
of their search for solutions. One after another, regulations and laws protecting 
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white workers began to be reversed. The rapid increases in white working-class 
standards of living of the previous period were not sustained: white real wages 
fell substantially from the second half of the seventies.55 As black trade union 
movements became powerful, white workers faced challenges to their racial 
authority from their black counterparts. A palpable sense of dislocation existed 
amongst white workers, finding expression in support for the parties of the 
extreme right: but ultimately their resistance to the move away from apartheid 
was to be of no avail.
Conclusion
In Southern Africa, “the white working class” and the “poor whites” were nei-
ther simple sociological categories, nor ones that can adequately be thought 
through within the boundaries of individual states. Who white workers and 
poor whites were, and what their significance was, was an endlessly refought 
political battle. They did not live in single national space but moved across the 
region. Their concerns were not purely parochial but related to transnational 
politics. They should perhaps be thought of not so much as “white people”, as 
but members of particular classes who were called “white”, by others, or by 
themselves, for particular ends, in distinct moments of global, regional and local 
historical time.
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Introduction
The 1930s witnessed Southern Rhodesia’s most severe socio-economic prob-
lems since colonial occupation in 1890, giving rise to new state social engineer-
ing initiatives about family and children’s education which influenced policy 
into the 1960s. The Great Depression engendered a poor and reprobate class of 
white juveniles whom the state viewed as an ominous sign of the cataclysmic 
rupture of white settler family and its values. It undermined the capacity of the 
working class to reproduce itself; white parents were unable to raise children 
with the skills and character to work for and defend the colony. More broadly, 
the condition of the white family violated the sustenance of “white standards” 
of living, the prestige of the white race and the hegemonic discourse of colonial 
control. “White standards” were discursively constructed in colonial Rhodesia. 
All whites were expected to live up to the self-proclaimed superior culture by 
virtue of being white. They were supposed to be better educated than Afri-
cans, occupy superior positions in the workplace and be able to access and 
afford the material goods manufactured for Europeans. Their possessions and 
behaviour were supposed to be markedly different from that of Africans. The 
1929 Children’s Protection and Adoption Act provided the framework for state 
intervention in youth rehabilitation and child welfare programmes for several 
decades following its promulgation. This followed a stern warning in 1928 from 
Southern Rhodesia’s first female legislator, Ethel Tawse-Jollie, saying that, ‘We 
[the state] cannot rely on parents of this country to do their duty invariably in 
regard to these children’. State exasperation with white parents to fulfil their 
duty in regard to their children pushed state policy into paternalism after 1930.
This chapter considers the history of Rhodesian state paternalism towards 
the white working-class family regarding the upbringing of white children 
(education and maturity) as part of building a robust colonial white society 
and preserving empire. The colonial state maintained considerable influence on 
the white family since the inception of colonial settlement in the 1890s. How-
ever, the 1930s saw the emergence of a multidimensional socioeconomic crisis, 
characterised by high unemployment amongst white youths and the break-
down of the family unit. In response, state policy morphed into a multifaceted, 
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intrusive and coercive state welfarism. White settler desire to maintain a multi-
generational model of colonial development resulted in state solicitude over 
the education of white children. This study analyses the establishment of state 
welfarism under the Children’s Protection and Adoption Act (1929) with a bias 
towards state guardianship in state-run child institutions. State control of white 
children to provide skills education and mould character for white maturity 
were key in the reproduction of the white working class and in building a 
robust colonial white society in Africa.
This study uses the 1929 Children’s Law as a lens to understanding the trans-
formation of state ideas about education and maturity for children from poor 
and “degenerate” backgrounds. In juvenile rehabilitation homes and other 
land schemes, the Rhodesian government sought to engineer a white youth 
who was “rural minded”; who was willing to take up jobs in agriculture or 
became a future farmer. The curriculum at St Pancras’s home for delinquent 
boys, established in the town of Bulawayo in 1936 in response to an upsurge 
in delinquency cases, reflected the 1930s government thrust of practical skills 
training for blue-collar jobs. State programmes under the Children’s Protection 
and Adoption Act revealed colonial authorities’ anxiety about the development 
trajectory of white society, and state ideology of preservation was aimed at 
achieving three main objectives. The first of these was to prepare white chil-
dren from the lower classes for a social educational model that was responsive 
to the productive needs of the economy, departing from the elitist educational 
model for whites which had, hitherto, been used. Secondly, it was to manage 
those who could not meet white expectation by setting the moral and social 
tone of white society in line with the state’s vision of ideal colonial society. 
Thirdly, it was to sustain a robust colonial society and consolidate the Empire. 
Rhodesian white society was ossified to a considerable degree and the fam-
ily welfare programmes and child rehabilitation were intended to restore the 
normative values for social cohesion. The state had intrusive powers over white 
society through the surveillance of the white working-class family and laying 
out penalties for violations to child rights. In addition, Rhodesian state usur-
pation of child guardianship aimed at ensuring the proper values in children 
could be likened to the controversial colonial separation of indigenous children 
from their parents in Australia and Canada.1 In the same way that colonists 
in the dominions did not want native children to inherit their parents’ “sav-
agery”, the Rhodesian state wanted to save white children from their parents’ 
“degeneracy”.
This chapter reflects on state fears and ideas, and the extent to which it 
was prepared go in order to preserve a racialised system. The state saw its nec-
essary to act as “parent” to certain groups of whites who failed to meet its 
expectations. However, by shepherding these groups, the state subverted its own 
legitimising ideology of white supremacy and minority rule by demonstrating 
that not all whites were superior and autonomous. This chapter also speaks to 
broader debates about how states intervened in the lives of children in colonial 
settings by forcibly removing white children from their parents.
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It was a universal colonial claim that unregulated youth development threat-
ened both national and imperial demise.2 In the structuring of white com-
munities and the problem of poor whites in white settlements, particularly in 
Southern Africa, children were deemed particularly vulnerable to cultural con-
tamination. State officials were anxious about so-called “evil” home influences, 
which referred to, amongst other things, failure by parents to provide their chil-
dren with food and shelter, “drunkard” parents, “immoral” mothers living with 
multiple men, exposure of children to “cultural contamination” (racial mixing 
of all forms), begging and prostitution.3 The years before adulthood made a sig-
nificant difference in producing either the next generation of responsible citi-
zens, national leaders, heads of family and good mothers, or moral and physical 
degenerates.4 The 1929 law indicated that the state viewed white children not 
as mere possessions of their parents but as individuals in their own right whose 
future was inseparable from that of the state and empire.
This study is largely based on the Rhodesian colonial archive housed at 
the National Archives of Zimbabwe, Harare, generated by various proto-civil 
organisations such as the Child Welfare Society and government departments, 
particularly the departments of Education and Social Welfare. The colonial 
archive is a rich repository of state programmes on poor and “degenerate” fami-
lies. However, the power relations were so paternalistic that categories like the 
poor, children, and “degenerates”, amongst others, did not have a voice and 
were often spoken for by the state. This top-bottom structure of the narratives 
limits our understanding of the views, attitudes and perceptions of these catego-
ries of people towards state programmes of rehabilitation and self-preservation. 
Those who operated on the fringes of state-defined parameters were objects of 
the state gaze and seldom had a voice. However, these sources are important in 
that they articulate government programmes and the intended outcomes allow 
for appraisal of government initiatives.
State and the Rhodesian white settler family, c. 1900–1930
State paternalism toward the white family was forged in the history and nature 
of Rhodesian white society. In 1890, Cecil John Rhodes and the British South 
Africa Company (BSAC), through a British Royal Charter, established com-
mercial interests over the Zimbabwean plateau. In the first two decades of settler 
colonial occupation, the white population was highly transient and remained 
so to varying degrees for the duration of the colonial period.5 As a response, 
the company government actively encouraged white immigration and settle-
ment to exploit the natural resources (land and minerals) of the territory. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, the government encouraged immigration of 
white women and settlement of families because the Rhodesian pioneers were 
largely freebooter white males.6 Rhodesia aggressively pursued demographic 
engineering through immigration policies that actively courted Europeans to 
come and settle permanently north of the Limpopo.7 White immigration was 
politically vital to the state because it sought to stabilise a white population for 
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administrative purposes as well as to sustain a sense of nation.8 Migration in 
settler colonialism involved permanent settlement, creating a sense of sameness, 
and the attempts by the settler or colonist to remake his society in the new 
place.9 In the Rhodesian context, European immigration was a facet of wider 
economic policy and national development.
The white family unit became an essential tool in developing a specific set 
of values upon which Rhodesian settler society was based, and the settler state 
actively assisted in family welfare. For example, Ordinance 19 of 1904 was 
designed to prevent destitution of and provide for the relief of wives and fami-
lies (children) that had been deserted.10 Rhodesian state policy was designed 
with a view to encouraging young white families to choose to settle in Rho-
desia over other territories of British settlement such as Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa.11 There were other regulations that incentivised 
the settlement of families and child rearing. For example, married white men 
in the civil service received a family allowance to cushion them from eco-
nomic hardship because the Rhodesian cost of living was higher compared 
to that of neighbouring South Africa.12 Civil service regulations also encour-
aged the employment of unmarried women only. A woman was supposed to 
resign upon marriage to concentrate on her domestic duties, particularly the 
raising of children. These regulations were inspired by Victorian domesticity, 
which confined women to the physical space of the home. Rhodesian society 
regarded domesticity and motherhood as sufficient emotional fulfilment for 
females.13 In colonial societies, women were perceived as mothers of the impe-
rial race, as symbols of moral chastity and beauty, and conduits of good behav-
iour.14 As such, Rhodesian society also shaped women’s gender roles for the 
sustenance of an ideal society and these defined motherhood as key to national 
and imperial success.
Child bearing and child health were state priorities in Rhodesia. The first 
white child born in colonial Rhodesia was Cecil John born to the Tullochs 
of Umtali in August of 1891 and by the 1923 census, the “second genera-
tion” of Rhodesians numbered some 8,308.15 The colony’s post-World War 
One birth rate improved from 27.85 around 1918 to 31.10 per 1,000 by 1923. 
Natural population increase was critical in propagating Rhodesian values and 
would arrest the transient nature of the white population in the colony. In 
order to consolidate the improving birth rate, the government appointed a 
Medical Inspector of Schools for the systematic examination of children to 
improve child health. The Inspector identified the tropical disease malaria, den-
tal hygiene and eye diseases as constituting a risk to child health. The Medical 
Inspector suggested the establishment of school clinics and feeding schemes so 
that there would be no need to hesitate bringing a young family to the coun-
try because of health concerns to would-be immigrants.16 In view of this fact, 
the Rhodesian state was solicitous about the welfare of white children with 
whom the future of the colony rested. The post-1930 period would test the 
state’s resolve in child welfare and the reproduction of white dominance in a 
colonial setting.
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The colonial education policy was linked to Southern Rhodesia’s efforts at 
creating an international image of itself as a colony conducive to family life by 
providing a competitive system of education comparable to any in the world.17 
Colonial education transformed significantly during the first three decades of 
white settlement. In the 1890s provision of education was the responsibility 
of religious bodies. The Education Ordinance of 1899 enabled the creation of 
an Education Department and in 1903 government-aided schools were intro-
duced.18 In 1907 some 50 per cent of white children of school-going age were 
receiving some form of education.19 However, by the 1920s Southern Rho-
desia had a relatively well-structured system of schools involving state-aided, 
state controlled and denominational schools. In 1923, some 6,000 white pupils 
were in school at an average attendance of 88 per cent.20 In 1930 the South-
ern Rhodesia Compulsory Education Act was passed making white education 
compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 15 years.
Unemployment, racial and cultural contamination
The 1930s and 1940s saw economic insecurity, the imperial ideology of white 
supremacy, and colonial fears of racial “degeneracy” collide in real time. The 
honeymoon of relative economic and social stability that Rhodesia had enjoyed 
since the turn of the century evaporated, giving way to unprecedented white 
unemployment which exacerbated state fears of white “degeneracy”. The Great 
Depression of the 1930s and the ensuing economic and social shocks trans-
formed the social fabric of Southern Rhodesian society. Thousands – black 
and white – lost their jobs in industry and commerce due to viability crises, 
farmers were forced off the land as commodity prices fell, and national income 
plummeted. The onset of the depression and the fall of commodity prices saw 
cotton and tobacco farmers moving to maize production to offset losses, but 
between 1930 and 1931 maize prices also dropped from 10 to 4 shillings per 
bag. However, the production cost remained at 8 shillings per bag. In addition, 
Southern Rhodesia’s national income fell from £13.9 million to £8.7 million 
between 1929 and 1931.21
Even more frightening for Rhodesian authorities, the period raised the spec-
tre of the “poor white” problem. In 1932, of the 21,500 settler wage earners in 
Southern Rhodesia, 8 per cent or 1,720 were unemployed.22 In 1933, a con-
servative estimate placed white male unemployment at 830, of whom 400 were 
married men.23 Rhodesian white male poverty was the source of a strong strain 
of disillusionment because society perceived them as breadwinning patriarchs 
whose duty it was to provide for their families and uphold white prestige. Loss 
of jobs resulted in economic insecurities that created “unwholesome” home 
and social environments that incubated youth delinquency.24
The ranks of the unemployed also included youths who were leaving school 
and could not find job vacancies. The question about white education was 
no longer one of access to education because the Compulsory Education Act 
(1929) had resolved this issue. The pertinent question became the relevance of 
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a general education and its suitability and desirability to the changing needs of 
the economy.25 From the 1900s, white education was elitist and aimed to pre-
pare white youth for the civil service, but by the 1930s the public service could 
no longer absorb all the school leavers. The colonial economy was no longer 
a useful place for those generally trained for white-collar jobs. Youths had to 
prepare for blue-collar jobs if they were to keep the mantle of safeguarding 
white civilisation and carry the settler’s mission in colonised lands.26 However, 
the competitive edge of white youths over Africans was compromised by their 
lack of practical skills. From the outset, Africans were taught practical skills for 
manual labour. Statistically, about 369 white pupils left school at the end of 
1931 and this figure was far less than the annual average of 700.27 The Director 
of Education speculated that the 1931 figure was lower than usual on account 
of parents keeping their children in school because there were no job vacan-
cies.28 In 1932, some 341 white youths left school and 247 required work.29 
The remaining 94 (28 per cent) entered higher education or left the colony. By 
May of 1933, some 91 white youths still required employment.30 Such statistics 
vindicated suggestions that there should be a “weeding out” of children who 
did not have the capacity to proceed to higher education and fill posts requir-
ing such an education to avoid the state wasting resources on a general higher 
education.31 The 1934 report of the Labour commissioner further emphasised 
that the school system was producing insufficiently equipped youths and this 
was reflected in the data relating to unemployed adults.32 Sections of white 
society blamed this development on the calibre of the Rhodesian teacher who 
was a product of England’s public school system who found a rural life and the 
challenges of mining unattractive.33
Unemployment, poverty and lax parental control combined to incubate 
youths who were not amenable to parental control and some who flouted 
racial restrictions. White children had to be lifted from the morass in which 
their parents had sunk if the dream of a multigeneration model of colonial 
development was to be sustained. Rhodesian state paternalism was rational-
ised to perform the function of guardian in place of “failed” parents. However, 
it was underpinned by local and Empire-wide anxieties. In the wake of the 
First World War, imperial authorities noted with concern the low birth rate 
and poor health of children.34 There was a worry in the British Empire about 
efficiency and decline marked by the South African War (1899–1902) and to 
a degree the ravages of First World War and the Spanish influenza. Although 
“degeneracy” was not defined in physical terms but in terms of astuteness of 
character and qualities to sustain imperial control, the ravages of war and disease 
did not go unnoticed. Ideas about imperial decline were particularly worrying 
for Rhodesia because the colony was trying to boost its population and firmly 
establish a settler colony predicated on specific values. Rhodesian legislator, 
Lionel Cripps, had earlier warned that, ‘The white men were the aristocrats of 
this country and it behoved them to keep that position for themselves’.35 The 
state harnessed its coercive apparatus and increase its bare-faced paternalism in 
order to reproduce appropriate settler values.
48 Ivo Mhike
In the harsh economic environment of the 1930s, the Rhodesian state recog-
nised juvenile delinquency as a social problem. Juvenile crime was most sugges-
tive of the erosion of white values and incipient social disarray because white 
children did not exhibit the “aristocratic” values needed to sustain white domi-
nance. Officials took the correlation of poverty and deviance as the basis for 
identifying delinquents and potential delinquents. Children from poor families 
were viewed as potential delinquents because they lived on the fringes of white 
society and, therefore, did not conform to the ideals of whiteness. In 1931, 
the director of education observed that poverty amongst whites resulted in 
parents’ failure to provide for their children and such children developed delin-
quent tendencies with the most common offence being theft. Other offences 
included malicious injury to property, assault and housebreaking. In particular, 
delinquency labels were attached to children from large poor families who were 
in receipt of government rations and considered likely to indulge in delinquent 
behaviours.36 In 1932, representatives from the CID, Department of Educa-
tion and Department of Justice submitted to the government a document on 
the incidence of juvenile delinquency.37 Although the report did not provide 
any statistical data, it identified poverty and lax parental control as common 
denominators in the identified cases.38 In this respect, juvenile delinquency was 
framed as a lower-class white problem and common mischief amongst white 
children from poor families was likely magnified as a harbinger of delinquency.
Eugenic rhetoric aided the Rhodesian discourses of “degeneracy” and juve-
nile delinquency which formed the basis for state intervention in the white 
family. Colonial eugenic thinking manifested itself not in the direct importation 
of metropolitan practices such as sterilization, but in a translation of the politi-
cal principles and social values that eugenics implied. Eugenics helped identify 
a range of roles including gender-specific work and productivity, described in 
social, medical and psychiatric terms. Applied to colonial Rhodesia, eugenics 
defined white maturity and how white children should be brought up and with 
whom they should socialise.
The Rhodesian state also framed white poverty as a harbinger of white social 
and cultural contamination. Through the influences of social Darwinism, infe-
rior races were believed to have a contaminating effect on superior ones and, in 
particular, poor whites had to be rescued to preserve the purity and superiority 
of the white race.39 In 1931, the Rhodesian Criminal Investigation Department 
(CID) at Que Que recommended that Douglas (13) and Ronald (9) be con-
sidered for a proposed Industrial School largely because, ‘it is well known that 
these children mix with natives in play, and are not cared for as they might be 
by their parents who are in receipt of government rations and are in a very poor 
way (sic)’.40 In a similar report from Bulawayo, juveniles Peter and James Quinn 
were deemed “out of control”. However, what worried authorities the most 
was that, ‘they frequent native compounds and return with Bicycles Cigarettes 
[an African brand] and other articles’. In addition, ‘they beg or steal these from 
natives as they have no money to buy them’.41 While theft was socially abhorred 
and legally punishable, Rhodesian authorities regarded stealing from Africans 
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as sacrilegious in a colonial context where perceived white superiority was 
sometimes synonymous with infallibility. Stealing from Africans by a member 
of a “superior” white race transgressed racial, cultural and legal boundaries of 
colonial society. In this respect, poverty increased white social indecorum and 
the Rhodesian state had to protect white children from struggling poor families 
in order to secure the future of the white race.
The state and child guardianship
The Children’s Protection and Adoption Act of 1929 became a quintessential 
instrument of state control over the white family. Initially promulgated to align 
Rhodesian child law with that of South Africa, white unemployment and sug-
gestions of the emergence of a “poor white” problem in post-1930 Rhodesia 
changed the functional nature of the new law. The law came in handy for the 
state when white parents could not fulfil their obligation over child welfare. 
The law consolidated state control over white children by giving the courts 
the power to remove a child from the custody of its parents where certain 
offences were committed and passing the parental rights either to a relative 
or to the state.42 This provision protected children against the so-called “evil” 
home influences, which referred to, amongst other things, parental failure to 
provide food and shelter, “immoral” mothers living with multiple men and 
exposure of children to racial and cultural “contamination” through begging 
and prostitution.43 However, being poor was enough of an offence for a parent 
to lose custody. Furthermore, the law sought to minimise the plight of ille-
gitimate white children by providing a mechanism where their status could be 
legitimised in relation to their parents in line with British law.
The transfer of guardianship largely targeted poor families. The case of the 
Van der Zandt family typified state paternalism under the Children’s law. This 
was a large family of seven children whom the authorities declared “poor white” 
because they were in receipt of government relief. In addition, the family was 
squatting on a piece of alienated land allocated by the Lands Department.44 
Officials ruled that ‘in their interest and the interests of the state’, the Van der 
Zandt girls Johanna (15) and Aletta (13) ought to be sent to an established 
institution away from their parents to protect them from a poor home environ-
ment.45 This resonated with state recommendations for Douglas, Ronald and 
the Quinn brothers mentioned earlier. Practically, the state had assumed control 
over these children because it judged the parents unable to bring them up in 
a proper way that upheld “white standards”. Rhodesian white society believed 
that unregulated female child development increased the likelihood that young 
women would cross the racial divide in their sexual associations. Interracial sex 
and miscegenation represented the worst form of racial and cultural contami-
nation in white Rhodesia. For the male child, he had to be trained to become 
a breadwinning patriarch and support a family.
The term “Children In Need of Care” enshrined in the Children’s Law 
encompassed a broad spectrum of “delinquents” and female children who were 
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labelled as children in “Moral Danger” and these were identified through the 
courts and were housed in certified institutions by the authority of the magis-
trate. The 1929 law established a probation system, formation of juvenile courts, 
places of safety, government Industrial Schools and other certified institutions 
for the broad category of “Children In Need of Care”, particularly those with 
no homes and who were not under proper parental control or were subject to 
immoral influence. Such children had to be sent to certified institutions until 
they were 18 years of age.46 The Probation and School Attendance Officer Syd-
ney Caley, appointed in 1936, acted as guardian ad litem.
State policy of usurping child guardianship contradicted Rhodesia’s 
 decades-old white immigration policy that portrayed the colony as a condu-
cive environment for young families. But in the crisis of the 1930s such radical 
measures were deemed necessary in order to save white society from imminent 
collapse. Beginning in 1936 the Southern Rhodesia Education Department 
operated machinery for dealing with neglected and delinquent children under 
the age of 16. This comprised several orphanages, boarding houses (with facili-
ties for clothing indigents and boarding them during holidays), working boys 
and girls hostels, and a moral welfare home for the senior girls and a home 
for delinquent boys. By 1939 government-certified institutions for destitute 
and maladjusted white children included St. Joseph’s and Rhodesia Children’s 
Home Orphanage (Salisbury), Daisyfield Orphanage (predominantly Afri-
kaner), and St Clare’s Home for white juvenile mothers (Bulawayo).47 There 
were other institutions operating on government grants which received chil-
dren through the voluntary committal process. This network of institutions or 
“Places of Safety” provided alternative home environments and propagated 
good moral values.
Agricultural training in a state certified institution
St Pancras home for delinquent boys, 1936–1940
The 1930s–1950s spawned a precipitous trajectory of ‘white men and boys 
who lacked the education, discipline and diligence necessary to raise white 
families’ and these ‘were perceived as an internal threat to settler visions of 
multi- generational success’ and a liability to the colonial fiscus.48 In particular, 
the white male child was regarded as the defender of colonial establishment and 
imperial designs. According to Stephanie Olsen, the white boy had upon his 
shoulders the safeguarding of civilisation and carried the white settler’s mission 
in colonised lands.49 With problems in industry and commerce, the state sought 
to produce breadwinning patriarchs by fostering a ‘rural-mindedness’ in male 
youth for agriculture sector jobs, providing instruction in elementary engineer-
ing, woodwork and metalwork. This would increase the number of whites on 
the land and create new avenues of youth employment. More broadly, the new 
educational model was enmeshed with the colony’s long-term goal to build 
a white skills base for future industrial development as well as establishing an 
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artisanal class that would serve as a bulwark against the economic mobility of 
Africans to the higher echelons of the colonial economy.50
St Pancras home for delinquent boys was established in 1936 near the town 
of Bulawayo and was run by the Education Department in partnership with 
the Church of England. The state intended it to be a hybrid institution which 
combined behavioural reform and industrial training because boys at St Pan-
cras represented all that the colonial officials feared in white male youths: a 
calibre of male youth who could not mature to support a family. Rehabilitation 
started with the very location of St Pancras. The director of education recom-
mended a country location as the ideal environment for juvenile rehabilitation 
and effective control of delinquents as opposed to an urban one. The urban 
environment and working-class culture were believed to have a morally cor-
rupting influence on children and a country environment was envisioned as 
most ideal in the process of rehabilitating the delinquent.51 In the case of Vic-
torian Britain, Steadman Jones argues that years of exposure to the decaying 
urban environment gave rise to a degenerate populace unfit to reach maturity 
and reproduce its kind.52 Indeed, images of social pathology, poverty and devi-
ance in the Empire were linked with theories of urban degeneracy. In addition, 
the rural location of the rehabilitation institution could well have been a way 
to break urban delinquency networks. Exposing urban juveniles to an alien 
country environment would bring them out of their rut of misdemeanour. 
In this respect, the rural location of the new institution was believed to have a 
therapeutic effect for juvenile rehabilitation.
Practical subjects were a particular focus at St Pancras because ‘the boys . . . 
expressed a loathing for school and they required much patience in teaching’.53 
Secondary education was thrown out of the window and agriculture was a 
prime subject. In 1938, the institution purchased 14 cows and one bull at a 
cost of £111, and pig runs were constructed with a view to teaching animal 
husbandry.54 Inmates were also engaged in chicken projects and a dozen animal 
books were purchased for the library.55 In addition, some 25 acres of land were 
put under the plough for the production of maize, potatoes, beans, corn, cow-
peas and sweet potatoes. When T.W. Stead from Natal was appointed as School 
Master in 1938, the Superintendent at St Pancras wrote, ‘He is enthusiastic and 
reliable and the right man for the job. With his influence, there will be an added 
emphasis on physical fitness and the practical side of Agriculture’.56 There was 
a deliberate effort to hire people with experience in South African reforma-
tory work as South Africa had a longer history of juvenile delinquency and 
Industrial Schools. In this respect, the Superintendent’s enthusiasm about the 
new appointment indicated the core values of the government programme at 
St Pancras. The fostering of a ‘rural-mindedness’ in white youths was a central 
rehabilitation objective.
However, state efforts were frustrated because the project at St Pancras 
remained small, drawing no more than a dozen boys for each calendar year. 
As an industrial school, the institution was also an overall failure because not a 
single graduate of St Pancras made it into farming. It was equally a failure as a 
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reformatory. William Laurent (17) became troublesome and authorities at the 
institution labelled him an ‘evil influence’ and danger to others only a year into 
his four-year committal period at St Pancras. ‘Willie’ was found in possession 
of stolen goods including an automatic firearm. In addition, he had sold stolen 
clothes to Africans on the school premises and attempted to poison the Super-
intendent with cattle dip. He also bullied and cheated other inmates at games. At 
their wits’ end, the St Pancras Committee and administration sent the boy home 
to be supervised by his parents until such a time when the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs found an alternative for him.57 William epitomised the colossal failure 
that St Pancras was in achieving character reform and instilling industrial train-
ing in delinquent youths from “degenerate” homes. By 1939, the institution had 
acquired a bad name for financial mismanagement, low numbers of inmates, 
and an increasingly negative public opinion, so much so that magistrates were 
reluctant to commit juveniles, forcing the government to close it down in 1940.
The collapse of the agricultural training at St Pancras reflected the general 
sentiment in the colony. When the depression began to bite and youth unem-
ployment rose, captains of industry also pinned delinquency and the youth 
labour crisis on the character of the Rhodesian lad. Appraising the charac-
ter and stamina of Rhodesian youth as a candidate for employment, Captain 
W.H. Kimpton of the Motor Traders’ Association, described the average youth 
as ‘indolent and imputed, without initiative or ambition’, faults he ascribed 
to ‘lack of parental control, poor physique and undue native assistance’.58 
Although A.J. Somerville, representing Principals of Salisbury Schools, vehe-
mently disagreed with this view, it was endorsed by the representative of the 
Salisbury Municipality, M.E. Cleveland, who perceived the youths as ‘lacking 
manners’.59 The Rhodesia Agricultural Union (RAU) also alleged that the 
1930s labour shortages were, to some degree, artificial and expressed disap-
pointment at the fact that offers of permanent employment on tobacco farms 
at £10 per month with lodgings had been turned down by white youths on 
the ground that ‘this was no suitable reward for the sacrifice of the attraction of 
town life which it entailed’.60 Similarly, Salisbury and Bulawayo experienced 
difficulty in getting youths to accept work on the mines.61 In view of this 
fact, white youth were ill equipped and unwilling to respond to the demands 
of the changing colonial economy and the business community did not have 
confidence in them.
Government officials were also concerned about unemployed youths who 
drifted into government relief works in road construction and in European 
Labour Afforestation Operations (ELAO) in Mtao and Stapleford.62 In 1934, 
there were 59 youths of 21 years of age and under at the relief camps.63 The 
basic daily rate of pay in these camps was 3s. 6d., with efficiency pay at 6d. 
and 1d. per day as bonus.64 Some made up to 6s. 9d. per day against the cost of 
meals, which ranged between 1s. 6d. and 1s. 9d.65 However, the government 
did not consider the money paid in relief works as a wage but a token given 
to enable the men to maintain themselves. Barring the social stigma associ-
ated with being in a Relief Camp, relief works were an attractive option for 
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youths who did not have any family to support. However, officials viewed the 
youths who were unwilling to take up proper jobs for relief work as running 
the risk of developing a dependency on the state. For example, a young man 
under 20 years at Stapleford refused an offer of employment at 5 pounds a 
month and ‘all round’, and another left work at 10 pounds per month, plus a 
free servant, vegetables and fruit, as he ‘preferred the life’ at Stapleford.66 This 
was exacerbated by the fact that some men were pulling their children, some 
as young as 16 years of age, from school to join them in relief work to sup-
plement family income.67 At Umvuma School, it became a habit for youths 
to leave school and wait until they were old enough to enter relief camps for 
adult unemployed whites. Such youths could never be relied upon to sustain 
an industrious life, become breadwinners and maintain family. Relief schemes, 
therefore, caused idleness and bred indolence. The commissioner of labour 
lamented that;
It is highly undesirable that a youth, during his most impressionable years, 
should be permitted to do relief work. . . . Quite apart from the influences 
with which they are brought into contact, the very nature of the work itself 
makes it undesirable for the uninformed character, offering as it does but 
little scope. . . . A more important aspect is that the youth is guided into that 
frame of mind which makes the acceptance of relief work or charity not 
distasteful.68
This calibre of youth, the commissioner claimed, would most certainly grow 
up to become a poor white. Indeed, the ELAO at Mtao had been established 
in 1925 to absorb ‘unemployables’ – a term referring to those who could not 
keep employment, apparently due to alcoholism, nomadic habits, and inadequate 
training – and acted as a temporary relief for those men who were unemployed 
at the time.
One could argue that white youths wanted something very different from 
the vision of white masculinity which their leaders considered so critical. Being 
willing to stay in relief camps with a day wage suggests an affinity for a homo-
social fraternal environment rather than the white male paternalistic domestic 
farm head, or even the working-class father. Young ‘delinquent’ men wanted 
what elite white men feared. The failure of St Pancras in engineering a youth 
with ‘rural-mindedness’ reflected wider state failures at making this model 
work. The attempted youth settlement scheme would further reveal the limits 
of the state paternalism over white youths.
Still birth: Rhodesian youth land settlement scheme, 
1934–1952
The government proposed to introduce a youth settlement scheme in 1934 at 
a time when farmers were the most affected of all occupations. The objectives 
of the scheme were the provision of an outlet for youths leaving school and 
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securing a larger white population on the land. Opponents of the scheme ques-
tioned the logic of trying to attract the youth to farming under such difficult 
circumstances. However, the Agriculture Department insisted that the scheme 
was designed to nurture the future class of farmers. Rhodesian-born youths 
(21–25 years), with some form of agricultural training, or those resident in the 
colony for not less than five years, were eligible for settlement on Crown Land 
subdivisions, preferably in the Mashonaland Watershed. The farm sizes were 
pegged at 500–1,000 acres and the settlers would be mandated to adopt mixed 
farming; dairying, pigs, poultry and general crops. In addition, every farm had to 
have small fenced paddocks and close rotational grazing of the pastures. These 
lands would be leased free of rent for a period and those who proved suitable 
would acquire the land. The Agriculture Department would make advances of 
up to £400 for the construction of small buildings, water supplies, dip tanks and 
stumping of land. These loans would be free of interest and terms of payment 
would be relatively easy. The Agriculture Department compelled these young 
farmers to live frugally and would not permit them to get into debt except to 
the Lands Department and the Land Bank.69
The programme targeted lower-class urban whites and children from farming 
communities who the state felt did not need a high education for non-existent 
white-collar jobs. However, state ideas were not in harmony with white atti-
tudes towards agriculture as a career path. The white youths’ loathing of manual 
work was sufficiently captured in the common adage ‘Digging and hoeing are 
the privilege of “Jim” and “Sixpence” and white boys are not to be degraded by 
such work’.70 Both the youths and their parents had a prejudice against manual 
occupations which they viewed as ‘kaffir work’ (manual labour usually done 
by Africans). Following the collapse of Matopos Farm School in 1927, Hillside 
Experimental Station closed down by mid-1930 due to high operational costs 
and very low numbers of youth trainees.71 Ironically, Hillside closed at a time 
when the state gospel of rural-mindedness was reaching a crescendo. It was dif-
ficult for the state to encourage youths to take farming as a career because in 
the 1930s agriculture was one of the worst hit economic sectors.72
The settlement programme suffered a lack of funding and low uptake. In 
1935, the Land Bank flatly refused to fund the programme highlighting the 
depressed prospects in the agricultural sector and instead urged the Agricultural 
Department to concentrate on making the sector more attractive to young 
Rhodesians for job prospects.73 Meanwhile, the number of youths willing to 
work on farms continued to dwindle. In 1934 the total number of youths placed 
with farmers was 26, and by 1935 only four of these remained in agricultural 
employment. Of the remaining 22, nine reportedly gave satisfactory service to 
their employers during their employment varying from nine to 12 months; and 
ten were discharged as unsatisfactory or left their employers dissatisfied with 
the conditions. There were clear indications in the mid-1930s that there was 
neither the money nor the appetite for the land settlement programme to take 
off. The overarching government policy to train and settle young Rhodesians 
on the land as part of cushioning them from the vagaries of unemployment and 
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as a way to increase white settlement on land did not resonate with a society 
struggling with the loss of its traditional job markets in the civil service, indus-
try and commerce. Even youths from farming communities aspired to get jobs 
in the urban areas.
The policy of economic nationalism or ‘Rhodesia for Rhodesians’ which 
had gained some momentum in the civil services and sectors of industry where 
Africans were replaced by white teenagers, was failing in agriculture and land 
settlement.74 Indeed, the Rhodesian economy was dependent upon agricul-
tural prosperity and elites in government preferred to have young Rhodesians 
take up careers in agriculture and become farmers, but with little success. In 
1937 the colonial state relaunched an incentivised scheme for the settlement 
of young white male Rhodesians on farms to commence in 1938.75 The new 
scheme was supposed to be limited to ten settlers who would have completed 
a two to three-year agricultural training in up-to-date and efficient methods 
applicable to the colony. The government anticipated that these youths would 
be settled on private land donated for this purpose and only the successful ones 
from the trials would get Crown Land, the loan payment period was stretched 
to 15 years and again the Land Bank was unwilling to fund the scheme.76 
When the war broke out in 1939 not a single youth had been settled under 
the scheme.77 A good number of unemployed youths and ‘delinquents’ were 
enlisted into the Rhodesian army under the 1926 Defence Act. After WWII 
the land settlement scheme suffered another false start in 1949 and eventually 
in 1952 there were ten eligible youths, but no land. Much of it had been taken 
up by the post-war Ex-Servicemen land settlement scheme.
Conclusion
Through extensive and ambitious social engineering initiatives for the white 
settler family, the state in Southern Rhodesia tried to redraw the moral bound-
aries of an ossified white community. Colonial officials articulated an aggres-
sive state paternalism that sought to intervene in the white family and usurp 
parental authority. New laws allowed the state to transfer legal guardianship of 
children to the state and the state also arrogated to itself the right to determine 
the kind of education suitable for the different classes of white children with-
out seeking parental consent. New educational policies, juvenile rehabilitation 
institutions and other juvenile facilities became instruments of state social engi-
neering which cultivated the values deemed appropriate by the state. Overall, 
this chapter points readers to Southern Rhodesia’s efforts at manufacturing 
an ideal white society. However, by acting as “parent” for certain groups of 
whites in colonial society, the state exposed the limits of the colonial discourse 
of white supremacy. The fulcrum of white minority rule was the perceived 
white superiority and by shepherding some whites to maintain white expec-
tation, the Rhodesian state was subverting its own legitimising ideology; not 
all whites were superior or autonomous. Sections of white society had to be 
hand-held to toe the line in order to preserve colonial racial and social order. 
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Colonial social policy designed to homogenise white society had some unin-
tended consequences.
Racial hierarchy and privilege were not simple products of colonial con-
quest, but were expanded through arduous work by politicians and bureaucrats 
to protect and expand them. Performance of power became an everyday thing 
aimed at galvanising both the coloniser and subject to accept the structure of 
colonial society. This chapter also speaks to debates about the extent of colonial 
states’ intervention in the lives of not only the colonised but also the white 
communities. The forced removal of children from indigenous families in Aus-
tralia and Canada is well documented. However, the colony of Southern Rho-
desia used a similar model to take legal guardianship from “failed” white parents 
into its custody. The overarching state goal to reproduce white supremacy for 
successive generations made it imperative to pursue paternalistic policies and 
directly determine the future of white children. The state determined that the 
future (children) of Southern Rhodesia could not be left in the hands of indi-
vidual parents but rested with the central authority of the state. The Rhodesian 
case presents one of those exceptional cases in colonial societies where such a 
model was used to control the children of the white race.
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3  Immigration and settlement 
of “undesirable” whites 




This chapter focuses on the immigration and settlement of so-called undesirable 
white immigrants in Southern Rhodesia, or simply Rhodesia, in the 1940s to 
the 1960s. In the post-Second World War years, Rhodesia embarked on a massive 
immigration campaign to attract more British settlers to increase the white pop-
ulation for economic, social and political reasons. This chapter argues that besides 
the exploitation of Africans, racism and restrictive immigration policies, notions 
of white undesirability troubled the Rhodesian settler community during this 
period. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that white undesirability was a con-
tested, fluid and ambiguous concept influenced by political, social and economic 
circumstances prevailing at the time. Rhodesian settler communities often con-
flated race, class and culture to classify other white groups as undesirable despite 
their strong economic position and white skins. It relied on assumptions and 
stereotypes directed towards other immigrants officially known as white aliens, 
mainly Italians, Greeks and Portuguese considered to be economically “poor”. 
In the post-war years, Rhodesian officials expressed dismay at the quality and 
type of British immigrants the country received. Later in the 1950s, the coun-
try received non-British immigrants and deported some of them as undesirable 
characters because of their class, moral conduct and criminal records.
Rhodesian settlers fashioned undesirability against its perceived settler 
standards – white respectability, moral purity and acceptable behaviour, and 
high wages, amongst other colonial rhetoric virtues. Curiously, instead of fash-
ioning white undesirability against Africans, Rhodesian settlers crafted it against 
the so-called desirable whites. As this chapter will show, Rhodesian immigra-
tion officials had powers to define, according to the law and opinion, the desir-
ability and undesirability of white immigrants. This chapter deals with social 
histories of undesirable whites and introduces human stories at the expense of 
laws and policies. It shows that although whiteness was a rallying point for the 
Rhodesian settlers, there were some divisions and tensions within the white 
community based on class, ethnicity, culture and political aspects. Despite the 
existence of these divisions, in a racialised society such as Rhodesia, whites cer-
tainly enjoyed colonial privileges and power compared to Africans. Rhodesian 
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settlers would consider it a disgrace if new white immigrants had similar living 
standards to Africans.
Desirable and undesirable white immigrants, whiteness 
and Britishness in Rhodesia
Immediately after the war, the Southern Rhodesian government embarked 
on a massive drive to attract white settlers of the “right type”, mainly from 
Britain. Generally, the right type meant white immigrants from Britain and 
English-speaking South Africans with capital, acceptable moral and political 
views, sound health, and with no criminal records, amongst other requirements. 
Section 3(d) of the Southern Rhodesian immigration regulation provided a 
definition of the legal immigrants which the country was willing to either 
accept or deny entrance to. Rhodesian immigration officials and the governor 
had the power to classify immigrants as desirable and undesirable after receiv-
ing positive or suspicious information from any foreign government or through 
diplomatic channels.1 Immigration officers were supposed to issue a written 
statement to immigrants either granting or denying entry or asking them to 
leave the country as undesirable. If immigrants were deemed undesirable, they 
had the right to appeal to the nearest magistrate court within three days after 
receiving a notice of deportation.2 Evidently, besides the provisions of the law, 
immigration officials played a significant part in defining the desirability and 
undesirability of immigrants depending on circumstances.
The issue of white population stability remained centrally important to set-
tler politics throughout the colonial period and immigration remained the 
main way of increasing the white population.3 However, Rhodesian immigra-
tion policies were selective, restrictive and less accommodating, especially to 
those immigrants who were not of British cultural extraction.4 Ethnic chauvin-
ism reflected itself in the immigration policies of Southern Rhodesia at least 
before the 1960s. This factor, amongst others, discouraged large-scale white 
immigration into Rhodesia especially from 1890 up to the 1940s, despite the 
officials’ desire to create a “white man’s country”.5 After the Rhodesian Front 
government unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965, 
white migration and demographic patterns took a different twist and scholarly 
attention has focused on this period.6 For example, Peter Godwin and Ian 
Hancock discuss the impact of the war on white politics in the 1970s and the 
contradictions whites encountered in trying to defend what they called the 
“Rhodesian way of life”.7 In his study of the final days of white Rhodesia, 
Josiah Brownell argues that the state capitulated primarily because it lost the 
battle of numbers to stand against Africans.8 The selectivity of Southern Rho-
desian immigration regulations was not unique. In the 1940s, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand were not willing to allow entry to whites of perceived poor 
quality.9 While the literature on Rhodesia discuss patterns of white migration 
and the selective nature of immigration policies, it assumes that only the so-
called desirable whites settled in the country.
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One striking feature of the Rhodesian settler community was its Britishness, 
a situation that remained dominant up until the late 1950s.10 Rhodesian set-
tlers appropriated the sense of Britishness to distinguish themselves from the 
Afrikaner-dominated South Africa. The state preferred settlers of British origin 
who could develop the country and be good citizens and this explains Rho-
desians’ desire to create a British fragment north of the Limpopo River. For 
white Rhodesians, the inclusion of non-British “types” would create, in effect, 
an entirely new fragment in Rhodesia, but one which was not entirely Brit-
ish.11 Frank Clements reveals that in white Rhodesian society, ‘status depended 
more on origin than on class or education. Where a man’s father came from 
mattered more than anything else’.12 Unsurprisingly, as John Parker observes, 
‘Rhodesia remained in many ways the most British of all the colonies’.13 The 
influence of civil servants and the jingoism of Rhodes, the founder of the col-
ony, were instrumental in propping up this ultra-British flare making Rhodesia 
‘more English than the English’.14 Therefore, in the years before the turbulent 
1960s, non-English speaking whites occupied a second class position within the 
Southern Rhodesian settler community.
Rhodesian whites created an image of a thriving settler community presiding 
over the African majority. One of the reasons for screening immigrants was to 
avoid “poor white aliens” entering the colony.15 Rhodesian settlers considered 
whites who lived below their expected standards as deviants and undesirable, or 
they were simply known as the “other”. This was different from the early Rho-
desian settler self-image fashioned in relation to Africans, the imperial home-
land of Britain and white South Africans.16 This is different from Linda Colley’s 
argument that common threats, real or imagined fears, or interests united British 
people in the Dominions and settler colonies acting as points of convergence at 
different times. Colley postulates that ‘whatever their own differences, Britons 
could feel united in dominion over, and in distinction from, the millions of 
colonial subjects beyond their own boundaries’.17 In South Africa, John Lam-
bert observed that British whites constructed their identities in relation to Afri-
kaners and Africans.18 In an ambivalent scenario, Rhodesian settlers not only 
fashioned their identities against Africans but also in relation to desirable whites. 
However, the definition of undesirability was fluid depending on the prevail-
ing circumstances, especially in the post-war years when the state judged other 
white immigrants as undesirable. As a result, the definition of desirability and 
undesirability depended on political, social and economic factors. The govern-
ment granted resident permits to some whites who initially entered the country 
as desirable, but later these same whites came to be regarded as undesirable.
Post-war white immigration, assimilation and 
“Poor White Trash”
During the Second World War, there was a drop in white immigration as over-
seas travelling was difficult and the Rhodesian government wanted to keep jobs 
open for the demobilised white soldiers. As part of its war effort for the British 
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Empire, Southern Rhodesia hosted over 12,000 German, Austrian and Italian 
internees as well as Polish refugees.19 Deliberations were made after the war 
to accept Italians who made applications to stay in the country provided they 
had employment and were “of good character”, in order for them to be assimi-
lated into the settler community.20 Immigration officials placed emphasis on 
their moral conduct to ascertain whether their desirability was compatible with 
established settler standards. However, many internees of different nationalities 
and Polish refugees chose not to remain in the country after the war. Even so, 
after the war, white immigration increased as hundreds of demobilised British 
soldiers entered the country under the Rhodesian land settlement scheme to 
attract British and Royal Air Force (RAF) ex-servicemen and their families.21 
The UK provided free passage into Rhodesia for a limited number of suitable 
British ex-servicemen and women together with their dependants.22 Rhodesia 
wanted white immigrants with a certain amount of income who had friends in 
Rhodesia who were already involved in farming.23 The government expected 
immigrants to possess a sum of money and/or property exceeding £50, a fur-
ther sum exceeding £10 for each dependent they brought with them, and 
bona fide employment for a period of not less than six months.24 Arguably, few 
whites could meet these criteria and this provision deliberately excluded a large 
number of prospective immigrants.
The Selection Immigration Board was responsible for selecting suitable and 
desirable white immigrants with almost complete autonomy. Some members 
of the government made up the Board and worked closely with other depart-
ments for consultation in unclear circumstances, but it had the final decision. 
During the war, refugees without income were a source of concern to the 
Board. The Board noted that Jewish refugees and non-English speaking whites 
who entered the colony during the pre-1940 period were keen to bring in 
their relatives of varying degrees of kinship without the necessary means or 
qualifications to earn a living.25 However, their relatives in Rhodesia attempted 
to overcome this setback by giving promises of maintenance. For fortuitous rea-
sons, such promises were of no effect before the law and repudiated in the event 
of death or a change of mind by the local sponsor, leaving the applicant to char-
ity.26 The Board did not regard these applicants as useful and desirable citizens. 
It considered that accepting such cases would lead to organised immigration of 
non-English speaking whites to the probable prejudice of ex-service and other 
British immigrants.27 The Board confined their acceptance to compassionate 
cases involving wives, children under sixteen and aged parents or grandparents. 
In this case, class played a crucial role in determining the undesirability of these 
white groups. The Appeal Board made their selections on the basis of personal 
opinion and not on law, in deciding on the desirability and undesirability of 
immigrants. Therefore, there was a possibility for the Selection Board to refuse 
individual applications made on identical grounds. For instance, the Appeal 
Board could decide to admit the unqualified whites on compassionate grounds 
or could refuse the application.28 Even if repeatedly overruled by the Appeal 
Board the Selection Board would adhere to its view and continue to reject 
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applications of this type, thus exposing the contradictions within the immigra-
tion policies of the country.
The state was unable to fulfil its intended ambition of attracting large num-
bers of whites and to assimilate them into the Rhodesian settler community. 
Authorities doubted the feasibility of simultaneously bringing large numbers 
of whites to Rhodesia and assimilating them with the ideas and habits of the 
country.29 As Shutt notes, new immigrants flocking into the country after 
the war were to be educated in the nature of white Rhodesian culture and 
manners by older settlers.30 Considering the racial nature of Rhodesia, it was 
difficult for the old settlers to integrate large volumes of new immigrants 
holding liberal views. However, some immigrants were officers leaving newly 
independent India who found Rhodesia to be the best place for them because 
they believed in white supremacy.31 There were also adventurous immigrants 
from South Africa who were perturbed by assertive Afrikaner nationalism and 
the election victory of the National Party. By the late 1940s it became appar-
ent that the influx of immigrants was greater than the country could possibly 
absorb.32 To deal with this challenge, the government introduced immigra-
tion restrictions to manageable proportions by compelling employers to give 
a guarantee for the repatriation expenses of immigrants introduced into the 
country. This regulation encouraged employers to engage immigrants from 
other territories in Southern Africa rather than the UK.33 This incentivised 
employers to hire migrants from so-called undesirable white groups in South 
Africa and Mozambique. The government introduced a flat rate of immigra-
tion guarantees, irrespective of whether an employer brings the immigrant 
from Southern Africa or from the UK. By 1950 the government had relaxed 
the immigration regulations into the country. After two years, the govern-
ment returned financial deposit guarantees to employers on behalf of British 
immigrants.
When the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland came into being (1953–1963), aspects of the desirability of white 
immigrants remained topical. Rhodesian settlers flaunted the idea of maintain-
ing the ambiguous British way of life in the Federation. Southern Rhodesia 
attracted more white immigrants because it was the most economically devel-
oped territory in the Federation. The 1954 Immigration Act and the Immigra-
tion Regulations governed the selection of immigrants into the Federation. 
The Federal government took over the responsibility of immigration from the 
three territorial authorities placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs based in 
Salisbury, Rhodesia’s capital and the Federal capital. The government’s immi-
gration policy was to bring into the Federation the greatest number of suitable 
immigrants that the country could absorb in order to develop the country’s 
natural resources.34 There were two selection boards: one in Salisbury and the 
other at Rhodesia House in Britain, which considered applications for perma-
nent residence in the Federation from British subjects. According to immigra-
tion regulations, immigrants were supposed to get residence permits before 
entering the Federation. The London board considered applications for permits 
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only from British subjects who at the date of application were resident in the 
UK or the Republic of Ireland. The Salisbury board considered applications for 
residence permits in the case of all other British subjects.
In considering applications for residence permits, the boards followed the 
procedure set out in the immigration Act and Regulations. The boards were 
to be fully satisfied that the desirable immigrants were of good character, 
sound physical and mental health, that they had sufficient means to pay for 
their maintenance, and were in possession of sufficient capital.35 The boards 
could refuse residence permits to any applicant likely to pursue occupations 
already congested in the Federation. They also considered the productivity, 
suitability and efficiency of qualified immigrants before granting them resi-
dence permits.36 The Federal board could refuse to issue residence permits 
to aliens if not satisfied that such whites were likely to become desirable 
inhabitants or were harmful to the welfare of the Federation within a reason-
able period after entry.37 Authorities expected immigrants who applied to 
stay in Rhodesia to have knowledge of the English language. This was in line 
with the national language policy and helped to preserve the Britishness of 
Rhodesia.
Rhodesian settlers expressed mixed perceptions towards some of the post-
war British immigrants. Some well-placed Rhodesian officials, such as Alan D. 
Hutchison Lloyd, claimed that a greater proportion of the post-war immigrants 
belonged to the lower class. Lloyd joined the Education Department in 1933, 
transferred to the Department of Justice, and later became a member of Garfield 
Todd’s short-lived Cabinet. Lloyd averred that after the war, British immigrants 
were of the poor type endeavouring to get away from the austere post-war con-
ditions in Britain.38 Old settlers expressed unsympathetic attitudes towards the 
class of new immigrants whom they accused of diluting the racial boundaries 
of Rhodesia. Lloyd recalls a revealing incident that sheds light on how other 
non-Rhodesian whites expressed similar disgust at the class of the post-war 
immigrants:
I remember well going down for an appeal by air to Bloemfontein in the 
Union of South Africa. I was sitting next to a man who told me he was a 
Director of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and lived many years in 
Ceylon, who, knowing I was a Rhodesian, said to me that he was surprised 
at the amount of the poor white trash that he saw in Bulawayo.39
Evidently, in this quotation, Lloyd was eager to express his status and posi-
tion because he could fly to South Africa and meet top officials. The idea 
of calling new British immigrants trash is quite revealing of how class and 
 poverty were important in defining undesirability. It also reveals that even 
British immigrants, despite being of the officially accepted cultural group, 
could be  considered undesirable if they were not sufficiently wealthy. Moreo-
ver, some new British immigrants freely mixed with Africans, transcending 
racial boundaries. Ralph Drew Palmer, who came to Rhodesia in the 1920s, 
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alleged that it was the nature of post-war immigrants that changed the politi-
cal landscape of the colony:
They used to go and have tea in the kitchen, and speak to [Africans], as 
they would do to another European, and eventually the African would let 
them down – he would pinch all the sugar or go away and not come back 
on the time he said he would. Moreover, all these sort of things would 
upset these chaps and they immediately went over to the right wing. It is 
one of the reasons for a sudden political change and feeling in the country; 
it was a result of the new immigrants.40
This kind of racial indifference angered the older settlers who considered 
themselves as heirs to the so-called Rhodesian way of life and guardians of the 
pioneering and imperial tradition in the country. Old Rhodesians cynically 
directed their intolerance to new immigrants as the scapegoats for political and 
economic pressures in the country.
Rhodesian settlers were not comfortable in welcoming immigrants hold-
ing different political views, and grew progressively more hostile to anything 
they believed to be communism after the Second World War. The example of 
Charles Taylor is a clear testimony where authorities used political justifica-
tion to conceal deep-seated labour problems in the country. Taylor, a recent 
migrant from Britain, was a key figure in the 1954 Rhodesian railways strike 
over poor salaries. He had previously been a member of the National Union 
of Mineworkers in the UK. Rhodesian immigration officials deported Taylor 
for leading the strike and most importantly because of his communist con-
nection in Britain.41 Taylor’s wife claimed that her husband ceased to be a 
card-carrying member of the Communist Party before he left for Rhodesia 
and, upon entering Rhodesia, had denied that her husband had any connection 
with the Communist Party in Britain.42 Garfield Todd, the prime minister of 
Southern Rhodesia, alleged that his administration deported Taylor because his 
wife said that he had been a member of the Communist Party in Britain but he 
lied to immigration authorities about his connections.43 Since Taylor showed 
great skills in organising a strike, it was essential to find some way of removing 
him from the scene.44 The briefings of the British Security Liaison Officer in 
Salisbury revealed that Taylor had a communist background and that he main-
tained his communist connection in the UK until his departure for Southern 
Rhodesia.45
Initially, the government accused Taylor of breaching the Rhodesian Peace 
Preservation Act by leading the strike. Jack Keller, a Labour member of the 
Rhodesian Parliament described the Act in cynical terms. He called it ‘a bar-
barous and a measure of the Mussolini and Hitler type. It gave the prime min-
ister power to turn Southern Rhodesia into a police state and should never be 
tolerated by a British possession’.46 Todd admitted that the Act did not target 
Europeans who should have a strong sense of responsibility. Later, Taylor com-
plained that he did not receive any communication from Rhodesia prior to his 
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deportation as a prohibited immigrant. The high commissioner in the Federa-
tion of Rhodesia and Nyasaland noted that Taylor had outstanding qualities 
as a demagogue.47 The Rhodesian government considered Taylor a dangerous 
person to remain in the colony and decided to deport him as an undesirable 
immigrant. The National Union of Mineworkers protested over the deporta-
tion of Taylor from Southern Rhodesia because of a labour dispute and without 
trial.48 However, Taylor did not bother to use the provisions of the legislation 
to contest his deportation. Taylor alleged that whilst in Rhodesia he did the 
unmentionable thing of borrowing money from his (African) house-boy to buy 
milk for his children.49 This was unmentionable because Taylor belonged to the 
broader white society expected to live above the level of Africans.
Some whites became undesirable and were declared prohibited immigrants 
after the government granted them permits to stay in Rhodesia. For instance, 
one Watch Tower Movement missionary called Cooke arrived in Rhodesia in 
January 1948, on a six-month visit permit for work. He was engaged as a 
full-time missionary and devoted most of his time to Africans. Later in 1948, 
four more Watch Tower missionaries arrived from Canada for the purpose of 
full-time employment. The secretary for Native Affairs was of the opinion that 
the Watch Tower organisation was now more of a nuisance than it being dan-
gerous.50 He also felt that declaring these five Europeans as prohibited immi-
grants – after allowing them in to the colony for two months – would make 
martyrs of them. He agreed with the commissioner of police that the sending 
of missionaries to Rhodesia by the Watch Tower Society was unnecessary and 
undesirable.51 He therefore suggested that instead of declaring these five people 
prohibited immigrants, they be given a time limit and told that their tem-
porary permits would not be renewed. The government deliberately refused 
the renewal of their permits and deported them as prohibited and undesirable 
characters. However, it was no secret that the state knew about the previous 
activities of the Watch Tower movements in the country around 1917. These 
missionaries were whites, English-speaking and possessed qualities that made 
them desirable in the first place. Their alleged activities amongst Africans shifted 
their desirable status to become undesirable immigrants.
Some cultural associations such as the District of the Sons of England and 
Benevolent Society of Rhodesia were deeply concerned with the emergence of 
divisions within white Rhodesia settler community, supposedly caused by new 
immigrants. The association originated in Toronto in 1874 before it spread into 
South Africa in 1881 and later into Rhodesia with its membership restricted 
to males of British birth or descent, pledging to maintain imperial interests in 
the subcontinent.52 The Lodge complained that non-British immigrants were 
diluting the British way of life in the country. The Rhodesian settler commu-
nity was more egalitarian and not entirely reflective of the class-based British 
life. The minister of Internal Affairs, Hugh Beadle, told the Sons of England 
about the British foundations of white settler Rhodesia. He alluded that the 
preservation of the essentiality of the British character of Rhodesia and the 
reasonable standard of living of whites were two foundations of the country.53 
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These ideals seemed axiomatic but there was pressure on the government to 
introduce measures that might encroach on them. Southern Rhodesian legisla-
tors designed the Aliens Act of 1946 as a way of preserving the colony’s British 
background. Beadle assured the Lodge that since 1946 the immigration of aliens 
had been limited annually to 8 per cent of the number of British immigrations 
who entered the colony.54 Periodic movements for admitting larger numbers of 
central Europeans and Italian peasants for the colony’s economic progress were 
not sufficient for justifying the dilution of Rhodesian white values. Officials 
reasoned that the influx of non-British immigrants had the potential of lower-
ing standards of living in the colony.55 However, this was an exaggeration: offi-
cials conveniently excluded other white immigrants because of their cultural 
heritage regardless of their socio-economic status.
Rhodesian officials were not willing to accept immigrants looking for jobs, 
to avoid the problem of unemployed whites. The country needed white immi-
grants able to start their own private business. The Rhodesian Recorder, a monthly 
magazine concerned with industrial development in the country, in an exag-
gerated manner alluded to this fantasy: ‘Rhodesia is outstandingly a place where 
you can get on your own, in preference to getting into a job. People taking risks 
quite the opposite to the socialistic doctrine of so-called “security” built up the 
British Empire’.56 This comment captures differences between Rhodesia and 
the post-war British welfare state. The industrial community further advocated 
for more thrift and entrepreneurial settlers to immigrate into the colony. ‘We do 
not want too many cotton-wool people in Rhodesia. . . . We need all talented 
folk who are thinking of settling here. . . . Rhodesia is one of the last bastions 
of private enterprise’.57 The idea of attracting only talented whites and framing 
Rhodesia as the last bastion of private enterprise is telling of the rhetoric of 
settler pride. Certainly, this was an exaggeration cushioned in settler national-
ism and quite opposite of the economic realities in the country. Rhodesian 
whites prejudiced job seeking immigrants as soft-handed and lazy because it 
was against the settler projection of a hardworking community. Desirable white 
immigrants were supposed to bring skills and money to invest in the country or 
establish branches in Rhodesia from overcrowded British industries.58 The idea 
was that this type of white immigrant would lead to the economic develop-
ment of the country. White immigrants who could not take care of themselves 
were undesirable as they had the potential to offset established white standards 
within the Rhodesian settler community.
Immigration of other “undesirable” whites
During the Federation years, Salisbury, the Federal capital, attracted the most 
immigrants including the so-called undesirable white immigrants because it 
offered more opportunities. In the 1950s, the largest groups of undesirable 
alien whites were Italian, Portuguese and Greek.59 Soon after the Second World 
War, Greece was plunged into serious economic challenges leading to the exo-
dus of many people looking for economic opportunities and the country was 
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steeped in poverty in the 1960s.60 The Federation attracted Italian, Portuguese 
and Greek immigrants who were seeking economic opportunities. Because 
they were non-British and were looking for economic opportunities, Federal 
authorities considered them to be undesirable. Non-British immigrants for the 
years 1955–56 constituted 12 per cent of the total white immigration, though 
only 10 per cent were considered to be desirable.61 This meant that 2 per cent 
of the total number of white migrants were non-British undesirable immi-
grants, which was quite significant and the majority of them chose to settle in 
Southern Rhodesia.
There were particular worries within the Selection Board over Italians 
who opened firms and businesses in the Federation and employed their own 
nationals.62 The state wanted to attract investment in the Federation and limit 
the numbers of the so-called alien immigrants. Interestingly, even if Italians 
belonged to the wealthy classes, their cultural background made them unde-
sirable. The Board encountered difficulties when non-British firms registered, 
acquired premises and engaged staff from outside Rhodesia to apply for resi-
dence permits.63 Officials wanted firms to employ Rhodesian settlers before 
engaging Italians, Portuguese, Greeks and other white immigrants.
The construction of the Kariba Dam in the 1950s exposed race and class 
tensions in Southern Rhodesia as the presence of Italians caused uneasiness 
amongst the pro-British settlers of the colony. The project itself was a source of 
settler pride because of its size and engineering achievement, seen to demon-
strate white civilisation and progress in the region. As Julia Tischler writes, the 
fact that the Federation awarded an Italian construction firm the tender to con-
struct the Kariba Dam generated much tension in Rhodesia and it was a met-
ropolitan problem. ‘It exposed colonial patronage as being incompatible with 
“free-market” modernisation, probing British motives behind post-war devel-
opment and contributing to the ideological deconstruction of the Empire’.64 
Rhodesian whites did not embrace the presence of southern Europeans whom 
they looked down upon as belonging to inferior cultural heritage. Their white 
skin and race were not enough to be on equal terms with British and English-
speaking settlers in the country. Their class made them undesirable despite the 
fact that they were Europeans and not Africans.
However, it was not only during the construction of the Kariba Dam that 
race and class tensions were exposed within the white Rhodesian community. 
Perceptions about Italians continued to surface in racial partnership politics 
associated with the Federation period in Rhodesia. The overtly British white 
Rhodesians perceived Italians as “poor” whites. Their presence in the coun-
try would therefore dilute the perceived Britishness and moral standards of 
Rhodesian white society. Some Rhodesians called Italians and Greeks, as the 
novelist Doris Lessing states, “wops and dagos” or even worse “scum of the 
earth”.65 Their white skins were not sufficient as a cultural asset, even when 
placed in contrast with Africans. Lessing recalls one Rhodesian liberal white 
saying, ‘I do not mind being considered the equal of an educated African, but 
I object to any dregs from Europe being my equal simply because they have 
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white skins’.66 In this case, undesirability was quite an arbitrary and fluid con-
cept that the state deliberately applied to include and exclude other white 
categories.
The Rhodesian business community perceived that non-British artisans 
accepted lower rates which was in direct contrast to established settler standards 
associated with advanced skills and higher wages. Rhodesian whites questioned 
the possibility of assimilating Italians who were willing to accept lower stand-
ards against the accepted settler status.67 There was no legislation restricting 
the proportion of alien to British employees and firms took advantage of this 
situation. This led to the formation of clusters of non-British nationals and 
Rhodesian settlers who felt that this had the potential of diluting and endan-
gering their imagined white standards and the Britishness of Southern Rhode-
sia. Moreover, the situation disadvantaged British subjects in the country who 
felt entitled to available job opportunities. Selection Boards could refuse issuing 
permits to aliens if there were unemployed British white artisans available in the 
country.68 Overall this was not helpful as some alien firms were prepared to do 
without rather than employ British artisans. In 1958, the Rhodesia chief indus-
trial officer compiled a list of 73 firms giving names of building contractors in 
Salisbury who employed aliens. Twenty firms employed only alien artisans and 
the remaining forty employed a mix, although aliens were predominant.69 This 
was in relation to the official desire to populate the country with British setters. 
In the existing circumstances of poor employment prospects, there were fewer 
British immigrants willing to migrate to the Federation. In Britain and South 
Africa, most people in the occupational categories from which the Federation 
obtained its immigrants enjoyed a high standard of living.70 These countries also 
demanded their services and no one risked being unemployed. As a result, this 
forced firms to hire cheaper and readily available white artisans.
Another factor worrying officials was that many foreign migrants had left 
their families behind, especially Italians working on the railways. This brought 
substantial demand for family reunion that had a great impact on the number 
of permits issued to aliens and irked officials when some of them used their 
social networks to bring in their relatives and friends.71 After the war, Italy faced 
economic challenges and hence many Italians abroad saw no reason for going 
back home. Some had lost contact and roots with home after spending many 
years in other parts of the world and wanted to stay in Southern Rhodesia or 
other territories in the Federation. After the promulgation of the Aliens Act in 
September 1946, by 1949 the Alien Immigrants Selection Board approved 148 
applications from Italians.72 The Board received a steady stream of applications 
for permits from Italians living in such places as Egypt, Abyssinia, Eritrea and 
Somaliland because in these territories colonial rule was ending, triggering 
political and economic uncertainty.
The Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 
was responsible for bringing most of the undesirable whites into the country 
employed by the Rhodesian railways. Because of their cultural and national 
affinities, they tended to stick together in little enclaves because they entered the 
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country in batches, infuriating Rhodesian whites concerned with the preserva-
tion of a British settler colony. Rhodesian settlers were also a minority mainly 
made up of immigrants but could not tolerate other white categories because of 
colonial class, ethnic, political and moral prejudices. In December 1955, the first 
batch of Greeks employed by the railways faced objection from their British 
colleagues.73 However, this apparently subsided because the numerically smaller 
and politically weaker Greeks did not retaliate. Rhodesian whites showed initial 
objection and resentment for working with Greeks because of language diffi-
culties and prejudices related to unhygienic habits.74 Rhodesian whites associ-
ated whiteness with settler privileges, higher wages, white-collar jobs, hygiene 
and comfortable living conditions above those of Africans. Tischler argues that 
in a society founded on immense inequalities between the black majority and 
the white minority, settlers vehemently defended these privileges.75 Rhodesian 
settlers dominated the African majority using discriminative legislations in all 
aspects of life. As a result, settlers wanted to protect these colonial privileges and 
could not tolerate whites who seemed to lower these standards.
The following examples demonstrate that Rhodesian settlers conflated racial 
boundaries with acceptable moral conduct to ascribe undesirability to non-
British immigrants. During the Anglo-Rhodesia steel project, the presence of 
Italian workers disgusted Rhodesian officials. The minister of Interior, Hugh 
Beadle, declared that an influx of Italians were living almost on the level as Afri-
cans.76 The Italian ambassador was anxious to dissuade the Rhodesian govern-
ment from retracting their approval from the scheme to employ Italian labour. 
The Foreign Office was anxious to see this project progressing well to ease 
Italy’s economic challenges and population problems, thereby diminishing the 
spread of communism in Italy. It would certainly be unfortunate, to the British 
Foreign Office officials, to abandon the project purely because of any prejudice 
against Italians on the part of the Southern Rhodesian government.77 The paro-
chialism of Southern Rhodesian settlers towards other whites had the potential 
of tarnishing British-Italian relations in the post-war years. Identity politics 
amplified by the classification of other white groups as undesirable had definite 
political implications. Although it was anxious for the deal to work, the Foreign 
Office did not want to endanger the general immigration policy of Southern 
Rhodesia. In similar circumstances, the Rhodesian railways which employed 
Italian plate layers expected them be able to read, write and speak English in 
order to be able to understand instructions.78 Italians supervised Africans in the 
railways; therefore, it was mandatory for them to present settler self-image as 
respectable white masters. The Rhodesian government could not expect the 
railways to employ Italians holding extreme political views at variance with the 
democratic principles observed in British territories.79 Since they worked with 
Africans, there were fears that radical or fascist-minded Italians would influence 
Africans to disrespect authorities and question the settler government.
The proximity of colonial Mozambique in the east allowed for Portuguese 
artisans and “chancers” to infiltrate into the Federation looking for employ-
ment.80 By calling Portuguese artisans “chancers”, Rhodesian settlers perceived 
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these immigrants to be of poor class by their white standards. This resulted in 
many Portuguese entering the building industry and competing with white 
British artisans. Since Portuguese artisans looked for cheap employment, this was 
an aberration to established white views. Industrial officials complained about 
the alleged conduct and indecent behaviour of Portuguese workers considered 
inappropriate with regards to perceived white moral purity. Because of their 
numbers, Portuguese immigrants formed their own communities, which made 
assimilation impossible. Officials noted that their social contacts were Asians, 
coloured and African prostitutes, shebeens (unlicensed drinking establishments) 
and that they generally lived in squalid conditions and standards lower than 
that of Africans.81 In colonial Mozambique, sexual intercourse between African 
women and Portuguese men was not strictly prohibited, unlike in Southern 
Rhodesia. Marc Epprecht points out that ‘Sea kaffirs’ (Portuguese), carrying a 
reputation of sexual indiscipline from Mozambique, were especially worrisome 
to respectable Southern Rhodesians.’82 Industrial officials complained that Por-
tuguese immigrants deliberately broke every industrial law and were allegedly 
prepared to work under uncomfortable conditions, which a local white Rho-
desian artisan would not tolerate.83 Allison Shutt and Tony King show that old 
settlers wanted to present a picture of Southern Rhodesia as a white man’s 
colony where whites could achieve a higher standard of living than elsewhere.84
Another example of where unacceptable moral behaviour translated to unde-
sirability is the case of Portuguese Joao Filipe Viegas. In February 1956, a mem-
ber of the Criminal Investigation Department cautioned him after he harassed a 
21-year-old white woman. Another white woman accused Viegas of constantly 
following her around Bulawayo, pestering her and abducting her nineteen-
year-old daughter.85 In August 1956, there were complaints that Viegas was 
having an affair with a young coloured woman. In the opinion of the senior 
Social Welfare Officer, Viegas was wrecking what was otherwise a happy mar-
riage, prompting his deportation.86 In addition, officials classified four Greeks 
as undesirable residents for homosexual practices, all of whom were firefighters 
on the Rhodesian Railways.87 In the early 1950s, a popular culture of intoler-
ance against homosexuality coalesced in a less explicit but equally repressive 
form in Southern Rhodesia.88 The appearance of homosexuality within the 
Rhodesian settler community with its celebrated masculinity and machismo 
was unacceptable. The masculinity was associated with ‘hard-drinking, wom-
anising, laughing-in-the-face-of danger, at-ease-in-the-bundu (wilderness) and 
with Africans’.89 Yet the state encountered difficulties and embarrassment when 
southern European whites with different sexual views entered the country 
in the post-war years. It was also difficult to ascertain one’s undesirability in 
terms of sexual conduct; these are circumstances that officials tried to rectify by 
deporting individuals accused of indecent behaviours.
Rhodesian officials accepted immigrants with criminal records in their pre-
vious country of residence or who were involved in unlawful acts. However, 
some whites with criminal records entered Rhodesia as holiday makers under 
circumstances which the state could not detect. In 1953, Manuel Madeira De 
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Faria entered the country on a holiday visit but did not declare his previous 
crimes in Mozambique. The government deferred his application for a resi-
dence permit when he admitted to two convictions in Lourenço Marques for 
assaulting Africans.90 In May 1955, when it appeared he was likely to become 
destitute, he admitted upon enquiry that he also had a conviction of robbery 
in Beira.91 De Faria was a serial criminal but he managed to enter Rhodesia, 
exposing the colonial state’s porous borders. Later on, authorities were able to 
track his criminal record and deported him back to Mozambique as an unde-
sirable immigrant. Even more embarrassing were cases of laziness portrayed by 
certain whites. For instance, the case of Joao Salgado Ferreira who entered the 
country on 9 November 1954. Employers dismissed him for laziness shortly 
after taking employment, prompting him to travel around the country accept-
ing casual employment.92 This was an embarrassment to the acclaimed settler 
picture, as Shutt writes, of a hardworking class of whites determined to develop 
their country who could even work in their homes despite having mostly Afri-
can servants.93 When he was later joined by his wife – three months pregnant 
by Ferreira’s brother – and three children, his marital relationship came under 
strain. He left his children alone in dirty and unkempt conditions, completely 
neglected by their parents.94 In 1956, the government deemed him undesirable 
and he was deported on grounds of his morals and ethical conduct not resonat-
ing with Rhodesian settler social standards.
The case of Jose Joao provides another illustrative example. Following his 
entry into Southern Rhodesia in 1953, the courts had convicted him for threat-
ening violence, possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition without 
a permit. Against established white standards, he lived in squalor in an African 
compound, habitually consorting with African women for sexual intercourse.95 
When he entered the country, officials could not ascertain his behaviour lead-
ing to his deportation as an undesirable white immigrant in a situation where 
moral and criminal accusations overlapped. In 1956, the courts convicted Fer-
nando Moreira Malia of assault occasioning bodily harm and allegedly living 
with a pregnant coloured woman.96 Arguably, there were other whites involved 
in such acts but these could not attract the states’ attention because they prob-
ably belonged to a cultural category that was deemed acceptable. In 1955, the 
government declared Joaquim Antonio De Lemos as a prohibited immigrant 
and he returned to Lourenço Marques. He re-entered Rhodesia, worked as an 
insurance agent, and ran an informal employment bureau at Bulawayo before it 
came to the notice of the Immigration Authorities.97 Later, the police arrested 
him for secretly recruiting and importing Portuguese artisans, charging exorbi-
tant recruitment fees.98 The government deported him because of his criminal 
activities and for circumventing the authorities. Another Italian, Luigi Grillo, 
faced 42 days’ imprisonment for three counts of theft. He stole money totalling 
£22, 10 from a fellow railway employee, and the government declared him 
as undesirable and a prohibited immigrant.99 In another case, the Ministry of 
Home Affairs was perturbed to learn that L. P. Pafitis, a Cypriot, had been ille-
gally resident in the Federation for five years without officials’ notice.100 These 
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cases go to show that Rhodesian settlers wanted to project an image of a law 
abiding community.
In some instances, class was central in defining immigrants as undesirable 
without placing emphasis on race. For example, in June 1956, two Greek plas-
terers and one Italian carpenter arrived in Gwelo. Officials reported that the 
carpenter was of a reasonable standard but the Greeks failed badly.101 One of 
the Greeks found work so strange that his hands blistered the first day and he 
eventually worked as a learner supervisor on the railways.102 At the same time, 
another Greek plasterer arrived in Fort Victoria and his lack of ability was such 
that the ICEM representative removed him and put him on a day’s trial with 
a Gwelo firm. The result of the trial was that the employer was prepared to 
continue his employment on the same conditions as the trial, that is, without 
payment of wages.103 The ICEM local representative then asked MacDonald 
Construction Ltd. to employ him and suggested, as an inducement, that they 
could pay him less than the minimum of the building agreement. Again at 
Fort Victoria, officials found an African helping a Greek plumber where he 
had gone wrong in making a sheet metal downpipe. On being informed, the 
employer was not too concerned and stated, ‘these chaps are grafters and I can 
kick them around which is more than I can do to the Britisher’.104 This quota-
tion suggests that Greek workers were less white since employers could beat 
them just like Africans without any problem. They could not do this to British 
artisans who could sue them or even publicise the incident in the newspapers. 
It would be unfair to condemn the artisan in this case as there were very few 
countries where the plumber was required to do sheet metal work; he might 
have been quite a good plumber. It would have been acceptable if the Greek 
was the one showing the African where he had gone wrong, or at least would 
have preserved the white settler image.
Disobeying superiors at work, especially in front of Africans, also qualified 
white immigrants as undesirable. The cases discussed here demonstrate how 
ethical conduct at work and moral questions rendered other white groups as 
undesirable. Authorities defined the Italian Elio Jugovaz as undesirable because 
of his alleged unbecoming conduct in the work place. According to officials, 
Jugovaz was purposely obstructive in his work, subversive in his speech, rebel-
lious against discipline and incited others to adopt an indifferent attitude 
towards work.105 Indeed, officials did not expect his conduct in front of Africans 
and the government severely reprimanded him, he lost his salary and he was 
eventually deported. Likewise, Pavlos Nikiforakis, a Greek, commenced work 
on 30 December 1955, as firefighter at the Rhodesian railways. Authorities 
made some enquiries regarding a delay in a shunting engine where Nikiforakis 
worked, resulting in him receiving two severe reprimands for absence from 
duty.106 He also got a wage reduction for fifty-two days for absence from work. 
He agitated for his release from the railways and allegedly used the administra-
tion as a means to enter the Federation. The government eventually deported 
him on 14 September 1956 as an undesirable character showing negligence 
while on duty.
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Despite these fears, decolonisation on the African continent had some imme-
diate undesired effects. The country received large numbers of immigrants from 
Mozambique and Angola in 1975 following the end of Portuguese colonial 
rule in those countries.107 Immediately after Belgium granted the Congo inde-
pendence in 1960, the new country was plunged into civil war that had a psy-
chological impact on Rhodesian whites.108 It created a sense of white solidarity 
against African nationalism. David Coltart’s family hosted Belgian refugees, and 
he recalled they ‘told harrowing tales of what was happening in the Congo . . . 
the spectre of thousands of Belgian refugees in their country had a profound 
effect on the mind sets of white Southern Rhodesians’.109 In 1960, there were 
bloody riots in Southern Rhodesia as blacks protested against the colonial state’s 
racist policies. Because of these insecurities, white solidarities, conservatism and 
rightwing extremism surfaced in Southern Rhodesia. The coming into power 
of the Rhodesian Front in 1962 and the subsequent hostilities between blacks 
and the settler regime had lasting effects. The fear of African nationalism forced 
Rhodesian settlers to embrace previously undesirable whites. However, the 
Rhodesian Front declared other whites as prohibited immigrants for political 
reasons in the 1970s. The period after the UDI ushered in a different historical 
moment in Rhodesian settler colonialism and significantly altered patterns of 
white migration. It marked a turning point of race relations in the country as 
armed confrontation between blacks and whites that lasted until 1979, with the 
dawn of the country’s independence in 1980.
Conclusion
Southern Rhodesian officials considered some of the British immigrants who 
entered the colony in the immediate post-war years as undesirable and of the 
poor type. Inasmuch as the country was desperate to attract more British settlers 
of the “right type”, the opposite happened. Colonial bureaucrats and indus-
trial officials complained about lazy, “cotton-wool” type of whites flooding the 
country. The net effect of this was significant as far as the social and political ter-
rain of the colony was concerned. Their liberal ideas were often less compatible 
with Rhodesian racial boundaries. However, this was not a permanent situation 
as some of them switched to right-wing conservatism in the later years. Being 
a British immigrant was not sufficient justification to claim desirable status in 
Rhodesian settler society’s constructions of whiteness, respectability and iden-
tity politics. Claims to desirability called for more than just a legitimate claim 
to British cultural extraction. Class and acceptable moral conduct were essential 
aspects in the definition of desirability. The deportation of individuals classified 
as undesirable demonstrates the heterogeneity and divisions prevailing within 
the Rhodesian settler community before the political instabilities of the 1960s 
and 1970s. However, whiteness tended to conceal internal tensions within the 
Rhodesian settler community. However, this is not enough reason to justify set-
tler colonialism by showing that some whites were undesirable, trash or poor. 
Whatever the case, indeed, whites enjoyed better material benefits than Africans.
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The state was afraid that the so-called undesirable whites had the potential 
to upset the ambiguous British way of life in the colony and dilute the self-
built settler image. The Rhodesian settler community projected an image of a 
striving society, commanding respect and supremacy over Africans. The govern-
ment expected post-war white immigrants to maintain this image associated 
with material privileges, respectability, good behaviour and acceptable social 
conduct. The presence of the so-called white immigrants and subsequent state 
action to police their alleged social conduct reveals more about the Rhode-
sian settler perceptions and prejudice towards other whites. Moreover, undesir-
ability was an economic, political and social state-engineered and sanctioned 
category of identity. Immigration officials acted as classification officers of class 
categorisation and as gatekeepers against the penetration of undesirable whites 
in the country. While Rhodesian immigration officials worked hard to weed 
out the so-called undesirable whites, they were not always successful in car-
rying out their mission. The fact that unwanted white individuals entered the 
country exposes the porosity of colonial borders and immigration policies. On 
paper, Rhodesian immigration policies were selective, yet in practice undesir-
able white characters slipped into the country.
Undesirability was a fluid and contested category encompassing prejudice, 
unacceptable moral behaviours, extreme political views and class as well as 
criminality. The state arbitrarily applied the term undesirable depending on eco-
nomic and political developments in the country. In describing both British 
and non-British white immigrants as undesirable, the Rhodesian settler com-
munity conflated class, race, cultural and ethnic aspects under different circum-
stances. The overlapping of these facets stretched the definition and usage of 
the term arbitrarily. Arguably, immigration officers’ personal opinions and the 
ever shifting economic and political terrain of Rhodesia at any given moment 
altered the meaning of white undesirability.
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4  White people fit for a new 
South Africa? State planning, 
policy and social response 
in the parastatal cities of the 
Vaal, 1940–19901
Bill Freund
The poor white problem
During the first half of the twentieth century, no issue exercised the white poli-
ticians of South Africa more than the problem of the “poor whites”, remark-
able if compared to the later stereotype that saw South African whites as almost 
all living in the lap of luxury. Johan Fourie traces written references to this 
apparent scourge back to 1886.2 He also characterises most explanations for 
white poverty to the difficulties of farming in South Africa where the Anglo-
Boer War and then the Great Depression greatly accelerated crisis conditions 
and drove large numbers off the land.3 In a somewhat off-hand way however, 
Fourie lists a whole set of other causes and in fact these were probably also 
relevant often enough. Individual poverty cases will differ and may well have a 
dimension that is not due to macro-economic trends.4 I have argued years ago 
that both poverty and that “poor whites” are categories that can be defined in 
different ways depending on the historical context; they are not really scientific 
terms of any sort.5 The poor white problem was taken up as a political issue 
and with great enthusiasm by politicians and, for the National Party, as Lindie 
Koorts’s recent biography of Malan reminds us, like almost no other over dec-
ades.6 As such, economists are unable entirely to capture how the issue was 
understood and what really lay behind it.
The deepest connection lay in the link to racial thinking about the nature of 
South African society.7 Jeremy Seekings cited some years back a typical parlia-
mentary response of the past:
The political imperative was explained by an NP MP, Dr. Stals, who had 
just won his seat from the South African Party. The “poor white” prob-
lem, he said: is a question which not only concerns the poor; it affects the 
whole white civilisation of this country. It confronts us with the question 
whether we, the descendents [sic] of the staunch old pioneers, will main-
tain their civilisation and hand it over to our children. . . . It may be asked 
whether there is poverty only in South Africa and whether other countries 
do not suffer from the same thing. There are poor people everywhere, but 
the circumstances in South Africa are unique. . . . In this country, there is 
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a small number of whites against the natives, a few civilised people against 
uncivilised hordes, and for that reason it is so important that not a single 
white person should be allowed to go under. . . . There is no greater prob-
lem than this, because the existence of the European civilisation in this 
country hinges on it.8
There was a more prosaic reason as well. The majority of the poor whites were 
potential voters and they were largely Afrikaans speakers. As Hendrik Verwoerd 
addressing the 1934 Afrikaner Volkskongres in the role of South Africa’s first 
professional sociologist pointed out: ‘Insover ‘n baie groot deel Afrikaanssprekend 
is, moes ons skat dat ongeveer een kwart van ons Afrikaanssprekende bevolking blanke 
armes is’.9 Thus the poor white question was directly political but also a cudgel 
for Afrikaner nationalists to take up as political competitors. Verwoerd even 
insisted that for the entire population, keeping whites up to reasonable civilised 
level was critical for the future of the country. In effect, one had to hold up the 
banner for what was referred to as “civilised labour”.10
So how was this problem to be resolved? Thanks to the writing of Jeremy 
Seekings, we have a recent window on debates which marked the inter-war 
years in this connection. Seekings has convincingly shown that the US spon-
sored Carnegie Commission, meeting after 1931, was not on closer examina-
tion a turning point here as has been imagined.11 With a psychologist on its key 
research team and a big representation from the Dutch Reformed Church, the 
Commission was actually relatively hostile to the role of the state in alleviat-
ing poverty. Indeed Seekings argues that the Commission saw the poor white 
problem as fundamentally psychological.12 From this point of view, there were 
continual murmurings about the dangers of dependence, of the poor failing 
to meet their obligation as self-reliant Calvinists and the poisonous effect of a 
dole from the state. Poverty had to be linked to the troubles and weaknesses of 
particular individuals. This can probably also be linked to a rejection of urban 
life as the bright future of white South Africans. Back to the land was the sound 
movement. The Church (but the state as well) sponsored new agricultural set-
tlements, for instance on the Orange River. The old view had been to leave 
the problems of poverty and destitution to family and church. The question of 
secularisation – and the resentment of the Church at being sidestepped – was 
an important one.
Yet Seekings argues that during the 1920s the Pact government particu-
larly did intervene, and fairly effectively, in fighting poverty amongst white, 
and to a lesser extent, Coloured people (some of whom had the vote). Indeed 
General Hertzog liked to think that he had brought the poor white issue to 
a close, rather prematurely, as prime minister. Seekings goes further in taking 
the emphasis away from the shadowy poor white paradigm and the moralism 
with which it was suffused towards specific material reform in the direction 
of training social workers and offering material aid to dependent children and 
oldsters. A hallmark here was the establishment of a non-contributory old age 
pension scheme which took effect from the start of 1929. Another was the 1937 
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Children’s Act. In general, he argues that white South Africans did benefit from 
what was for the time a considerable start to a welfare state. Interestingly, this 
focus on state intervention was strongly promoted in a particular form by Ver-
woerd. He was particularly interested in the systematic training and diffusion of 
social workers, a new profession in South Africa in which he had himself been 
trained in the USA, who could direct the upliftment of the poor in the right 
way. In introducing the question of state intervention, he even referred to the 
potential nationalisation of the mining industry which towered over the South 
African business horizon.
The 1922 strike had been fought over the role of whites in the gold mines 
and it was a struggle which a state, determined to back the mining industry, 
won.13 There continued to be white workers on the gold mines but they were 
essentially supervisors of labour and tools of management, or genuinely skilled 
labour. They formed a very small percentage of the total labour force albeit that 
they won a much larger proportion of total take-home pay. The National Party 
largely, if begrudgingly, accepted this situation, but what about state employ-
ment and what about secondary industry? Well before Carnegie, a major factor 
as well was the willingness of the state to take on white and Coloured workers, 
at the expense often of Africans, in state employment. The chief exhibit for the 
interwar years was the railway system,14 but there were some others as well. 
When Parliament approved the creation of a state Iron and Steel Corporation 
in 1928, it was understood that it would be a resort for white workers to the 
greatest extent possible.
To go back for a moment to Verwoerd, he was far from the only force 
who thought about poverty as a sociological, not merely or even primarily, an 
economic construct. Parnell points us already in 1992 to the idea that proper 
state-initiated and supervised housing were thought also to play a civilising 
role in a civilising community and the Slums Act of 1934 cleared the way to 
the erection of what were seen as decent housing schemes to replace life in 
squalid pondokkies.15 Fourie also points to a feature which perhaps is the most 
under-researched: the role of education.16 This too can be a source of ideologi-
cal intervention where workers’ children are instructed in a way of behaviour 
and orientation and he mentions the growing educational levels of Afrikaans 
medium teachers during the inter-war years. However there is also the ques-
tion of technical education aimed at jobs-orientated skills acquisition. This too 
took off in South Africa. On the whole, secular state intervention won the 
day in terms of the arguments for combatting white poverty. However other 
dimensions remain part of the picture and the assault against social ills has 
many prongs.
Parastatal employment
Here there was an opportunity to create entirely new settlements with no need 
to destroy slums and a large build-up of urban people where there had previ-
ously been none. In taking this on, there seem to be two central themes. The 
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most direct is the provision of large numbers of jobs restricted to whites. The 
connection here to poverty alleviation was highly significant. The second, to be 
taken up later, is the subtler connection between what was considered advanced 
town planning at the time and an attempt to turn feckless white workers into 
what was called civilised labour. There is no automatic link between planned 
housing, whether or not state-owned, and racial or any other particular exclu-
sion. This depends on the context of the society. It is true that any large-scale 
development built “to scale”, however necessary and useful, will not please all 
inhabitants. This chapter seeks to explore the link that South African society 
held out to planning, not to condemn all planning.
There was once a very strong tendency on the part of liberal scholars and 
historians to contrast modern English ways of confronting social problems and 
organising society with the backward Boers progressing at an ox-wagon pace. 
Indeed segregation and apartheid were conveniently collapsed into this kind of 
perspective. As Seekings states,17 the range of state interventions already in place 
before the Carnegie Commission were themselves a deliberate thrust towards 
modernity married to “scientific” ideas about race and segregation, significantly 
promoted by Afrikaners. This is the way Steve Sparks has written about Sasol 
and Sasolburg, and Alan Mabin on urban planning generally, and I have tried 
to do the same in forthcoming work on developmentalism in South Africa.18 
This is not to dismiss modernity as a racist plot but rather to understand it as 
an outlook that could take many forms and embrace racial division with white 
domination as common sense. This was true both before and after the fateful 
election of 1948 when the Purified Nationalists returned to power using apart-
heid as a slogan.
The creation and development of the parastatals had a huge impact on the 
economy of an increasingly prosperous South Africa, not only in the promo-
tion of these very large firms with requisite infrastructure but in the general 
benefits for the expansion of heavy industry, notably in metals and chemicals. 
This chapter wishes to supply some evidence for this in the continuing national 
development after 1940, especially with reference to the entirely new towns 
of Vanderbijlpark and Sasolburg, created to serve the new state-initiated para-
statals of ISCOR and Sasol respectively. During the 1940s and 1950s, African 
colonies were the site of numerous development efforts by the state which 
often went ludicrously or tragically wrong, but not all of the planning of that 
era failed to produce the desired effects. For all their social and environmental 
aspects which could be condemned, the key state-created industrial operations, 
ISCOR (steel) and Sasol (coal into oil), were in their own terms extremely 
successful. The London-linked money associated with the gold mines was very 
hostile to the creation of ISCOR. However, in time, Anglo American, the big-
gest private firm in South Africa, itself got into steel manufacturing on a big 
scale. South Africa had been Britain’s largest customer for steel; this ended in 
the decade after World War II. For a generation, it was a great economic success 
story. ISCOR’s privatised successor, Mittal, succeeded in selling large amounts 
of steel to China in more recent years moreover. Sasol today is South Africa’s 
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biggest source of tax revenue and its massive new operations in the USA may 
well make it a major international player in the chemicals industry. These are 
anything but economic failures and at peak they employed very large labour 
forces.20
Yet already in the 1930s when ISCOR opened up its Pretoria plant, it quickly 
became fairly obvious that the initial idea of an all-white workforce was a fan-
tasy.21 This was never going to be a viable case. However, it was a remarkable 
feature that the proportion of white workers was high, that it remained high 
right up to 1989 when ISCOR was privatised, and that hiring was policed in 
such a way that black workers were barred from all but the most primitive kinds 
of skill acquisition often described as “semi-skilled”.22 Large numbers of whites 
were very well paid compared to blacks in the same factories. Thus in ISCOR 
in mid-1954, 9,000 whites earned £50 million, while 11,500 “Natives” earned 
£13 million.23
These proportions were in contrast to the mines where whites usually 
formed roughly only 10 per cent of the workforce. Gold, of course, was South 
Africa’s number one export and the gold mining companies’ imperative to 
keep white worker numbers down – admittedly with a huge percentage of the 
total wage bill – was consequently tolerated. As for ISCOR, worker numbers 
reached a peak of 76,00024 (dropping to 60,700 in mid-1982 and 49,560 at the 
end of 1985).25
The creation of new ISCOR mills in Vanderbijlpark in 1940 and in New-
castle in 1972 both resulted in management being obliged to cope with the 
requirement of maintaining a very large white labour force while the condi-
tions of employment were such as to mop up white unemployment and indeed, 
until the final years, the industry created a job surplus that was problematic to 
fill. This was not met by excessive wages initially. Many white workers mak-
ing £2–3 per month or less in the 1950s received subsidy payments from the 
Department of Social Welfare. These bottom wages improved but apprentices 
continued to be a special category at the bottom of the wage ladder.
There remained the idea that unskilled workers were necessary but not 
worth much to capital. In South African terms, therefore, the issue was conse-
quently how to train and keep genuinely skilled workers who had to be white 
on the job. This was a constant struggle.
There were several responses. One, about which more could certainly be 
researched, was education and training. The parastatals themselves ran train-
ing facilities, which were very important in producing acceptable workers.26 
Table 4.1 Employment at Iscor by race19
Whites Others (Natives, 1934)
1934  2,000  1,500
1954  9,000 11,500
1972 18,700 17,800
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ISCOR had an excellent rate of completion of training bursaries on schedule – 
65 per cent instead of the usual 20 per cent – and 45 per cent of its work-
ing artisans had been trained by the company as of the start of the 1970s.27 
This did not mean of course that artisans and other trained workers necessar-
ily stayed at ISCOR or other state corporations for their entire career. Other 
employers paid better. However, they still entered the overall labour pool from 
a much improved starting point. Vanderbijlpark particularly attracted a number 
of industrial employers using ISCOR metal and metal products.
The parastatals were an important reason why “poor whiteism” largely disap-
peared as a social and political question in South Africa. It was still significant 
when the first two Purified National Party politicians, Malan and Strijdom, 
held power up to 1958, but actually very little changed in 1948. It is a mistake 
from this point of view to see a dramatic shift with the onset of apartheid if by 
that one means the 1948–90 years when the National Party held power and 
promoted this slogan to replace segregation before it gave way in turn to “sepa-
rate development”. Concern with poor whites as a national question tended 
to give way to the search for a largely Afrikaans management class, particularly 
in state agencies. With Verwoerd in power, the system started to change signifi-
cantly taken as a whole since the regime became obsessed with finding a means 
of building separation of the races within a white-dominated regional structure. 
For black South Africans, forced removals and the attempt to disrupt black 
urban life, although the latter was never entirely successful, meant a big change 
after 1958. However, for whites, the rules which enshrined earlier practices 
remained much the same. The economic empowerment of whites in the early 
apartheid years was an apotheosis of earlier policy.28
There was a constant but growing labour shortage.29 Stuart Coupe showed 
that for the metal and engineering trades generally, the number of white work-
ers monopolising skills hardly increased in the boom years.30 Moreover, white 
South African workers with real skills were potentially quite mobile and the 
retention rates in the small town plants for ISCOR at Vanderbijlpark and 
Newcastle, were not good. Pretoria, with its more diverse economy, was better 
placed in this regard. However, the ISCOR plant in Pretoria lacked the space 
for expansion and met with increasing awareness of pollution problems, so it 
came to hold only a small share of operations.
A second answer lay in recruiting skilled workers in Europe, a policy that 
did not end for ISCOR until the last gasp of prosperity at the start of the 
1980s.31 To take the example of ISCOR, these workers came not only from 







Britain, but from Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Italy and the Neth-
erlands, and later Greece. Particularly desirable were bricklayers, electricians, 
fitters and turners.33 In key periods such workers got a free passage to South 
Africa and housing with rentals fixed at a maximum of 20 per cent of their 
income. Beyond that, they were eligible for a Home Ownership Scheme and 
were required to join a workers’ club. Some 27 engineers, 381 production 
workers and 421 artisans were hired from overseas in 1975, a late banner year. 
Integrating these foreigners was defined as a major task for the social services 
and schools. This kind of worker was unlikely to evolve quickly into a diehard 
Afrikaner Nationalist but everything was done to turn him into a civilised 
South African worker. It is also true that he was unlikely to object strongly to 
the racial policies which underwrote his own good wages.
A third strategy was to look for space in the workforce where manage-
ment could situate white women, Coloureds and Indians. Already in the 1970s, 
management began to experiment with hiring women for what would previ-
ously been male jobs. This shift was obviously considered far less explosive than 
one fiddling with the racial ceilings.34 In addition, the 1976 Annual Report 
announced that there were 979 women employed in production, mostly in 
Vanderbijlpark and Pretoria, and there were additionally many administrative 
workers. However, women were still not deemed acceptable as artisans.35 The 
facility in Newcastle, with its large black population nearby in parts of the 
Zulu “homeland” and the presence of an Indian community better-primed for 
skilled jobs after the 1960s, also offered management some relief.36 In the mid-
dle of the 1970s, however, the refusal to train or accept workers of colour, espe-
cially in Vanderbijlpark and Pretoria, remained salient.37 Newcastle was less of a 
problem in theory with its Indian minority, but in fact this major new expand-
ing facility in a town that did not have much appeal to white workers had its 
own difficulties in the form of high turnover. All in all, however, conditions 
evolved in the 1940s and 1950s so that it was the “poor whites” who began to 
have the upper hand in bargaining, and were able to enforce racial boundaries 
through their trade union, and armed by more upskilling in a very favourable 
labour situation.38 The problem only became less acute as the industry itself fell 
into crisis due to an economic downturn and slackening demand for workers. 
Sasol was not very different and indeed Crompton suggests that in the 1980s, 
security considerations favoured continuing dependence on regime-friendly 
whites.39 The managing director of ISCOR in 1985 pointed out to his minis-
ter that all ISCOR personnel, including management, came under systematic 
police and security surveillance.40
During the 1950s, the national archival record reveals ongoing concern with 
the question of Afrikaner employment at the parastatals. However, this was 
primarily a concern affecting top management and it connected most with 
the thrust for promoting national development under the Afrikaner national-
ist aegis. It affected lower levels of staff to a limited extent, especially given the 
real-life conditions of labour shortages. The most important figures in the his-
tory of the parastatals were in fact Afrikaners who had emerged under the aegis 
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of J.C. Smuts’s United Party, notably the brilliant scientist and organiser H.J. van 
der Bijl, H.J. van Eck of the Industrial Development Corporation and Etienne 
Rousseau, key figure in Sasol. Rousseau, smarting from such criticism, quoted 
a message from Van der Bijl in his prime in 1945: ‘Through ISKOR and other 
undertakings, he was doing more for the economic insertion of the Afrikaans 
speaker than what we are doing in Federale Volksbeleggings’.41 In a speech in 
his honour in 1972, Rousseau called Van der Bijl a “kampvegter” [champion] in 
the struggle to advance the Afrikaner.42
Despite the large numbers of whites, of course the workplace also employed 
a large black workforce, mainly consisting of contract workers staying in hos-
tels and inured to harsh conditions from previous employment on the mines. 
The differentiation between black and white was extreme and enforced in 
the crudest of ways. Black overseers at ISCOR came equipped with sjamboks; 
white security guards and supervisors carried guns. The regime was particu-
larly stark for hostel dwellers who had to wear special bracelets different from 
the house residents outside the hostel perimeter and could be confined to a 
detention room provided in the hostel. Hostel dwellers were largely recruited 
from rural sites in the Homelands, often with the assistance of chiefs, although 
ISCOR employees went out on recruitment drives. There was also humil-
iation from the naked medical examinations and the corporal punishment 
sometimes administered, as it was in the mines. The paternalist regime of Sasol 
and ISCOR and the industrial hegemony that underpinned all the early plan-
ning, based as it was on extreme inequality, was acceptable more from con-
straint than accord.
Furthermore, there was little or no mobility for blacks, unlike for whites. In 
1967, ISCOR, which dominated the economy of Vanderbijlpark, opened up 
a training facility for black workers. The training consisted of a) an induction 
course, b) instruction in the bastard work language of Fanakalo, c) pre-school 
education, d) safety instructions, e) training of instructors and f) training of 
operators. That was it. Workers themselves remember training as being only 
to a limited extent about performing tasks and focussing mostly on the need 
to work hard and obey all whites. Fanakalo was in fact not extensively used 
on this account. Instead, workers were obliged to understand Afrikaans, which 
they resented acutely. Accident risk was discussed but in practice accidents were 
always defined as the fault of the worker. The compound dwellers especially 
were trained to see the world with racialised lenses but without of course the 
inherent racial assumptions of those responsible for the system. At least one 
popular work song summed it up: Qubula zasha, Abalungu ngodem (Lift up, damn 
the whites). Victor Munnik recorded the views of veteran ISCOR workers 
recently: ‘Blacks were like tools. Where there was hard work, blacks were always 
taken. . . . We were the first people to be the machines of ISCOR. We were 
the people who were doing the work of the machines of today’.43 Whites in 
stark contrast formed part of a Vaal Command and Sasolburg notably was the 
one constituency won by the far-right Herstigte Nasionale Party in a 1985 by-
election. The racialised set-up in this extreme form was a major consequence of 
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the “solution” to a national problem of policy confined largely to one minority 
racial group.
Planning for race, class and family
The core towns built for whites lay at the apex of the planning exercises. These 
are therefore classic suburban towns built according to plans in which particular 
areas reflected closely the cost and appropriate status in the parastatal world that 
went with positions at work, even though an increasing number of residents 
worked for firms other than the parastatals, albeit with parallel hierarchies. Alan 
Mabin has pointed out that the greatest common view of the time amongst the 
rising stars of urban planning was their hatred for messy, unsightly slums, their 
dislike of laissez-faire in urban development and their faith in what planning 
could do. He asks this question: ‘Does this urge to control disorder and create 
separations characterise all modern planning?’ These planning exercises were a 
‘marriage of modernity and racism’.44
The assumption here is that the common view was applicable to most situ-
ations globally at a time when planning was gospel. However, it is important 
to note that the marriage to which Mabin refers was not necessarily the case 
universally. Thus a fascinating study of New York public housing at this time 
characterises its reforming proponents (often Communist Party members) as 
specifically intending to construct public housing in Manhattan to break down 
racial separation on the edge of Harlem.45 The construction of numerous hous-
ing projects at this time in some of the most affluent neighbourhoods of Lon-
don where land had been cleared by wartime bombing was also in a different 
vein. Slum clearance also, of course, is not a despicable goal. This chapter takes 
the point of view that it is important to link the planning paradigm with par-
ticular South African norms and mores, not to denounce all planning or all 
modernity while understanding limitations and the consciousness around these 
trajectories.
Vanderbijlpark was laid out in 1941 on 25,000 acres purchased by the Iron 
and Steel Corporation of South Africa, including five miles of Vaal River front-
age amounting to 40 square miles in all. For H.J. van der Bijl, who was then 
directing the South African economic war effort, Vanderbijlpark was a prize 
project that encapsulated his sense of the good life:
I visualised a town with people living in surroundings and under condi-
tions which will be conducive to a healthy, happy and productive life. For 
this reason I was determined to make ample provision for parks, playing 
grounds, health clinics, hospitals and schools. A town, like a flower or a tree, 
should at each stage of its growth possess symmetry and completeness and 
the effect of growth should never be to destroy that unity but to give it 
greater purpose, not to mar that symmetry, which at all stages makes it a 
comprehensive whole.46
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The ‘roads [were] named after postal districts or scientists, engineers, musicians, 
medical men and the like’ to give the town an elevated character.47 Van der Bijl 
had a fine house built on Beethoven Street. Great emphasis was placed on tree 
planting. While the town was to have a business centre with some apartment 
buildings, the dominant mode was suburban with an emphasis on green space 
and recreation and supposed isolation from industries, which were themselves 
to be relatively clean. The wealthiest neighbourhood around Beethoven Street 
still passes today, like the wealthier Northern suburbs of Johannesburg, as an 
urban forest.
The Vanderbijl Park Estate Company was created to produce houses on 
a mass scale efficiently and quickly. The goal of a new house finished every 
day was often realised. All of this was well developed before planning for the 
“Natives” even began – except on blueprint. Class differences in the white pop-
ulation were defining in terms of space. Particular blocks were all of a muchness 
in terms of size and amenity. The oldest modest parts of white Vanderbijlpark 
had no garages, although this changed in the 1950s. In Sasolburg, all purchased 
houses originally had garages but in an early phase, others were rented with 
only carports. In response to an indignant resident who felt demeaned by this, 
Minister of Economic Affairs Nico Diederichs felt obliged to respond that 
this was a gesture intended to benefit those who would struggle to pay higher 
rentals.48
The town designer of Vanderbijlpark was Roy Kantorowich, a student of 
Carl Feiss at Columbia University, known for his enmity to the grand urban 
renewal plans of Robert Moses in New York City. Kantorowich was also 
implicated in the construction of the much-excoriated corporate/administra-
tive high-rises on the reclaimed Cape Town Foreshore. Vanderbijlpark and the 
Foreshore evoked the two ideal forms in modernist thinking in architecture at 
the time: the green belt suburb with curving streets and easy avoidance of the 
growing menace of automotive traffic and the imposing dense high-rise for the 
city centre. It could be said that Kantorowich was one of a number of South 
African architects and planners eager to bring these ideas from the metropolitan 
high culture to South Africa: his greatest pride with regard to Vanderbijlpark 
was its contour road plan.49
Sasolburg, just south of the Vaal and inside the Orange Free State, proclaimed 
a white urban area in 1955, grew very rapidly until the economic crisis of 
the 1970s manifested itself. As with Vanderbijlpark, the plans, over which the 
architect-planners for a long time continued to hold control, saw Sasolburg in 
relative isolation, a world unto itself which was not really integrated into the 
farming and mining environment around the valley of the Vaal. Here, with the 
planning situated in the early apartheid period, streets were typically named for 
Afrikaners, or at least South African political figures and national heroes. Sasol-
burg was established under the direction of Max Kirchhofer, a Swiss immigrant 
who believed strongly in the green belt and was profoundly concerned with 
the issue of school location. He too believed that ‘a town is an entity, a whole 
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living organism’ and that planners needed to focus on the ‘self-contained resi-
dential precinct’, a model easily adaptable to racial segregation.50
For Kirchhofer, as with Edwin Mallows, the British-born ‘doyen of South 
African planning’ at the University of the Witwatersrand, who worked closely 
with him on the site, the question of separation of automobile traffic from 
pedestrian usage was perhaps his biggest concern. The chief menace facing 
the South African town was ‘the nerve-racking and dangerous intermixing 
of pedestrians and motor cars’.51 The cornerstone of a neighbourhood was to 
be the primary school to which resident children could walk safely without 
crossing busy roads.52 The principal environmental idea in both cities, apart 
from functional separation, was the massive planting of trees, including in 
the black locations. This forest effect is noticeable to the present day when it 
incurs worry as shrubbery hides criminals and pathways become littered or 
unkempt.
Kirchhofer was inspired by the New Towns being constructed in post-war 
Britain on top of ideas that came from his native Switzerland about urban citi-
zenship and urban tidiness. He would have identified himself as a liberal and 
liked to consider that potentially as much thought was given to black housing 
in Sasolburg as to white.53 In the factors that he took as professionally impor-
tant, the black population had the same needs as the white and these were 
accordingly accommodated, or so he was convinced. Yet “organisms” could dis-
play gross inequalities and in Sasolburg, they did. Moreover in Sasolburg, typi-
cal of many South African cities of the day, a curfew for Africans operated by 
decree after 9 pm. The Vanderbijl Park town clerk opined in 1952 that ‘it is the 
Committee’s policy to endeavour to keep the natives out of the European areas 
as far as possible. For this reason steps have been taken to provide shops, recrea-
tion and social centres and a clinic at Bopelong’.54 Not only did these small 
townships have little planned business districts, there was even a hope that they 
would develop craft centres and reach the ideal that blacks would rarely have to 
be spotted in the white town.
However, what is perhaps even more striking than the tiered layers of demar-
cation created by housing is the extent to which the white town in both cases 
was intended to civilise the paler skinned natives. White louts unused to urban 
living were to be made accustomed to a regime of suburban neatness and order 
and hopefully rendered suitable for further social and material mobility, while 
foreigners unused to the South African “way of life” had to be domesticated. 
Club membership for immigrant ISCOR employees was a requirement. It 
was hoped that the system of amenities, much of it sporting, would also have 
a socialising effect. In time, VESCO, the planning agency, actually introduced 
large African fauna to Vanderbijlpark (which abutted the Vaal) as a symbol of 
desirable appreciation of the national environment.55 Sasolburg was equipped 
with a botanical garden and a bird sanctuary.56 Those numerous men hired who 
were not married were placed in controlled situations – specially designed hos-
tels with appropriate recreational facilities nearby. Residential areas were placed 
separately from business premises. Churches were located far from spots where 
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men might take to drinking. Neat lawns were supposed to stay clear of rusting 
old cars and other working-class or farm boy appurtenances.
In a correspondence over what was termed “backyard development”, the 
Swiss Kirchhofer considered that untidy backyards were a throwback to rural 
living that needed to be eliminated through strict regulation according to his 
big plan. They were due to the fact that
living in towns is a new experience for a large portion of the white popu-
lation of this country. It is understandable that the backvelder when he 
moves into the closely knit urban pattern will bring with him a mode of 
life conditioned by the vast open spaces. . . . A certain amount of guidance 
would be helpful and strict application of the laws should do the rest.57
This, he argued, was better than the official idea of concentrating on hiding 
views of the backyards. For a long time in both towns, authorities attempted 
to enforce planning regulations that fitted the original plans of the architects 
approved by the state. It was claimed in 1949 by ISCOR that ‘the Company will 
not permit any alterations or additions to the existing buildings, which will tend 
to destroy the character of the buildings in terms of the Establishment designed 
for use as a dwelling for a single family’. The Archives are replete with detailed 
correspondence about proposed alterations through the 1970s. However, this 
and other aspects of the model town order, was a never-ending struggle.
Reality was a bit more complex than the exhaustive planning exercise. Sasol-
burg was probably created with the desideratum that domestic workers should 
be forced to live in the location rather than ‘accommodating them on the 
European premises’ – something that proved impossible to enforce. Kirchhofer 
fended off any responsibility for this later. ‘All squatting was to be prohibited’.58 
However, before permanent dwellings were available, where were the work-
ers to stay? From the beginning, squatting was hard to control.59 The female 
domestic workers who were permitted to live on premises inevitably had male 
visitors and, more furtively, resident lovers or husbands whose residence pro-
moted the availability of workers to the employer. It could not possibly be ille-
gitimate for these women to go to church and worship God, but that required 
inevitably large black crowds walking through white Sasolburg, for instance, 
on a Sunday. Another anomaly in the system, critical in the phase where black 
labour was in heavy demand, was the apparent right of potential workers to 
spend the first 72 hours in a proclaimed white area without an endorsed pass 
while looking for work. Finally, there was the problem of legitimate work-
ers for whom there was no legitimate space in the townships. A fascinating 
memorandum from 1958 points to the large presence in Sasolburg of men and 
children in servants’ quarters; the domestic workers were successful in agitating 
to the end that there would be no work for the white household if these were 
expelled with nowhere to go.60 Such households were obviously tempted to 




Life in a regulated small industrial city was less attractive to a workforce than 
was imagined in the dreams of van der Bijl and the city planners. Workers had 
their own ideas about what they were doing with their lives.61 It is not entirely 
by chance that the most famous Afrikaner anti-establishment rock and roller, 
Johannes Kerkorrel, came from a modest home in Sasolburg. Whites exhibited 
both a loyalty critical in some respects to the whole parastatal-governmental 
authority but they sought to carve out space that did not always fit what the 
authority desired or sometimes even opposed. Regimentation for whites bred 
rebelliousness.
Real life did not by any means entirely follow the dictates of civilised labour. 
Whites who did not like the controlling regime of the company towns also 
turned to the countryside where they could lead an unregulated or much less 
regulated existence. This also involved business possibilities, illegal or unregu-
lated. On a little property, a man could keep a few cows and grow some maize 
as well as tinker at rusty machinery and fix cars. In time, many white families, 
for example, settled in what became known as Greater Steel Valley, close to the 
ISCOR factory, on some 600 smallholdings.62 This was originally defined as a 
waste disposal area but got settled anyway. Here ISCOR employees engaged 
in multi-tasked, multi-income lives on land that was disastrously polluted well 
outside the regulated world of the town.
The Verwoerdian system tried to put itself forward as apartheid, racial separa-
tion. It put itself forward as different from crude racial mastery by whites or, to 
take the familiar Afrikaans expression, baasskap. I would propose that working-
class whites generally enjoyed and profited from baasskap but were not necessar-
ily taken with racial separation. Resident whites may have been keen on racism 
and racial laws, but they also sometimes profited from illegal activities and spon-
sored them themselves. Like the black residents, they often preferred to shop in 
the multi-use Vereeniging centre rather than the planned precincts of the new 
towns.63 As was generally true in the Vaal Triangle region, smallholdings housed 
not only white individuals and families but workers and other black residents 
in time-honoured fashion. In 1967, a survey by the Vanderbijlpark Council 
found 4,555 Africans in the surrounding area.64 This was also true south of the 
Vaal around Sasolburg, albeit less densely.65 Some were temporary ISCOR con-
struction workers. Only 353 were farmworkers legally employed but the largest 
number were domestic workers, employees doing work other than agricultural 
work, and minors. In the official records, bureaucrats were plagued with com-
plaints by white residents about supposedly illegal black activities and presence, 
although generally found to be more or less legal in fact.
The Vaal Triangle towns were very largely a black and white world. Only in 
Vereeniging were there established communities of Indian traders and workers 
and a small settled population of mixed race. Neither Indian nor Coloured peo-
ple were officially welcome in Vanderbijlpark or Sasolburg.66 Sasolburg was in 
fact located south of the river in the Orange Free State, where Indian residence 
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was illegal. The small Coloured presence in Vanderbijlpark (even smaller in Sasol-
burg) was a source of ongoing if low-key official anxiety, as there was no “group 
area” to house the handful employed there.67 Finally, an attempt was made to 
move all the Coloured people in the Triangle to Grasmere outside Vereeniging.68 
However, apart from the misery it caused, this was quite impractical and led to 
Coloured people living illegally on peri-urban properties or elsewhere.69
Moreover, for other transactions involving sex and other relations between 
men and women, marijuana, gambling opportunities or, above all, beer, there 
was a difficult to control world of peripheral peri-urban properties. In the Ver-
woerd era, trawling the peri-urban sea was an important but unending task for 
mariner policemen.70 Here it was possible to find ramshackle businesses of all 
sorts. Owners might be absent; in a few cases, they were themselves not white 
and here transgressions could occur. Thus, in 1954, officialdom discovered that 
a whole row of Indian-owned shops and houses could be found at the south-
ern border of Vanderbijlpark on the property of a Coloured woman, Susan 
Wessels, married to an Indian man described as a general dealer named Kajee 
Omar. However, some of these shops appeared to be rented from white men in 
Vereeniging. This typical anomaly was shut down but would reappear in new 
guises.71 In 1961, state agents found once again the row of Indian shops on the 
south end of Bophelong, rented from white women in Vereeniging, this time 
full of white shoppers who preferred it to the carefully planned town centre. 
This zone included Chinese businesses that bore the traces of gambling for the 
day’s horse races.72 From Zamdela, the Sasolburg township, while it was true 
that it was rather easy for black residents to walk to the Sasol entrance, the real-
ity was one of littered, unsanitary and potentially even dangerous footpaths by 
the dozen. Moreover, Sasolburg had attracted African Explosives and Chemi-
cals Industries and other employers, creating more complicated trajectories that 
could hardly be stopped.73 This irregularity had already irritated the planners 
twenty years earlier in Vanderbijlpark.74 These very conditions that had so hor-
rified early city fathers in Johannesburg, in Vrededorp and Fordsburg early in 
the twentieth century, simply recreated themselves, albeit on terms rather more 
favourable to white workers.
An apocryphal bit of Sasolburg urban legend was the monthly encounter 
at the Sasol factory gate between husband and wife. The wife took the money 
required for household necessities immediately on payment and the husband 
then went off with his mates for a major weekend drinking bout, marking an 
incomplete if perhaps predictable social transition from the point of view of the 
planners. Whites occasionally exploded outside the confines of the company 
controls. In Vanderbijlpark, a resident who worked for Metal Box recalled that 
in the early days, ‘there was one pub and it saw fights every night’.75 This in 
turn meant that white civil society required not merely the intervention of the 
churches but of welfare and charitable organisations with a mission to inter-
vene in acute social problems. Far from sounding the knell on religious and 
aligned interventions, these company towns offered extensive new possibilities. 
The Red Cross, Noodhulpliga, Kindersorg, Family and Marriage Society of 
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South Africa, the Cancer Union, Kreupelsorg and the South African National 
Council for Alcoholism had no problem keeping busy on the Vaal.76
These activities could not be considered as resistance to ISCOR; indocility 
captures the reality better.77 It was only after the end of the apartheid gov-
ernment that residents felt empowered to engage in protest against the big 
employer, which apart from employing the majority, was also sometimes the 
provider of credit.78 Until apartheid broke, it was reported that ISCOR people 
tended ‘to work for ISCOR for their whole lives and you step into a culture of 
how people do things’.79 Moreover, even the white smallholders were bound 
to ISCOR by the accepted dictates of security in a beleaguered white South 
Africa; many were members of an ISCOR Command.
Conclusion
The new towns of the Vaal went hand in hand with massive new job oppor-
tunities for the poor whites of South Africa. Whites had many arrows in their 
quiver to rule out African competition for their jobs even though considerable 
migrant labour was necessarily brought to ISCOR and Sasol to meet part of 
the needs of management. Indeed by the end of the 1950s, the situation in 
the parastatals was best characterised in terms of labour shortage. There were 
extensive opportunities for whites to acquire skills that made them increas-
ingly independent of state patronage with time. It is less clear if what we might 
term high modernist cultural forms, notably in the planning and organisation 
of these towns, were very successful in diffusing notions of suburban respect-
ability. The former poor whites had their own ideas about how they wanted to 
organise their lives under increasingly favourable conditions.
Fourie has made a very welcome and important intervention in proposing 
that current analyses of poor whites ought to consider the situation of poor 
black South Africans today, even if his insistence on the efficacy of home own-
ership as a solution may be less than convincing.80 Nothing is more central than 
the struggle against unemployment and overly precarious forms of labour even 
though, as a recent collection reminds us, this can only be a long and complex 
set of interventions that will also require far more co-ordination.81 The role 
of skill endowment and of education cannot be overestimated here. This ena-
bles individuals to find new possibilities and new situations even if a particular 
employer is no longer able to provide work. Parnell’s point about the centrality 
of housing, carried through in our assessment of the planning involved in the 
Vaal Triangle towns, is not without a strong echo in the social housing policies 
carried through by the African National Congress since 1994. Moreover, there 
is probably an equivalent, even under the most positive conditions, of discom-
fort and rebelliousness as the beneficiaries of development programmes take up 
directions that authorities do not expect. It is important to see historical devel-
opment as the result not only of state legislation and decrees, not only as the 
product of the plans of private and public sector bureaucrats, but that the poor, 
whether or not white, also have agency. The poor white question entangled 
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moral and racial ideology together with practical economic questions. This 
analysis hopefully takes the positive benefits of modernisation in tow without 
missing the negative side, which abstracted from economic considerations to 
insist on a paternalist vision that was impossible to be enacted without struggle 
and indocile reactions.
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5  Whites, but not quite
Settler imaginations in late colonial 
Mozambique, c. 1951–1964
Caio Simões de Araújo
Introduction
The poor white problem remains an ever-present, although elusive, topic in 
the literature on Portugal’s late colonialism in Africa. While the social and 
political life of the white settler community in Angola has been studied in 
some detail and resulted in important book-length publications,1 in the case of 
Mozambique this issue has not yet received the same scholarly attention, with 
the notable exceptions of Cláudia Castelo and Jeanne Marrie Penvenne.2 This 
relative silence can be only partially explained by the drastic imbalance in the 
demographic make-up of those two settler colonies: while the black African 
population of Mozambique was always significantly larger than that of Angola, 
the former’s European community never grew to the same dimensions as the 
latter.3 Relative proximity to Portugal and intense economic development in 
the post-war period made of Angola a prime destination for Portuguese settlers. 
Yet it was the racial politics of decolonising Africa that brought this case to the 
spotlight, in both academic and political circles. As the Congo Crisis unravelled 
beyond the northern border, in March 1961 Angola was witness to a series of 
violent clashes between anti-colonial actors, the African population and white 
settlers, resulting in a sizeable death toll on both sides of the colonial divide in 
the ensuing months.4 In comparison, while an armed struggle was waged in 
Mozambique from 1964 onwards, settler-led violence, or white terrorism, did 
not take place in such a widespread manner until 1974, when formal decolo-
nisation was already in motion.5 Unlike their Angolan counterparts, moreover, 
Mozambique settlers did not launch a formal political movement even when 
their discontent against the metropole ran high.6
Of course, while one can certainly argue that the “settler colonial situation” 
in Mozambique was unusual, that is not to say it was a minor or irrelevant affair. 
If the relatively scant white presence resulted from a lack of opportunity on the 
ground, the long-standing economic dependency on its neighbours worked to 
entangle colonial Mozambique in a regional system of white privilege and rule. 
While historians tend to agree that here this “proximity” – however under-
stood – to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was consequential in shap-
ing settler culture and society, this is a point made generically, and, therefore, 
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still invites further study and scrutiny.7 In my view, this is important because, 
despite the increasing scholarly interest on the transnational nature of racial and 
imperial formations, race and empire remain compartmentalised fields of study, 
particularly along geographic or linguistic lines.8 Even though “settler colo-
nial phenomena” have been described as ‘inherently transnational and transcul-
tural’,9 the specialised literature has been typically restricted to former British 
colonies.10 Indeed, the emerging field of Settler Colonial Studies has resonated 
little in the historiography of, say, the French or the Portuguese empires.11 
Likewise, histories of colonial racism tend to reify formal political boundaries 
by concentrating on the relationships between coloniser and colonised alone, 
which can work to sideline the often influential role of inter-imperial or trans-
colonial conversations and connections in shaping racial politics and thinking, 
in the metropole and colonies alike.12
In this chapter, I intend to bridge this gap by articulating the scholarly debate 
on settler colonialism to my own research on the racial politics of late Portu-
guese rule in Mozambique. Here, I am interested in exploring the analytical 
potential of Veracini’s argument that the “settler colonial situation” is a distinc-
tive historical formation, both transnational and relational in nature.13 In par-
ticular, Veracini has argued that a settler colonial project is always entrenched 
in a “spectrum of comparison”, i.e. comparison between the settler society and 
the metropolitan “home”, and between different settler states and their respec-
tive projects.14 This transnational and comparative dimension, I argue, puts in 
evidence some contradictions and dynamics that are otherwise sidelined in 
histories centred on the metropole-colony axis alone. In this chapter, I examine 
the settler situation in Mozambique not only as a Portuguese imperial affair, 
but also as a context associated to broader international debates on the future of 
European presence in Africa and to the analogous experience of South Africa. 
In order to do so, I engage sources that are evocative of both local concerns 
and transnational sensibilities, from the colonial press to diplomatic correspond-
ence. The “poor white problem”, I contend, can be productively read in this 
way, across different scales. This is relevant because, while most historians tend 
to briefly mention the lower-class status of settlers as a distinctive attribute of 
Portuguese colonial society, much is yet to be done in the way of exploring 
what Cláudia Castelo has identified as the representations and phantoms sur-
rounding this group.15
Luso-tropical visions, settler paradise: Colonial settlerism 
in theory and practice
In 1953, Portugal’s minister for the Overseas Territories, Sarmento Rodrigues, 
publicly spoke of the principles and goals orienting the country’s overseas 
policy. His speech focused on the newly launched First Development Plan 
(Plano de Fomento), a substantial public investment package geared to boost 
economic growth in Portuguese territories by supporting agricultural produc-
tion, facilitating the exploitation of natural resources and, above all, improving 
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transport and communication networks.16 Beyond infrastructural development, 
Rodrigues emphasised the decisive role white settlement was to play in the 
near future. Without a considerable increase in the white population overseas, 
he argued, ‘we cannot expect true progress, which includes the efficient and 
permanent defence of our territories, and their perfect nationalization.’17 While 
‘improving living conditions and economic growth’ would facilitate white set-
tlement overseas, the state should proceed with caution. After all, Rodrigues 
remarked, white settlement ‘does not mean transferring – without studies, 
preparation and sometimes painful experiments – the human masses that find 
themselves vulnerable in Europe’.18
In my view, Rodrigues’s speech is expressive of the tensions and contra-
dictions permeating Portuguese – and, more generally, European – colonial 
thought and policy in the mid-century. Although, in retrospect, the post-war 
era may appear to have been inevitably heading to decolonisation as an end-
point, historical scholarship has showed that the late 1940s and 1950s were 
a period of recalibration and restyling of Europe’s relations to the colonial 
world.19 Certainly, this included steps towards greater autonomy and, at times, 
negotiated transfers of power. But it also involved European aspirations and 
strategies of revival and renewal of empire. This “second colonial occupation”, 
as Low and Lonsdale convincingly put it,20 animated political, economic and 
ideological change, ranging from legal and constitutional reforms, unprece-
dented commitment to colonial development, and the espousal of various gra-
dations of an anti-racist rhetoric, particularly at a time when racial thinking and 
discrimination were rapidly falling into disrepute.21 Portugal was not immune 
to these continental and global tendencies, even though here they assumed 
a particular expression, shaped by financial constraints and the political and 
ideological conservatism of the Salazar regime.22 The Portuguese post-war set-
tlement policy must be situated against this background.
Politically, Portugal resorted to the reaffirmation of national-imperial unity 
by introducing a constitutional revision whose main innovation was to aban-
don the concept of “colonial empire”. The term “overseas province” con-
veniently replaced the politically charged word “colony” to suggest that the 
non-European territories were integral parts of the motherland. As Bandeira 
Jerônimo and Costa Pinto have argued, this constitutional unmaking of the 
empire ‘reinvented national identity [and] reinforced mythologies of national 
and imperial exceptionality’.23 As the same authors point out, in addition to 
legal change, increased public investment in modernisation and development 
also intended to encourage the integration of all parts of the newly defined 
nation.24 While the First Development Plan was the most significant expression 
of this policy, other measures were devised to cultivate closer ties within the 
“Portuguese world”. This included an unprecedented investment in colonial 
scientific research, an expanded bureaucratic and security apparatus, and the 
encouragement of migration flows to the overseas provinces, by either vol-
untary movement or under the auspices of settlement schemes.25 It is in this 
context that Minister Sarmento Rodrigues stressed that white settlement was a 
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condition for ‘the efficient and permanent defence of our territories, and their 
perfect nationalization’.26
Besides its political expediency, the turn to state settlerism as an imperative 
of post-war imperial renewal was, too, marked by the critical recalibration of 
Portuguese colonial discourse and thought, of which Rodrigues’s tenure at the 
head of the Ministry for the Overseas Territories was in itself an indicator. It 
was with Rodrigues’s approval that, in 1951, the Brazilian sociologist Gilberto 
Freyre conducted a notorious research trip to Portugal and its overseas territo-
ries as an official guest. Since the 1930s, Freyre had espoused the idea that the 
Portuguese colonisation of the tropics had been benign and largely free of racial 
prejudice.27 During his 1951 travels, Freyre coined the term “Luso-tropical” to 
refer to the “complex of civilization” resulting from the Portuguese ability ‘to 
integrate [non-European] native peoples and cultures’ into a new society.28 As 
Castelo has showed, while in earlier periods Freyre’s ideas had failed to resonate 
amongst a Portuguese elite still committed to racial thinking and eugenics,29 
from the mid-century his “Luso-tropicalism” was embraced as a semi-official 
ideology of the regime.30 At a moment when the national-imperial politics 
were being redefined in Portugal, the Freyrian argument that social plastic-
ity and the “vocation to colonise” were hard-wired into Portuguese culture 
gained currency. Culture, however, was understood in clearly racialised terms. 
As Castelo pointed out, the ‘psychosocial characteristics that Freyre attributed 
to the Portuguese were innate and were present at any time or place’.31 The 
white settler – as a racial and cultural agent – was the main protagonist of the 
process of Luso-tropical formation.
That white settlement and a multiracial rhetoric were to so decisively rise 
to the frontline of the post-war politics of imperial renewal may appear odd if 
examined against the historical record. Much effort has been invested in show-
ing how the Luso-tropical thesis was inaccurate at best, if not simply wrong.32 
For instance, while racial mixing in Portuguese Africa existed as a historical 
practice, it was not generalised or free of social stigma.33 Neither did it result 
from a peculiar vocation to miscegenation.34 Likewise, for most colonial his-
tory, white settlement in Portuguese Africa had been rather scarce. Although 
Mozambique and Angola had been deemed as potential settler colonies since 
the late nineteenth century, no consensus existed on whether massive European 
settlement was desirable or even possible, in racial and climatic terms.35 While 
in the first half of the twentieth century the white population of these ter-
ritories increased as a result of expanding colonial bureaucracy and economic 
development,36 no public initiative was carried out, as the few existing projects 
failed to materialise.37 The state position until the 1940s was, in fact, marked 
by public inertia coupled with the active discouragement of private initiative.38 
In face of tight state control intended to fight unemployment and prevent the 
formation of a class of poor whites, migration to the colonies was limited to 
civil servants and skilled labourers.39
What, then, explains the rise of colonial settlerism in the mid-century? Here, 
I borrow the term from James Belich’s work to name a more or less articulate 
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ideology by which the standing of colonial migration shifted in official dis-
course, public debate and popular culture.40 Contextual differences aside, the 
mid-century saw an explosion of efforts and debates on how to better channel 
Portuguese emigration to the overseas provinces, to a point at which, by the 
end of the decade, settlement was dubbed, in the Portuguese National Assembly, 
as ‘the fundamental question that dominates all other issue’.41 In the literature, 
this shift in political tone and policy priorities has often been described as an 
anachronism, the product of a conservative regime unable to face and digest 
the reality of impending decolonisation.42 While this might be true in relation 
to specific policies, I suggest that looking at the broader colonial world affords 
us another reading. To many observers in the immediate post-war moment, 
empire was to play a vital role in European reconstruction. A popular neolo-
gism in the political vocabulary of the period – “Eurafrica” – conveyed the idea 
that Africa represented the natural and rightful solution to Europe’s economic 
and demographic problems, for it provided a fertile terrain for investment and 
emigration.43 Here, the notion of “multiracial partnership” promised to deliver 
the benefits of “modern civilisation” to Africa without authorising Africans’ 
anti-colonial aspirations or settler’s blatant racial exclusivism.44 Yet by upholding 
the centrality of the white official, skilled labourer or settler as its driving force, 
multiracialism served to advance a conservative and racially defined model of 
social and economic change, essentially summarised in the phrase ‘whites car-
rying the Africans along’.45 To the proponents of white settlement, the settler 
carried the promise of material development and multiracial cooperation. In 
the political climate of the 1950s, the notion that Europeans could settle and 
thrive in Africa’s multiracial societies was both “rational and convincing.”46
In this context, thus, Portugal’s turn to white settlement and multiracialism 
as colonial policies becomes less an anachronism and more a political engage-
ment with a rather contemporaneous predicament – and one that was shared 
by other European countries as well, albeit in different terms. At any rate, in 
the mid-century the problem of stepping up metropolitan migration to Africa 
became a political imperative: it was frequently featured in the press and care-
fully discussed at the National Assembly. A prominent figure in this regard, the 
Congressman Armando Cândido, was adamant in his call for state interven-
tion: white settlement, he argued, was ‘an imperative duty, a frontline neces-
sity’, because ‘Angola and Mozambique are promises that our blood ought to 
fulfil’.47 “Europe”, he goes on, ‘wants to resurface. Africa wants to advance. (. . .) 
No rivalry can surpass this argument of common salvation. (. . .) Eurafrica is not 
a new idea, but now it is urgent to follow it through’.48 In an exposition deliv-
ered to the National Assembly and later published as a book, Cândido suggested 
a concerted state policy to carry out the “ethnic occupation” of the African 
provinces with metropolitan settlers.49 In this position, he was not alone.
Indeed, by the mid-century very few would vocally deny that white settle-
ment to Africa was a national priority and, consequentially, should be trans-
lated into public policy. In the 1950s, development plans offered the budgetary 
resources to sponsor a new settlement programme.50 In Southern Mozambique, 
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a megaproject of “irrigation and colonization” of the Limpopo Valley directed 
major investment to infrastructures – particularly to dam the Limpopo 
River for irrigation and to expand the railway network to the Rhodesian 
border – but also allocated funds for rural colonisation, including expenses for 
white settlement.51 As Castelo has persuasively argued, the Limpopo scheme and 
parallel megaprojects – e.g. the Cunene settlement in Angola – encapsulate the 
contradictions and tensions underlying late Portuguese colonialism. On 
the one hand, they were a deliberate effort to modernise colonial economy 
through engineering and agronomical science. On the other hand, they were 
designed to foster an antiquated model of rural production based on the 
nuclear peasant family working small land units. In transferring Portugal’s tra-
ditional structures and rural lifestyles to the tropics, these settlements (colonatos) 
embodied the regime’s conservative politics and nationalist ideology better 
than other processes of social and economic change, such as industrialisation and 
urbanisation.52
Surely, the picture was much different when seen from the point of view of 
the existing settler community. As Castelo has argued, even though a roman-
ticised image of the poor “peasant settler” was disproportionately represented 
in colonial discourse, this group remained relatively marginal in relation to 
the global pattern of Portuguese migration and settlement to Africa.53 While 
potential settlers with little or no resources could apply for travel subsidies and 
join rural settlement programmes, the majority of the newcomers disembark-
ing in Luanda and Lourenço Marques were voluntary migrants attracted by 
economic development and not allured by promises of agricultural labour and 
land ownership. Of these new arrivals, many would enlarge the ranks of colo-
nial bureaucracy or join the mostly urban middle class working in services or 
commerce. During the late colonial period, the level of education and profes-
sional qualification of the settler population remained higher than the national 
average in the metropole.54 To this urban, educated and privileged settler com-
munity, a colonial project predicated on rurality, tradition and frugality was 
perhaps too obviously doomed to fail.
Settlers of ‘the lowest category’: Poor whites and 
the multiracial myth
On 3 August 1954, the leading Mozambican daily Notícias covered the arrival of 
a group of settlers to Lourenço Marques, aboard the vessel Império. Written by 
the novelist Guilherme de Melo, the article was peppered with lyric flavour and 
laudatory remarks. The first batch of peasants to settle in the Limpopo Valley, 
they were ‘rude and simple’, the men with their ‘untied shirts’ and the women 
in ‘modest dresses’. In their simplicity, however, they embodied ‘the soul of the 
people, the simple and crude soul of the eternal Portuguese people’.55 Later 
that year, Melo visited the settlement. He saw a ‘rude but sane, humble but 
hospitable’ people: a woman missing ‘two or three teeth’, and children in their 
‘bare feet and torn clothes’. There was something familiar at work here. After all, 
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Melo pondered: ‘this is the Portugal of the villages, [. . .] which is being built [on 
the African bush]’. The whole process should not be taken lightly. European set-
tlement was a serious matter, and the entire enterprise was being closely super-
vised by engineers and technicians, whose offices were adjacent to the farmers’ 
houses. In the future, it was expected, no supervision would be required, for 
the settlers would become ‘accustomed to this new environment, [. . .] they will 
own their houses, their own oxen. The land will be theirs’.56
The odd juxtaposition of a romanticised portrayal of humble peasant life and 
a patriotic praise of what was essentially an effort in state-driven modernisa-
tion was fairly common in official and popular narratives of Lisbon’s settlement 
programme. To another observer, the great transformation of the Limpopo 
Valley, made possible by ‘a legion of technicians,’ marked the dawn of a time 
of ‘renewal and progress’. Yet irrigation systems and agricultural planning co-
existed with ideals of home, family and catholic morality. If new buildings, the 
dam and the railway symbolised modernity, the church built in the settlement 
‘assert[ed] the spiritual nature of Portuguese colonization’.57 This type of nar-
rative was rather common amongst the most conservative voices in the metro-
pole – including Salazar himself – to whom Portuguese society and national 
identity were based on Catholic morality, on the idea of obedience of hierar-
chies, on traditional rurality and devotion to the land as epitomes of national 
virtue, and on the myth of noble poverty, i.e. the valourisation of modesty and 
resignation to poverty.58 The colonatos were designed to reproduce and propa-
gate this set of conservative and traditionalist values in Portuguese Africa, while 
being at the same time a nationalist – and nationalising – gesture of evidently 
political implications.
Multiracialism was, too, a crucial trope underlying public debates on white 
settlement. In the Limpopo region, where white settlers were to work in the 
vicinity of their African counterparts, policy-makers hoped that contact and 
collaboration would further multiracial conviviality and serve to diffuse Sala-
zarist values. As an official pamphlet put it,
we want (. . .) white families from the metropole (. . .) to grow roots to 
the land, to own the land where they work, exercising here the traditional 
virtues of the Portuguese peasant – tenacity, modesty, commitment to work 
and love to the family, therefore serving as an example to their African 
brothers.59
As Castelo has argued, the schemes of rural colonisation relied on the false 
assumption that the white peasantry would operate as exemplary models to be 
emulated by the “erratic” African masses, thus leading to increased productivity 
and social assimilation into the national body.60 At work here was the Freyrian 
notion that the Portuguese settler possessed the innate ability to cooperate with 
African populations and thrive in the tropical climate, regardless of their level 
of education, technical training or familiarity with modern methods of agricul-
tural production. Political debate on this matter often depended on problematic 
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stereotypes and a rather idealised image of the settler. As a Congressman told 
the National Assembly in 1952: ‘the Portuguese peasant, holder of racial virtues, 
will carry to the bush the qualities of work, persistence, affection for the land, 
sobriety and candour in behaviour, frugality, all of which will certainly have 
an effect on the education of the black Portuguese’.61 Poverty was not neces-
sarily detrimental to the civilising mission. Rather, a common assumption in 
Portuguese colonial thinking was that lower-class settlers were more prone to 
co-exist with Africans on cordial terms, given their relative proximity in the 
civilisational and social scale.62
Unsurprisingly, the picture was much different when seen from the stand-
point of settler society itself. Both colonial officials and so-called naturais (i.e. 
second generation, Mozambique-born, whites)63 expressed their reservations, 
when not open disapproval, about Lisbon’s settlement policy. Criticism was 
found at all levels of society and civil service for various reasons. Some of the 
detractors voiced their grievances to members of diplomatic missions. After a 
visit to the Limpopo area, the South African Consul reported that the existing 
Portuguese community feared that ‘the semi-literate peasants [would] have no 
conception of the conditions and would be appalled by the reality’. Conse-
quentially, local residents suspected, the newcomers would drift ‘back to the 
towns, where their illiteracy would make them unemployable except on “kaffir 
work” ’.64 The governor-general of Mozambique himself, Major Pinto Teixeira, 
showed dissatisfaction with the course of action set up by the metropolises. As 
he told the Consul, the “theorists” sitting in Portugal were “silly fools” with no 
knowledge of African realities.65 According to another diplomat, the US Con-
sul, Teixeira shared the criticism of ‘the more intelligent members of the local 
population’ when he publicly stated that ‘it is necessary not only to prepare the 
colony for the colonists, but the colonists for the colony’.66 Interestingly, Teix-
eira urged Trigo de Morais, the main engineer behind the Limpopo scheme, 
to conduct a study visit to analogous rural settlements in South Africa, for the 
purpose of ‘inject[ing] a little more realism into the somewhat idealistic plans 
for the Limpopo Valley’.67 The issue of settler selection and preparation was also 
openly discussed in the press. Oliveira Boléo, an intellectual who wrote several 
opinion pieces on the issue of white settlement, argued that the ‘bar [needed] to 
be high’ or failure and deflection would be inevitable. He feared that ‘in a dec-
ade [we might] see thousands of settlers wandering the streets [of the capital], 
knocking on the doors, telling the story of their odyssey in this land’.68
Besides misgivings about the feasibility of the project itself, various observers 
also raised concerns about the possible effects the recent arrivals would have on 
race relations. While one of the goals of the Limpopo project was to promote 
multiracial contact by planning for the settlement of African farmers along their 
European peers, African families were introduced in the scheme progressively, 
in small numbers, and only from 1957 onwards.69 Still, much speculation existed 
about it from the offset. For instance, the US Consul noted it was ‘thought-
provoking [. . .] to come upon a community in Southern Africa where white 
men are driving bullock carts along with black men’. This peculiar situation, 
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he thought, could provoke a ‘significant although unascertainable impression’ 
on the African.70 According to a colonial official placed in the area, ‘white set-
tlers [could] end up in the same position in life as the natives’. As said official 
told the Consul, the ‘intimate association of white and black [could] destroy 
the “reasonable barriers” that exist’.71 Poor settlers, in this view, threatened to 
disrupt the racial hierarchies of colonial society. This anxiety over the possibility 
of racial decay was also articulated in the press. An editorial claimed that ‘the 
life of the white men should never mirror that of a black man, for the first is 
expected to orient, to teach, to rule’. White unemployment and poverty could 
damage the ‘prestige of the European’, with negative results as far as the ‘respect 
and obedience of the native’ was concerned.72
Interestingly, to other observers the poor white problem was dangerous for 
the opposite reason, because it could aggravate racial antagonisms by creat-
ing colour bars where (presumably) none existed. While the official discourse 
boasted the innate non-racist attitude of the Portuguese people, confiden-
tial correspondence and news articles reveal a different picture altogether, in 
which poor whites were disproportionally given credit for colonial racism. In 
a detailed report on the social colour bar in Mozambique, for instance, the US 
Consul argued that settlers of ‘the lowest category, such as domestic workers 
and manual laborers, are even more prejudiced against Blacks than better-class 
Portuguese’. It was not at all uncommon, the Consul claimed, to witness a white 
‘who cannot read or write’ mistreating an African ‘who is cleaner, smarter, and 
better educated’.73 The Portuguese anthropologist Jorge Dias painted a similar 
picture. Dias is an interesting source because he represents a younger generation 
of thinkers for whom the theory and practice of colonialism needed signifi-
cant reform. In the 1950s, he was sent to Portuguese Africa on several research 
missions to study the problem of “ethnic minorities” as part of a larger move-
ment to recalibrate colonial governance by a closer engagement with applied 
social sciences.74 As a result of his travels, he reported on the social life of the 
settler community in both urban and rural settings. His conclusions were less 
than reassuring. In a visit to the Limpopo Valley in 1960, he was perturbed to 
find white farmers terribly ill-prepared for local conditions, including by the 
sight of youngsters farming the land barefooted or drinking untreated water 
because they had seen ‘the Africans do the same’.75 To Dias, ‘some whites give 
the impression of being more primitive than many Africans’.76 Yet despite ‘their 
misery and difficulties in adaptation’, some settlers harboured unrealistic pre-
tentions, such as a husband who ‘had promised his wife to find her a Black serv-
ant to wash her feet’.77 Going against the grain of dominant colonial thinking, 
Dias argued that ‘we cannot count simply on the virtues of our people, [but] we 
need to select and prepare them.’78 Perhaps more importantly, it was imperative 
to “educate” settlers so ‘they do not feel they are superior merely by the virtue 
of being white’.79
Despite these recommendations, two years later the conditions in the Lim-
popo Valley deteriorated even further. A government report on the uplifting of 
the African population in the region singled out the white farmer as a source 
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of racial antagonism. Contrary to what was expected, many of the new set-
tlers did not get along with their African peers at all. Quoting from a police 
report on the quarrels between Europeans and Africans in the settlement, 
the reporting officer described the poor white in rather unflattering terms: 
‘approximately 70% [of our settlers are] wicked and lazy, which causes constant 
hostility between them and the natives’.80 The list of reprehensible, if not crimi-
nal, behaviour was long, and included trespassing on the property of African 
farmers, grabbing their chickens, invading their crops, reaping their corn, steal-
ing their watermelons and pumpkins, mistreating their cows and threatening 
them with violence in case they reported any such offences. ‘All these acts’, the 
rapporteur concluded, ‘stimulate the natives’ dislike of the European’.81 In the 
Limpopo Valley, daily life was tainted with ‘heated arguments, obscene insults, 
threats, and beatings, and things are worsening’.82 Local opinion was that the 
metropole was to blame, due to the lack of rigorous vetting of potential set-
tlers. In fact, ‘rumour had it’ that settler recruitment was managed by priests 
and council administrators in Portugal, who were eager ‘to get rid of their bad 
elements and for this reason convince them to come to Africa’.83 To avoid fur-
ther escalation of racial tensions, the reporting officer requested more policing 
and discipline, to be imposed energetically if necessary. The police, he advised, 
‘should not follow the same methods observed in a civilized context’. In the 
Limpopo settlement, the state needed to intervene without reservations, to 
‘abuse its authority’ in face of the ‘ignorant settler’.84
The situation in the urban centres was not necessarily better. Rural set-
tlers who could not adapt to the harsh conditions abandoned the colonatos 
for Portugal if they could afford it or migrated to the capital or even South 
Africa.85 Particularly in Lourenço Marques, they joined a growing population 
of unemployed whites. To be sure, the problem of settler unemployment had 
haunted Mozambique’s economy seasonally, since at least the early 1950s.86 As 
the decade progressed, it served to fuel the growing local criticism of Portugal’s 
settlement policy. Jorge Jardim, a prominent businessman and Mozambique’s 
delegate to the National Assembly, dismissed rural colonisation as a both expen-
sive and ineffective venture, while defending instead the industrialisation of 
Mozambican economy coupled with the facilitation of voluntary migration 
of skilled labour.87 Mozambique’s Legislative Council, too, called for a more 
rigorous control of immigration based on the aptitude of settlers.88 Only then, 
Gonçalo de Mesquitela pointed out, would Mozambique ‘receive the last inapt 
[of settlers], as we cannot expect to receive the most apt’.89 Another Council 
member, Dias Ferreira, opposed an “open door” settlement policy, claiming this 
would result in a ‘factory of unemployment’ for which the local government 
would have to pay.90 In conclusion, the Council favoured larger powers to be 
given to the local Mozambican government in the areas of immigration and 
settlement while opposing schemes of rural colonisation.91
The late 1950s was also ripe for a small but rather prominent group of set-
tlers, frequently naturais, to voice their opposition to the metropolitan govern-
ment for what they regarded as an exploitation of Mozambique’s resources 
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without much in return. This local settler opposition was a diverse but not for-
mally organised political force. It included liberal professionals, such as lawyers, 
and politically-minded members of the businesses community. Their grievances 
had several causes: from the conservative politics of the regime to the eco-
nomic stronghold it imposed on the province and the lack of local autonomy 
and decision-making power.92 Lisbon’s settlement policy was another critical 
issue through which this local elite expressed their political dissent, includ-
ing by criticising it as a social liability and an imprudent spending of public 
resources. In May 1961, an anti-government manifesto distributed in Beira and 
Lourenço Marques openly targeted a policy that was producing in Mozam-
bique ‘a poverty similar to that of the metropole’. The signatories condemned 
Lisbon’s record of indifference, which for many years had allowed voluntary 
Portuguese emigrants to go, ‘like human ants’, to Brazil, Venezuela and other 
destinations. After years of this ‘waste of manpower, which other more capable 
countries put to use’, the Lisbon government was now ‘adopting, although too 
late, its colonization scheme [. . .] which have destined some of the settlers ab 
inition to an almost certain life of misery’.93
Despite the local criticism, the settlement policy survived way into the 1960s, 
even though the rate of new arrivals decreased if compared to the previous 
decade.94 If anything else, the early 1960s saw a push to the intensification 
of existing policy. As part of a broader legislative package of reforms, Lisbon 
created Settlement Boards (Juntas de Povoamento) to specifically manage white 
settlement in Mozambique and Angola, while establishing the free circulation 
of people and goods between Portugal and its overseas provinces. The relaxa-
tion of immigration procedures was intended to promote the unity between 
metropole and overseas territories by facilitating voluntary white settlement. 
Certain restrictions on settler mobility, such as the presentation of an invitation 
letter and proof of employment, were lifted. These measures did not sit well in 
local circles. In June 1962, editorials published in the newspaper Notícias bit-
terly criticised the ‘propagandists of illusion’ enticing ‘poor, uneducated and 
ignorant agricultural workers to come to the “land of opportunity” without 
the slightest knowledge or assurance of employment’.95 In an open criticism of 
Lisbon’s priorities, the editors stressed that ‘there are no conditions for work, 
because neither industry, nor agriculture, [. . .] nor anything have been devel-
oped sufficiently’.96
While the problems of unemployment and white poverty were windows into 
what many settlers saw as the injustice of the imperial relationship itself, other 
observers were more interested in how economic competition for unskilled 
and poorly paid jobs was deteriorating the state of race relations. As the paper 
Notícias da Beira reported, ‘the formation of a white proletariat is not [. . .] an 
admirable manifestation of absence of race prejudice, neither does it encourage, 
in the African, the sentiment of equality before the European’. Rather, because 
poor whites now flooded the labour market to compete for low skilled jobs 
with the African with no instruction, ‘the doors are closing [for the latter]’.97 
Therefore, by limiting the employment opportunities available to Africans, 
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the news article cautioned, ‘we may fall into a racial segregation that is [. . .] 
the opposite of what our vocation dictates’.98 While economic competition in 
urban settings was not a particularly new problem – and had been on the rise 
since the early 1950s – it became increasingly entangled to colonial concerns 
about the state of seemingly deteriorating race relations.
In fact, in 1956, two years after the launch of the Limpopo scheme, Jorge 
Dias described with disquiet the racist behaviour within the settler community 
in Lourenço Marques, in what he saw as a dangerous disregard for the (presum-
ably) traditional non-racist attitude of the Portuguese people. Yet to him this 
unfortunate situation did not result from the reality of colonialism itself. Rather, 
he was more inclined to trace the origins of colonial racism to the influence 
that apartheid South Africa exerted on white settlers. The poor, individuals 
with ‘no culture or half-cultured’, were an easy prey to apartheid’s appeal. Dias’s 
reading is so vivid that I will quote it at length:
Many of the Portuguese of Mozambique, [. . .] because they drink whiskey, 
drive cars, know how to say a few things in English and have acquired the 
mockery of a culture, translated in the acquisition of [material goods] to 
which they were not used, feel an inferiority complex in relation to their 
neighbours [in South Africa]. [. . .] Placed then in the position of admirers 
of their neighbours, vaguely displeased with their own economic power 
when compared with the latter’s, and convinced of their own superiority in 
relation to the metropole, where people of their class have a clearly inferior 
standard of living; these third-class Portuguese – despite their undeniable 
virtues – seek to imitate these neighbours. [. . .] Well, if their neighbours, 
in their eyes so civilized, consider the African to be inferior, it would be 
unreasonable to act otherwise. [. . .] This general trend opens the gate to 
various acts of violence and rudeness by individuals with no scruples, who, 
once in Africa, think they are an elite by the simple fact that they are white. 
[. . .] Some of them, who in the metropole were in the lowest social rank, 
hold on greedily to the opportunity of upward mobility and think that in 
order to achieve this end they must demean the Africans, by brutalizing 
them at times, both morally and physically.99
In my view, the elitist bias of his remarks evidence how class inequality within 
white settler society informed understandings of race relations and was crucial 
in defining what counted as respectable, civilised behaviour. This opinion was 
not uncommon amongst an educated and self-proclaimed progressive class of 
government officials and settlers, who blamed the state of racial unrest on their 
poorer countrymen. Because Portuguese late colonialism was so strongly predi-
cated on the claim to multiracialism as a civilising virtue, cordial multiracial 
relations were celebrated in public discourse, the press, and official functions. 
The type of racist behaviour associated with the lower classes was deemed as 
uncivilised, inconvenient and in need of reformation. The notion that poor set-
tlers were particularly racist persisted for years to come. But what is interesting 
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about Dias’s observations is that he repositioned the problem of colonial racism 
and white settlement in a comparative frame, and explicitly relates it to apart-
heid South Africa. While Dias was concerned with the cultural, and as a result 
political, influence of apartheid on the settlers’ mindset, other observers pointed 
out the very material, tangible shadows of South African presence in Mozam-
bique, from economic dominance to the tourist trade. While in Mozambique 
regional tourism had been a recurrent topic of public debate for decades, in the 
1960s it assumed greater proportions, as the industry grew steadily to represent 
a significant economic activity.100 At a time when multiracialism was being 
celebrated as a benign colonial ideology, South African tourists were accused of 
bringing the colour bar with them.
That Portuguese settler colonialism existed in the shadows of apartheid was 
a claim that gained much appeal on the eve of decolonisation. Already in the 
late 1950s, the American anthropologist Marvin Harris, who had spent a year 
in Mozambique and interviewed dozens of Africans, published what was, at 
the time, one of the only first-hand critiques of Portuguese colonialism. Going 
against the official narrative, Harris described an ‘apartheid-like system of sepa-
rate and unequal treatment more severe in many respects than that which exists 
within the Union of South Africa.’101 Liberation movements, too, deployed sim-
ilar arguments and analogies in their struggle to expose the evils of Lisbon’s rule. 
As the Angolan nationalist João Cabral put it, the ‘so-called anti-racialist policy’ 
had given way to a ‘classic colonialist policy’ based on massive white settlement. 
As poor whites were now working on positions earlier occupied by assimilated 
Africans, Cabral argued, ‘colour discrimination was taking more obvious apart-
heid forms’.102 Likewise, when the prominent Mozambican nationalist – and 
later president of FRELIMO103 – Eduardo Mondlane spoke to the United 
Nations in 1962 as a petitioner, he stated that Portuguese settlers ‘had exactly 
the same attitude toward Negroes as the South Africans had’.104 Two years later, 
as the clash of political forces accentuated and Mozambique, as much as the rest 
of Southern Africa, descended into a liberation war, the entanglements between 
Portuguese settler society and regional white rule became perhaps too obvi-
ous to ignore. One decade later, an article by the white oppositionist António 
de Figueiredo published in the Anti-Apartheid News denounced that Lisbon’s 
multiracialism ‘means white domination’.105 In the long run, settler colonialism 
had simply imploded the multiracial myth.
Conclusion
The transfer of metropolitan peasants to Africa was a move to secure colonial 
sovereignty amidst what was perceived as a particularly “troubled time” (that is, 
the eve of decolonisation). Yet this shift to transform Mozambique into a settler 
colonial space necessarily strengthened social and political entanglements with 
the other settler states in Southern Africa in ways that often escaped and chal-
lenged metropolitan control. The unrealistic expectations that the settler, how-
ever unskilled or unprepared, could bring economic development, civilisation 
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and multiracial conviviality to Africa were frustrated by the rapid deteriora-
tion of race relations and failure of settlement projects. The contrast between a 
state initiative centred on small-scale family farming and poor settlers, on the 
one hand, and the aspirations of a local settler elite, on the other, only served 
to emphasise the politically conservative and economically deficient nature of 
Lisbon’s late colonial rule. Local oppositionists were aware of this contradic-
tion and criticised Lisbon-based policy-makers for forcing on Mozambique 
the same poverty experienced in the metropole. At the same time, the allure of 
South Africa was not limited to its booming economy and promises of settler 
comfort. Here, the disquieting notion that racial prejudices could cross the bor-
der and come to shape the racial attitudes of the Portuguese settler community 
was common. In fact, to some observers, Mozambique ‘had been infected by 
South Africa.’106 Colonial officials were unable to perceive racism as a defin-
ing attribute of settler culture, but frequently singled out poor whites as “bad 
apples” in an otherwise healthy and colourful fruit bowl. Despite Lisbon’s insist-
ence on producing “Portugals in Africa”, the poor, uneducated settler remained 
perpetually out of place in a system where race and civilisation were supposed 
to overlap. They were whites, but not quite.
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6  “Village Portugal” in Africa
Discourses of differentiation 




Much of colonial and imperial historiography appearing soon after decolonisa-
tion, either implicitly or explicitly considered settlers – that is, people from the 
metropole who made their homes in the colonies as their own country – as in 
loco agents of colonialism and did not acknowledge their relevance as objects 
of study. The analysis of the structures and effects of the colonial system was 
privileged, as well as resistance and the national liberation struggles. In the late 
1980s, however, a group of historians and anthropologists set out to explore new 
frontiers and themes of research that could challenge the reductive dichotomy 
between colonisers and colonised.2 They argued that approaching these two 
groups in a homogeneous, stereotyped and diametrically opposed manner did 
not offer much insight into the colonial situation, since it concealed the ethnic, 
social and cultural diversity in colonial contexts; the internal heterogeneity of 
each of those categories; and possible zones of contact and permeability. The 
idea that these categories were not immanent or static but constructed by colo-
nial power and reused by anticolonial narratives gained ground.3
Taking the literature on settler colonialism into account, this chapter pre-
sents a case study of Portuguese colonial experience in Africa. It focuses on 
white settlers who were sent by the Portuguese Estado Novo, the dictatorial, 
conservative and colonialist regime that prevailed in Portugal between 1933 
and 1974, to state-sponsored rural settlements established in Angola (Cela and 
Cunene) and Mozambique (Limpopo) in the 1950s as archetypes of Portugal 
in Africa. These settlers were only a tiny portion of Angola and Mozambique’s 
settler societies and were not representative of the “average” Portuguese colo-
nist.4 Although Portuguese citizens, native from the metropole, and “civilised” 
and Catholic, they were poor and illiterate, moved to rural areas and were sup-
posed to work the land by themselves. Their over-representation, both visually 
and descriptively, in the press and in the propaganda, often connected with the 
discourse about the exceptionality of Portuguese colonisation vis-à-vis that of 
the British and the French is intriguing and calls for historical inquiry. This 
chapter intends to add to a more comprehensive approach to the white socie-
ties in “Portuguese Africa”, proving its economic, social and cultural internal 
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heterogeneity. This contributes to setting up a comparative framework between 
settler societies in Southern Africa.
I will seek to identify, compare and interpret the different ways of seeing, 
making visible and understanding the people who settled in the Cela, Cunene 
and Limpopo colonatos, as well as their experience of living and working in 
these settings. For this, I employ a variety of sources: official discourses, news-
papers and propaganda publications, scientific production, self-representations, 
and perceptions of other settlers and of African people around the colonatos.5 
I open with a brief contextual discussion on the question of planned agricul-
tural colonisation since the late nineteenth century, before proceeding to focus 
on the 1950s “ideal” colonatos as evidence of the contradictions and dilemmas of 
the late Portuguese settler societies in Africa.
Planned agricultural colonisation: background views, 
failures and impasses
The establishment of white Portuguese settlers in “Portuguese Africa” was 
strongly influenced by environmental, economic, social and symbolic factors, 
and even by legal obstacles.6 In terms of effective political action, there is not 
much to note about state-directed white settlement in Angola and Mozam-
bique until the mid-twentieth century. Except for the creation of Moçâme-
des (1849–1850) with Portuguese immigrants from Pernambuco, Brazil, and 
of Lubango (1884–1885) with settlers from Madeira and Trás-os-Montes, both 
in the south of Angola, there were only occasional efforts to create agricultural 
colonies and to provide free transportation for a few hundred settlers. After the 
sending of hundreds of settlers to Angola and Mozambique in 1891 (a hasty 
response to the British Ultimatum), local colonial governors severely criticised 
the settlement policy conceived in Lisbon without any knowledge of local 
realities; and complained about the burden of poor and unskilled migrants to 
the Public Treasury in the respective colonies, since the government was forced 
to repatriate settlers to Portugal on several occasions.
The physician Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro (1839–1917) and the naval physician 
and naturalist explorer José Pereira do Nascimento (1860–1913) were active 
supporters of transplanting whites from the metropole to the African colonies 
based on the scientific study of Portuguese Africa (climate, geography, vegeta-
tion, etc.) and the acclimatisation of settlers to tropical spaces, to guarantee 
their survival and reproduction without the much-feared racial degeneration. 
Both wrote about the places where Europeans could live without risks for their 
health, provided they followed the recommended hygiene habits.7
Regardless of the scientific conclusions of these two doctors, Africa con-
tinued to be seen as a dangerous and inappropriate place for the permanent 
settlement of Europeans. Due to the inhospitable climate and deadly diseases, 
it was a fate only for the degredados (deportees), the condemned and the per-
ceived failures of the metropole.8 At the same time, it continued to be argued 
that the European could not adapt to the tropics without losing their civilised 
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habits and moral virtues, and that the European family would hardly go beyond 
the second generation without losing these.9 Irrespective of the possibilities 
of acclimatisation, prominent Republican politicians considered that it made 
no sense to settle illiterate and poor Portuguese migrants, to exploit the land 
on their own.10 Given the existence of an abundant and cheap African labour 
force to run the essentially agricultural economies of Angola and Mozambique, 
only Portuguese people with initiative and capital would be necessary in those 
territories.11
Norton de Matos, high-commissioner of the Republic in Angola between 
1922 and 1924, who was from Minho, a region of abundant emigration to Bra-
zil, argued that, in the Portuguese colonisation of the Angolan plateaus suitable 
for white settlement, the rural establishment of families of agricultural workers 
in villages should be prioritised. These families, of the same geographical origin, 
would reproduce in Angola the households that already existed on the metro-
pole, resulting from kinship and neighbourhood relations, and would work the 
land without use of African labour. Although the core of Norton de Matos’s 
white settlement programme was rural, he also advocated an emigration of 
elites capable of raising the cultural level of the entire white population and 
contributing to the civilisation of the natives.12
After the establishment of the military dictatorship in 1926, it fell upon 
Vicente Ferreira, high-commissioner of the Republic in Angola between 1928 
and 1929, to advocate an ambitious plan of settling the Angolan plateaus, which 
had several aspects: collective colonisation through the direct action of the State, 
singular colonisation for settlers with capital who would explore medium-sized 
farms, agricultural orphanages and agricultural penal colonies. However, he 
gave prominence to the collective colonisation with families of rural workers 
with few financial resources, coming from all the provinces of the metropole 
(continent and islands), in order to recreate the ethnic composition of the Por-
tuguese population in Angola. In addition, they would maintain the ‘immortal 
qualities of the race’, which they would transmit ‘magnified throughout the 
centuries’.13 Nonetheless, and as a deterrent to the perceived unfitness for work 
and to moral misconduct, the legislative decree provided for the expulsion and 
repatriation of settlers.14
In the early years of the Estado Novo, the regime displayed no enthusiasm 
for the transfer of small-scale agriculture of the metropole to the colonies. The 
discourse that denigrated the Portuguese established in Africa at the expense of 
the State continued. Armindo Monteiro, Minister of the Colonies (1931–1935), 
criticised the settlers of the official rural missions for being dependent on state 
subsidy, for having accommodated to the condition of officials and for demean-
ing themselves in the eyes of the natives.15 Only colonisation by capitalist pri-
vate initiative won his praise. The settlers he presented as models were those 
who, with their own resources and without State support, embarked on the 
overseas adventure, bet on the creation of wealth and showed themselves capa-
ble of integrating African workers, contributing to the latter’s elevation through 
work and education.16
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The official view was that only individuals with technical knowledge, cadres 
and leaders of industry, commerce and above all agriculture, should migrate to 
the colonies.17 ‘People who arrive without knowledge and capital are not lack-
ing in Africa: we have millions of them. We are not in a position of spending 
money to transport them – and later, by force of circumstances, to repatriate 
them’.18 This position was endorsed by the successive ministers of the colonies 
until the end of the 1940s.
The travel instructions for settlers, published by the Sociedade de Geografia de 
Lisboa (Lisbon Geographic Society) in 1945, explained the characteristics that 
those who set out to settle in Africa should possess: good psychological and 
physical conditions to adapt easily to the new environment without regret-
ting or becoming sick. Moreover, the prospective settler should be entrepre-
neurial and determined to love the new land; he should be healthy, strong 
and relatively young. He should have some education and, at least, be able to 
read and write and have a trade, since, otherwise he would not have advan-
tages over the Africans with whom he could not (and should not) compete in 
manual tasks. To prevent the settler from demeaning and lowering himself in 
the eyes of the native, he should only travel when he had a sure guarantee of 
work.19 While the liberal professionals would always have a sure occupation 
in the colonies, unskilled workers would hardly find a place there. Hence the 
latter were not considered suitable for Portuguese colonisation in Angola and 
Mozambique.
The booklet Brief Concepts for an Ideal Program of Portuguese Coloni-
sation, published on the same occasion, conveyed the ideal type of settler: a 
patriotic individual, provident, exemplary, and moderate, a representative of 
the civilising race, who embodied ‘the noblest Portuguese virtues’, an exam-
ple to the natives.20 And once again, besides the moral qualities, the settlers 
were supposed to have education and professional qualifications. Only then 
could a racially and socially cohesive settler community be built, protected from 
the threats and degrading influences of the surrounding environment and of 
the natives, aware of its superiority and mission, capable of welcoming newly 
arrived settlers, of imposing patterns of collective behaviour and ensuring their 
compliance.21
It is important to note that the position favouring a small and qualified over-
seas migration was not ideologically hegemonic in Portugal, as can be attested 
by dozens of articles published in the Boletim Geral das Colónias and the pres-
entations in the colonial congresses advocating the lifting of legal obstacles to 
colonial settlement and state investment in the intensive white colonisation.22
Enclaves of rural Portugal in Africa
Growing anti-colonial sentiment following the Second World War and the 
international dynamics towards decolonisation, on one hand, and revolts and 
unrest at local level on the other, imposed new development ideas and prac-
tices to reform and legitimise the European colonial empires in Africa. For 
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that purpose, knowledge, planning and public funding were mobilised by the 
colonial governments in unprecedented ways.23 In the early 1950s, Portugal 
replaced the terms “empire” and “colonies” with “Portuguese overseas” and 
“overseas provinces” in its Constitutional Law in order to sustain the idea of 
a multi-continental and multiracial country and to justify Portuguese perma-
nence in Africa. The economic boom, due, in particular, to the rising prices 
of export commodities such as coffee and cotton, had a positive impact in 
the colonial economies, especially in Angola and Mozambique. From 1953 
onwards, the Estado Novo launched a set of Planos de Fomento para o Ultramar 
(Development Plans for the Overseas Provinces), intended for six-year periods, 
to foster the economic and social development of the overseas territories and 
its inhabitants.24 In the initial plans the most significant expenditure was allo-
cated to infrastructure, exploitation and use of natural resources, and settlement. 
Between 1940 and 1960 the European population of Angola rose from 44,000 
to 170,000, while in Mozambique it rose from 27,000 to 97,000. On the eve of 
independence in 1974 the European population was estimated at 324,000 and 
190,000 respectively. The rapid increase in the Portuguese migration to Angola 
and Mozambique is linked to the economic growth of these territories – a 
definitive pull factor for migration not directed by the state – and the new 
official discourse and policy concerning demographic colonisation.
The overseas minister Sarmento Rodrigues (1950–1955) illustrated the new 
policy, stating that the government was willing to support all kind of measures 
that directly or indirectly could export the metropole’s perceived demographic 
surplus to Angola and Mozambique:
I accept all systems, all contributions; I only see the settlement at the end 
of all acts. I come to subordinate everything to it, like a master idea. [It’s] 
[p]ure deception. It is only a way – a long way – to reach the greatness of 
the united Nation. . . . It is possible that not everyone realizes this historical, 
genetic moment that we are going through.25
Directed agricultural settlement was the only possible way. However, for 
reasons not yet fully understood, but which are partly related to the ideo-
logical foundation of Salazarism and to the agency of actors with real political 
influence, such as the governor-general of Angola, Agapito da Silva Carvalho, 
and the engineer António Trigo de Morais, the greatest public investment was 
directed to the creation of three major enterprises of planned agricultural col-
onisation: two in Angola (Cela and Cunene) and one in Mozambique (Lim-
popo). Its purpose was the ‘tropical acclimatisation of the rural parish of the 
Metropole’.26
The colonato of Cela, located in the mild Amboim plateau in central Angola, 
was the first official colonato created in Angola during the Estado Novo. In terms 
of its size, the amount of public funds invested, and the number of families 
installed, it was also the most representative of the “model” colonatos. This was 
reflected in the manner it featured in the public imaginary, with Cela seen as ‘a 
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kind of living room of Angola, where the myth of Portuguese colonisation was 
exhibited to the admiration of strangers’.27
Silva Carvalho visited the Amboim plateau and was positive about its pros-
pects, particularly after viewing the coffee farm of the Portuguese settler Gon-
çalves Magalhães in Gambagando (Cela), and hearing the farmer’s enthusiasm 
for the land and the climate.28 As a result, Silva Carvalho issued a directive on 25 
February 1949 for the identification and evaluation of areas potentially suitable 
for settlement and cultivation. With this aim, the Brigada de Estudos e Reconheci-
mentos Agronómicos da Repartição dos Serviços de Agricultura de Angola, headed by 
the agronomist Ilídio Barbosa, inspected the areas of the administrative posts 
of Cela, Ebo and Condé, and identified Cela as fulfilling the necessary criteria. 
Based on his impressions, Barbosa therefore endorsed Cela in his preliminary 
report, including the recommendation that a detailed survey of the area would 
need to be undertaken. This, however, was never requested by the colonial 
government.29 In 1958, the agricultural engineer Lains e Silva exposed the fact 
that Cela had been selected solely on account of Barbosa’s impressions, not 
scientific analysis:
The idea that encouraged the Brigade to the venture of colonising the 
Cussoi valley was that of the apparent fertility of the lowland, an appear-
ance derived from the existence of a vast plain of black humic soils, to 
which irrigation should ensure high productivity. [. . .] Thus was born 
the proposal of European colonisation of the Cussoi valley, based on the 
impressionist recognition, or rather, not to say, somewhat romantic recog-
nition, which hastily led to the conclusion that the lowlands of the Cussoi 
valley were very fertile.30
Construction of the colonato commenced in May 1951 and the first settlers 
from Portugal’s Trás-os-Montes, Ribatejo and Alentejo regions arrived two 
years later. These pioneers had been selected in the metropole by the engi-
neer Francisco António Teixeira Boaventura of the Angolan Agricultural Ser-
vices, whom the governor-general of Angola had appointed expressly for this 
purpose. In identifying potential settlers, the preference was for indigent rural 
workers with large families drawn from Portugal’s most impoverished regions 
struggling with an excess of labour. Since the utilisation of African labour was 
prohibited on the colonato, selecting candidates with large families guaranteed 
a readily available labour supply for the cultivation of land. At the same time, 
recruiting families from already impoverished areas would discourage their 
return to their homeland.31
The first settlers who arrived in Cela were installed in the village of Vimieiro. 
There, they encountered serious problems: while houses were provided, these 
had no furniture and no piped water. In terms of the settlement and its activi-
ties, the authorities had promised to provide technical assistance and commer-
cial infrastructure to support the farmers – yet none of this was in place. This 
was compounded by the proscription of the recruitment of native labour. In 
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these adverse circumstances, several families decided to quit the settlement after 
just a few months – a development the authorities were careful to keep from 
becoming public.32
The regulation of the colonato of Cela33 anticipated that each settler would be 
assigned a plot of approximately 18 ha, an area considered to be appropriate for 
exploitation by a medium-sized family without use of African labour.34 Settlers 
were given cash advances for occupying the farm and investing in construc-
tion, implements and cattle. This credit was to be repaid over 25 years, from the 
fourth year after arrival. Along the margin of the lowland of the Cussoi river, 
fifteen villages, named after counterparts in Portugal, would be established with 
25 to 30 agricultural smallholdings (casais agrícolas) each.35 According to the Mis-
são de Inquéritos Agrícolas de Angola (Angolan Mission for Agricultural Surveys), 
the earmarked lowlands ‘did not have an effective agricultural occupation’ – 
yet the Mission also acknowledged that this ‘does not mean that, in the tradi-
tional African uses and rights, they [the lowlands] were considered without an 
owner’. In practice, the local African population was dispossessed and removed 
from the area to make way for the new settlers.36 The British Africanist his-
torian David Birmingham published a short fictional story in 1999 about the 
removal of Ovimbundu farmers from the valley and the alienation of their 
land by the Administration of the Cela colonato. Birmingham’s tale followed the 
archetypal Angolan peasant Kinyama, whose life personified the social and eco-
nomic transformations in this community resulting from the policy of planned 
white colonisation.37 The agricultural engineer Jorge Bravo Vieira da Silva, at 
the time researcher of the Mission for Overseas Research Studies, recalls the 
violence of the removal during the enlargement of the colonato in 1961 as 
bulldozers razed native villages. The fact, which he witnessed and denounced 
to the overseas minister, proves that the space was not only occupied from the 
agricultural point of view but was also inhabited.38
Moreover, the colonato did not live up to expectations. While climate was 
congenial for human habitation, it was unsuited for the cultivation of either 
tropical or temperate climate crops. As a result, the settlers produced only poor 
quality products and had to sell them at very low prices, far below what they 
would have been accustomed to reach in Portugal. This was compounded by 
the great distance, or even complete absence, of suitable markets.39
Despite these poor results, the state persisted with the expansion of the col-
onatos, maintaining that the lands were fertile and ascribing any failures to the 
incompetence of the settlers and the lack of water.40 Considering the economic 
difficulties of the families installed in these villages, the initial theoretical frame-
work was adjusted and adapted to the circumstances; the planned agricultural 
productions and the agricultural character of some villages were diversified. In 
1958, it was decided to settle new families in larger farms, oriented to more 
profitable crops (the medium-sized farms). Generally, the results were similarly 
poor.41
Initially, the sale of products was made through warehouses and the canteen 
of the Brigada Europeia of Cela (a technical agency of the Angola government). 
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The settlers disliked this system because the debits were discounted; and in 
1955–1956, they started selling their agricultural production to the merchants 
who had in the meantime settled in the village of Santa Comba, and with the 
truck drivers who transported goods to Luanda.42
Of the first 28 families that went to the colonato, only ten remained there in 
1959. In 1962–1963, 224 agricultural smallholdings were occupied (containing 
a total of 1,166 individuals), but in 1967, there were only 192. In April 1970, 
the vacant houses began to be sold by public auction, and in the following year 
it was decided to sell 126 houses.43 By 1964, 1.5 million contos had been spent 
in the colonato of Cela. According to an estimate, the cost of the installation of 
each family in Cela was about 2,860 contos.44
The preparation works of the agricultural explorations and the construction 
of the villages and the town of Santa Comba attracted hundreds of workers 
and technicians. Despite some mishaps and indecisions, the State invested large 
sums in the colonato of Cela and in the infrastructures of Santa Comba, which 
in the medium term became an administrative and commercial centre,45 with a 
hospital with 120 beds, schools for about 500 children, a church (a replica of the 
one in Santa Comba Dão, place of birth of Salazar), public buildings, residences 
for workers, a market, a hotel, etc. Thanks to the heavy expenditure and to the 
creation of an urban centre within it, the colonato of Cela evolved and became 
viable. Orlando Ribeiro’s notes of his two visits to the colonato, in the beginning 
and end of the 1960s, account for this evolution.46 In 1960, the geographer 
commented that the experience of Cela was desolate: it had been established in 
soils that had not been previously studied, it was directed to producing com-
modities whose sale had not been assured, it resorted to the routine techniques 
of the ox cart and the plough, the available agricultural machinery was not used 
(it was not adapted to the land, parts were missing as well as people who knew 
how to operate it), and the settlers led a very difficult life. In 1969 he was sur-
prised to find ‘the colonato in better conditions and the town of Santa Comba, 
transformed into an important services centre, lively and with a varied and 
prosperous commerce’. Industrial units had already been created in the area for 
the processing of the agricultural products. Since, in contrast to the initial pro-
ject, the white settlers were not able to generate sufficient income utilising only 
family labour, African labour and agricultural machinery were widely used. 
Irrigation was in development. However, this positive picture continued to be 
tarnished by the lack of technical assistance, by economically irrational deci-
sions,47 and by an arbitrary and authoritarian direction without respect for set-
tlers. In his notebook, Orlando Ribeiro wrote: ‘Administrator of Santa Comba: 
appointed for being tough and therefore to be able to solve the impertinences 
of the settlers “by slap”! Admirable concept of the head of services and proof of 
racial indiscrimination. . . . A technician of the colonato uses the sjambok, which 
we saw in the seat of the truck’.48
The colonatos of Cunene (in the valley of that river, district of Huila, South of 
Angola) and of Limpopo (in the valley of the same river, district of Gaza, South 
of Mozambique) were established in 1954. They were based on irrigation and in 
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conjunction with hydroelectric dams and arose from an idea of the civil engi-
neer Trigo de Morais, who had been the director of the Junta Autónoma de Obras 
Públicas e Hidráulica Agrícola (Autonomous Board of Public Works and Agricul-
tural Hydraulics, 1934–1949), state undersecretary of the overseas (1951–1953) 
and held the position of general inspector and president of the Fomento Ultra-
marino. According to the engineer and geographer Mariano Feio,49
irrigation has very little interest in the tropics (except in arid and semi-arid 
climates), unlike the Mediterranean climate, because in the latter the hot 
season is sterilised by the dryness, while in the tropics the rainy season is 
hot, so the crops suitable to these conditions can be grown with free irriga-
tion from the clouds. Thus, in the plateaus, one can say that only orchards 
(to pass dry season, which is long) and gardens need watering.
He observed that these differences were not understandable, dominating ‘the 
mystique of the transplantation of Portuguese agriculture – familial, small prop-
erty, intensive cultivation, work by arm and cattle, further imposed by the strong 
personality of Trigo de Morais, who had already been the apostle of irrigation 
in the metropole’.50
Unlike the colonato of Cela, these new enterprises would include white and 
black settlers. In the words of Overseas Minister Raul Ventura, the option of 
including natives ‘represents only the disguise of a reality: we could not do a 
work of exclusive European settlement because the place chosen [. . .] was 
densely populated with natives and, in our political conceptions (and our fears), 
native should not be expelled’.51
Thus, although the proposed law took the colonato of Limpopo as a factor of 
white settlement (3,000 families), the Câmara Corporativa (Corporative Cham-
ber) and the Assembleia Nacional (National Assembly) immediately drew atten-
tion to the problem of the Africans living in the area. The Overseas Ministry 
together with the General-Government of Mozambique opted for the mixed 
colonato. The undersecretary of state, the engineer Trigo de Morais, in an order 
addressed to the Brigada Técnica de Fomento e Povoamento do Limpopo (Technical 
Brigade of Development and Settlement of Limpopo), underlines that ‘It is a 
work in which the joint life of whites and blacks has to be fraternally connected 
by the yearning of the spiritual and material aggrandisement of the Nation’.52 
Overseas Minister Sarmento Rodrigues approved this plan.
In the colonato of Cunene, Trigo de Morais admitted at the start that the 
inclusion of the African population would be on a small scale. In his opinion, 
the native of that area was ‘in a depressing degree of backwardness’, which did 
not allow the same involvement as in Limpopo.53 The selection of white settlers 
to be installed focused on rural families, without any assets or material links to 
the metropole. Francisco de Almeida e Vasconcelos, who was responsible for the 
recruitment of settlers to Limpopo and Cunene, informed that 435 individuals 
were recruited from ‘amongst families of rural workers who did not have any 
material interests that could still tie them to the metropole’.54
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Before presenting the Cunene colonisation project to the president of the 
Conselho, Trigo de Morais commissioned a study from Professor Botelho da 
Costa. The result of the study of an area of about 50,000 ha was discouraging: 
‘There are [only] some spots [of] soils suitable for irrigation, each of which has 
no more than 2,000 or 3,000 ha’, in a total of 8,000 ha. The soils of the Cunene 
basin were, therefore, far from ideal for irrigation. However, Trigo de Morais 
managed to convince Salazar and his project was approved.55
Located in soils unsuitable for irrigation, in a region of healthy climate, at 
an altitude of about 1,230 m in southern Angola, the colonato was at a great 
distance from the nearest urban centres: 160 km to Sá da Bandeira, 230 km to 
Moçâmedes and 280 km to Nova Lisboa.56 Established in conjunction with the 
Cunene hydroelectric dam, it was formed by the town of Folgares and the vil-
lages of Freixial, Algés-a-Nova, Castanheira de Pêra and Matala. The first eleven 
settler families to arrive (a total of 71 people) were from the municipality of 
Mirandela (Trás-os-Montes). Each settler was given: a house, an irrigated prop-
erty (5–10 ha), a plot of 0.5 ha in the communal land (it failed shortly after), 
and a plot of 30 ha of dry land for cattle (this parcel was not distributed). Settlers 
had to give one-sixth of their income to pay the advances, namely the cost of 
the irritation works and the buildings. The distance between the houses and the 
fields was too long (half an hour on foot).57
Both yields (of tobacco, tomato, potato, wheat and rice) and prices were 
low. The problem of commercialisation turned out to be very acute, because 
the centres of consumption (modest and locally supplied) were at enormous 
distances and roads were terrible. The income per settler was lower than in the 
metropole, although the cost of living in the colony was higher.58 The colonato 
services took into account the need to transform the products, having built 
industrial structures from the start to prepare tobacco; to grind, dehydrate and 
flour lucerne; tomato paste and packaging.59
By the end of 1958, 157 European settler families were established in the 
colonato; in 1963, the number of families had increased to 324; in 1968, it had 
fallen slightly to 319. The cost of installing an agricultural couple, including 
irrigation and the distributed assets, was valued at 393.2 contos.60 To keep the 
promise of forming a mixed colonato, 39 African settlers were installed on an 
experimental basis, with irrigated plots of land of 2.5 ha and no buildings.61
The Limpopo irrigation project dated back to 1920, when the valley ‘was still 
bush and poorly explored’.62 British engineer John Aylmer Balfour had been 
invited by the governor Moreira da Fonseca to study the possibilities of irriga-
tion and drainage in the Limpopo valley. Despite the favourable conclusions, 
the policy of agricultural development through irrigation did not proceed, 
because it conflicted with the interests of the South African mining industry.63 
Likewise, the project of Trigo de Morais, drawn in 1925 and resumed in 1936, 
was not put into practice. It was thought that the colonial agriculture in the 
South of Mozambique, even the one irrigated, could not prevent Mozambican 
labour from emigrating to the Rand mines.64
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The official colonisation of Limpopo was initiated in 1954, with eight fami-
lies from Alentejo and two from Madeira. The property distributed to the set-
tlers and the legal regime imposed was very similar to that of the colonato of 
Cunene.65 In 1958, when the I Plano de Fomento came to an end, 262 families of 
European settlers and assimilados were installed in 13 villages, and 650 families 
of Africans (who were, however, settled on a tract of communal land), in a total 
of more than 5,000 individuals.66 From 1959, some assimilated African settlers 
were integrated into the colonato as settlers of full right, in other words, with the 
same conditions as the white settlers. In 1968, the colonato already had 10,000 
inhabitants, making the municipality of Baixo Limpopo one of most populous 
in Mozambique. The number of full right African settlers grew considerably: 
about one-third of the 1,593 settlers installed in the colonato were of African 
origin. But by 1974 that number had diminished to 1,380 settlers, of whom 
968 were from the metropole and 412 were African. In a portion of communal 
lands, 2,584 were African.67
Rice, land for grazing and dark tobacco predominated in the irrigated 
perimeter of the villages upstream and in the centre of the valley; downstream 
was better suited to the production of cotton, light tobacco, tomato, citrus fruits 
and textile fibres. From the beginning, the need for preparation and industri-
alisation of agro-livestock products of the colonato was understood, and conse-
quently some industrial structures were built.68 However, the settlers’ standard 
of living was generally low, the technical support and medical assistance were 
insufficient, and the discipline imposed in the colonato was too rigid. Despite 
contracts prohibiting the use of paid labour, Portuguese settlers always did so.69
Over the years, the need to increase the area of land distributed to the settlers was 
recognised. From the initial 4 ha it increased to 10 ha in 1960; and by 1965 it was 
possible to acquire up to 20 ha. However, the size of the white settlers’ lands 
was always higher than that of Africans, averaging 8.5 ha against 5.9 ha. The intro-
duction of machinery was also done unequally: of the 197 tractors purchased by 
settlers between 1961 and 1973, only 12 percent belonged to Africans, although 
the latter were one-third of the total number of settlers; the same unequal distri-
bution existed in the possession of vehicles and agricultural implements.70
Regarding the prospect of a second phase of the settlement of the Cunene 
valley and in the Limpopo valley, under the II Plano de Fomento, the Over-
seas Minister Raul Ventura cautiously evaluated the results obtained so far. He 
stressed that ‘above all it is necessary to avoid a racial conflict in Mozambique’, 
thus reacting to the problems encountered with the natives of the Limpopo 
area, who did not want to abandon their lands, even if they were promised 
irrigated plots, which they considered too small. He referred to the high cost of 
the enterprises – the calculation made by the Inspecção-Geral de Fomento relative 
to the installation cost of each individual European settler pointed to 230 contos – 
but assumed that the colonisation would continue up to the 3,000 families. If 
the settlement ended in 1958, the expense with each settler would amount to 
1,322 contos. He suggested that new settlers be installed with the funds from 
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the first phase, and only afterwards reflect on the convenience of extending the 
irrigated area.71
Despite Trigo de Morais’s instructions,72 the implementation of the irrigation 
plan of Limpopo implied the expulsion of Africans from their lands (macham-
bas), which created discontent. The coexistence of white and African settlers 
was very problematic, with daily acts of threats, violence and insults. A report by 
the local police blamed the white settlers sent by the Overseas Ministry for the 
social tension: they stole livestock from the Africans, took their cattle to graze 
in the Africans’ lands, spent their time in the tavern drinking, and did not take 
care of hygiene.73 However, many Africans themselves did not blame the settlers 
for the problems brought by the colonato. They saw that the settlers were poor 
like them and worked the land with their own hands.74
The memory that persisted amongst the elders of Guijá shortly after inde-
pendence about the first Portuguese settlers installed in Limpopo was related to 
the extreme poverty of the latter. Abner Ngwenga recalled during an interview:
They did not even have shoes when they got here for the first time. The 
whites here gave them blankets, clothes, and shoes when they disembarked 
at the port of Lourenco Marques. This was done at night so that the blacks 
did not see that those settlers were badly dressed and barefoot. In the morn-
ing they were put on a train to Guijá.75
The Africans’ expectation of the appearance of whites did not correspond to 
what they observed in settlers newly arrived in the colonato. The posture and 
behaviour of the settlers were also a source of strangeness, and generated in 
some Africans a feeling of superiority:
They did not employ anyone to cultivate for them, for they did it by 
themselves – husband and wife, with their own hands. [. . .] So it happened 
that when a Negro asked his own wife: ‘My wife, can you make me this or 
that’ the answer was ‘I am not a settler . . .’ (to make such low services). The 
blacks looked at the settlers with contempt.
[. . .] we found it very strange to see the settlers walking from house to 
house selling cabbages which they carried on their heads in conical baskets, 
trumpeting ‘cabbage, cabbage!’ In this area, we did not know that whites 
could go around selling vegetables [. . .].
When they arrived here, they saw, for example, that the members of the 
Chambele family cycled to the machamba, while they, the settlers, walked. 
When they came to Guijá they did not expect to find people with a good 
standard of living, like the Chambele.76
The fact that they were poor, and used poor clothing and footwear, were not 
very edifying examples for local Africans, and led to the “settler” becoming syn-
onymous with ‘poor man from Portugal’.77 An administrative inspector alerted 
in confidential information: ‘All our steps are closely followed by the natives 
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and we have to impose ourselves before them, stand by our actions: barefoot, 
going to the rivers and living, like them, almost in promiscuity with livestock, 
we do not impose ourselves’.78
The lack of schooling of the Limpopo settlers was also a cause for much 
criticism from the higher strata of the Portuguese settler society in Mozam-
bique. In the initial plan, one of the admission criteria was that the head of the 
household knew how to read and write, but in practice illiterate settlers were 
chosen. Since in the Limpopo area there were assimilados Africans, it was often 
found that it was the latter that read the newspaper and wrote the letters to 
the settlers.79 The situation is reported by Commander Gabriel Teixeira in the 
Conselho Ultramarino session on settlement:
To send there settlers who are only good people but are inferior to the 
black does not work. In the colonato of Limpopo [. . .] many of the settlers 
[. . .] were simple hoe workers, and despite all the selection made, there 
were many illiterates there who asked the black to write family letters. [. . .] 
The black, in his simplicity, solved the problem in the following way: there 
is the white from Lisbon and the white from the bush of Lisbon.80
Professor Silva Rego, however, did not see the illiteracy of settlers as an incon-
venience because ‘they were as carriers of lusitanidade [Portugueseness] as the 
others’; and considered that ‘one of the great virtues of our colonisation was to 
never be afraid of “poor whites” ’.81 He mentioned that he had seen country-
men from the village of Joane (Minho), who lived in the muceques (slums) of 
Luanda, living side by side with natives, asking the latter to read them the letters. 
He argued such a fact ‘should not embarrass us’ because ‘This fusion between 
destitute whites and Africans is also a condition and a circumstance which will 
help mutual understanding between one another’.82
A study of the social situation in the colonatos of Matala and Limpopo criti-
cised the housing for being poorly adapted to the climate and unhygienic.83 The 
stables were built next to the houses, which could be acceptable in the metro-
pole, but in Limpopo, where the climate is very hot and the insects are abundant, 
this was a problem. Moreover, the houses did not respect the norms of location 
and size followed in the province; and the cemetery was made in impermeable 
terrain. The study furthermore criticised the distance between houses and plots 
of land, the settlers’ advanced age and low schooling levels and the disparity 
between boys and girls at marriageable age. It is said that the settlers’ daughters 
did not want, in general, to marry the settlers’ sons, because they wanted to 
climb socially. In this regard, the picture of Limpopo was considered alarming:
[here] is part of the reason why the boys are going to look for the native 
girls in the neighbourhood. And because, unfortunately, the European does 
not usually marry the native girl, this results in the revolt of the girl’s par-
ents and even of the tribe, as one of the Régulos da Vizinhança said: ‘parents 
can forgive, but the difference in colour that the child presents constantly 
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reminds the whole tribe of the misconduct and abandonment of which the 
girl was victim by the child’s father’.84
In the colonato of Cunene, the daughters of the settlers were forbidden to marry 
officials, so they would marry the sons of settlers, but ‘in face of the bad results 
that followed, both moral and social, the prohibition was lifted’.85
Few sources thoroughly provide the voice of the settlers. There is very sparse 
information in academic or scientific works.86 These show that settlers were 
generally unhappy with their economic situation, were poorly motivated, and 
it does not seem that they had internalised the civilising mission which propa-
ganda attributed to them. Whereas the journalist of the newspaper A Provín-
cia de Angola, visited the colonato of Cela and saw ‘that those people, rude and 
healthy as the old land of Trás-os-Montes had the heart overflowing with joy 
and recognition’,87 Orlando Ribeiro, in 1969, wrote in his field notebook: ‘The 
“shown” settlers did not show themselves enthusiastic, how will the others be!’88
The negative views of settlers, their own discontent, and the problems that 
arose in model colonatos were always hidden from public opinion. Censorship 
services cut the articles that denounced the settlers’ difficulties.89 Information 
from the Gabinete de Negócios Políticos of the Overseas Ministry addressed the dis-
content of the Cunene settlers, given the low price of the products and the delay 
in their payment; and the abandonment of the colonato by the settlers’ children, 
with the aim of improving their lives, generally heading towards the Cassinga 
mining region.90 Facing the despondency and desertion of many settlers, it was 
again argued, in a private or confidential way, that the selection had not been 
rigorous, that they had chosen illiterates, individuals without agricultural experi-
ence, who felt superior in Africa and did not want to work alongside the natives. 
Negative consequences about race relations and the removal of Africans who 
lived in the occupied areas were also underestimated. But politicians and propa-
ganda insisted on praising the colonato of Cela – ‘within years with 100 villages, 
it will be an entirely white district in black Africa, a miniature Portugal inside its 
largest province from which it will radiate colonizing energy’91 – and the work 
of the engineer Trigo de Morais – ‘on his own initiative [. . .] great overseas set-
tlement works were executed, which are true workshops of ethnic-cultural con-
vergence, where the process of lusotropicalism accelerates’.92 In this last case, due 
to the political imperatives dictated by the involvement in the colonial wars, the 
emphasis was placed on the contribution to the creation of multiracial societies.
Conclusion: contradictions, misapprehensions and 
paradoxes
The state-connected media and propaganda apparatus of the Estado Novo rep-
resented the Portuguese settlers of the colonatos in a manner which differed 
significantly from representations in contemporary scientific studies, and from 
the dispassionate and crude perceptions held by the settlers themselves, as well 
as by their other white and African neighbours. The colonatos in “Portuguese 
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Africa” were based on multiple misconceptions and paradoxes. They were cre-
ated in a period of accelerated economic development, anchored in technical 
and scientific knowledge, with which it was sought to relegitimise the empire 
against the advance of the anticolonial movement.93 Tiago Saraiva points out 
that ‘to fulfil the vision of a rural Portugal’, those enterprises were inserted ‘in 
large state plans where technology plays a fundamental role’.94 In turn, science 
(agronomic, economic and social), though mobilised by political power – a pri-
ori or a posteriori – to give the colonatos a scientific basis, was often overlooked 
for opposing idealised or already ongoing measures.
The rigid and subservient discipline that was imposed upon the settlers did 
not hold them individually and socially responsible. Land ownership, the engine 
of attachment to land and permanent settlement, remained elusive. Moreover, 
the delivery of the plots of land was arbitrary, as these could be given and with-
drawn by the state.95 As a programme of deproletarianisation,96 that is, of trans-
forming the rural wage earners of the metropole into well-rooted landowners 
in Africa, the colonatos failed. Unable to raise the living conditions of the popu-
lations involved, they experienced high drop-out rates. The settlers’ children, 
when they became adults, typically sought jobs in the cities. The goal of secur-
ing national sovereignty and security in interior areas of Angola and Mozam-
bique by populating them with white settlers in the colonatos was compromised.
As I have argued elsewhere:
settlers who were mobilised for the official colonatos occupied a sui generis 
place within the group of the so-called colonisers. Despite all the rhetoric, 
propaganda and idealisation of the rural settler, he was always a minor-
ity in the whole of the overseas migration and did not correspond to the 
average social profile of the Portuguese who fixated in Africa: with higher 
educational and professional qualifications, mostly urban and working in 
commerce, services and public administration.97
The settlers who established themselves in the cities, that is, the bulk of the 
white Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, did not identify with the rural 
settlers. In fact, they perceived themselves as cosmopolitan, enterprising, and 
successful. The children of settlers, the so-called ‘second-rate Portuguese’,98 
heavily concentrated in urban centres, open to cultural interactions and inter-
national mass consumption,99 were still less likely to identify with villagers, hoe 
workers, regarded as caricatures of an archaic Portugal. That difference was per-
ceived and emphasised by some of the colonised, who did not see the distinc-
tive marks of racial and civilizational superiority on the rural settlers.
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7  Labour and mobility on 
Rhodesia’s railways
The 1954 firemen’s strike
Nicola Ginsburgh
Introduction
Doris Lessing’s The Grass is Singing vividly captures the reality of many socially 
aspirant Europeans who settled in Southern Rhodesia. Freshly arrived from 
England, Tony Marston is hired as a farm manager for Dick and Mary Turner, 
poor whites plagued by years of agricultural failure and social isolation. Tony’s 
unbridled optimism for his own future is reflected in his belief that he will soon 
enough profitably run his own farm. The most successful farmer in the district, 
Charlie Slatter, a “proper cockney” who started life as a grocer’s assistant in 
London, makes no attempt to hide his resentment towards Tony whose accent, 
education and relatively liberal racial views mark him as an outsider. Charlie’s 
unease over Tony’s presence intensifies when African farm labourers rush to 
inform him that Mary’s dead body has been found on the Turners’ property.1 
While Tony, the nearest European to the scene, feels “insulted” that he had 
been overlooked by the African farm labourers, Charlie and the police sergeant 
present to investigate the death ‘seemed to think it right and natural that he 
should be bypassed in this fashion, as if his newness to the country unfitted him 
for any kind of responsibility’. Tony, suspicious that Mary Turner had pursued 
a sexual relationship with her African domestic servant, is cowed into silence 
by the two men. Information of this nature was feared to cause irrevocable 
damage to white prestige and lower the status of all whites in African eyes and 
Tony retreats to the city; alienated, angered and painfully aware that in order to 
prevent his permanent ostracism from the settler community he must rapidly 
adopt certain racialised behaviours and attitudes.2
The interactions between Tony Marston and the established settlers in Less-
ing’s novel speak to a central tension at the heart of settler colonialism in 
Southern Rhodesia: the viability of a white settler state was reliant upon the 
mobility of white persons, but this movement simultaneously threatened to 
disrupt established racialised practices and undermine settler cohesion. Largely 
set in a farming district, the novel has also arguably contributed to the endur-
ing image of white settlement in Rhodesia as a predominantly rural phenom-
enon. The notion of the fundamentally agrarian nature of white experience 
has been strengthened in recent years due to the centrality of white farmers 
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in struggles over land in Zimbabwe in the early 2000s. This, in turn, has been 
reflected in the increasing number of studies which have attempted to grapple 
with issues of belonging, privilege and power in Zimbabwe through a critical 
framework of whiteness.3 The best of this work has been attentive to the com-
plex processes in the creation of white racial identity, has stressed the diversity 
of the white population, their backgrounds, political beliefs and experiences, 
and has acknowledged that racial privilege and power is constructed, claimed 
and performed in different ways across the settler population.4 However, much 
of this work has perpetuated homogenising tendencies evident in earlier Man-
ichaean colonial narratives.5 Despite some scholars recognising that land own-
ership was not the sole or primary foundation of white power and privilege,6 
the critical literature which has emerged on settlers in recent years has mostly 
been bounded by a chronological focus on independent Zimbabwe, has been 
dominated by rural, politically liberal and middle-class whites, and has failed to 
investigate broader social differentiation amongst settlers.
The Central African Federation period offers historians an opportunity 
to examine how white identity was created and claimed during a period of 
increased immigration and expansion. Imperialism was underpinned by the 
movement of persons, commodities, knowledge, ideologies and cultures, but 
paradoxically this movement was accompanied by essentialising processes that 
sought to create fixed racial categories, erect barriers to movement and concre-
tise national and imperial borders.7 Rhodesian authorities encouraged Euro-
pean settlement while placing strict restrictions on the type of white settler it 
allowed in, refusing those it deemed to be either nationally, ethnically, politically 
or economically “undesirable”.8 Settlers also policed themselves in internal 
processes of regulation. Established settlers instructed new arrivals in “proper” 
racialised behaviours and the particular standards demanded of white skin in 
Southern Africa.9 Alison Shutt and Tony King have stressed that the transient 
nature of the settler population meant that re-education was a constant task. 
Cecil Rhodes, early frontier myths, hostility to apartheid and promotion of 
the multiracial franchise as a central part of settler identity became important 
in the socialisation of new immigrants. Yet the success of this settler socialisa-
tion has been overstated.10 While settler ideologues stressed a shared culture, 
politics and way of life in order to highlight the supposed incommensurability 
of racial groups, restrictions on settlement, processes of internal regulation and 
pronouncements of racial unity ultimately failed to create a cohesive white 
community. Alois Mlambo has noted that post-war immigration of middle-class 
professionals created differences between “Old Rhodesians” and new arrivals 
with the latter holding relatively liberal racial ideas, preferring paternalist mul-
tiracialism than outright segregation and opposition to majority rule.11 Donal 
Lowry has acknowledged migrants with a more conservative outlook who 
desired to escape the British post-war Attlee Labour government as well as the 
“Bengal Chancers” and “Poonafontein Rifles” who arrived in Rhodesia from 
newly independent India.12 Nevertheless, historians have paid less attention to 
the emigration of lower class whites during this period.
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Labour historians of Southern Africa have increasingly interrogated the for-
mation of the highly racialised identities of white workers across Empire and 
the global processes central to class formation and struggle.13 While attentive 
to the ways in which politics, ideologies and identities were circulated and 
co-produced within these imperial flows of labour in Southern Rhodesia, the 
focus of this chapter lies not on the cohesion or common ideology produced 
by this movement, but in the fragmentation caused by international flows of 
labour; the ways in which European mobility aggravated divisions within white 
labour and settler society more broadly. The expansion of certain industries 
and high turnover of labour meant that new migrants, social groups, ideas and 
ideologies were continually being introduced into the labour force. These new 
additions meant that the socialisation of new arrivals into normative behav-
iours was a continual process; but it also meant that existing white workers’ 
identities, cultures and politics were constantly modified. This chapter probes 
this dynamism, failed settler socialisation and competing notions of idealised 
white behaviours through exploring an under-examined strike of European 
firemen on Rhodesia Railways in 1954. For white railway workers, the railways 
represented more than the mobility of goods and persons, they also held the 
promise of upwards social mobility in the settler community. However, many 
of the immigrants who moved from the UK failed to transcend the borders 
of class and status they were trying to escape. While the 1954 strike ostensibly 
emanated over pay and conditions, it was also fuelled by an assertion of certain 
rights and privileges that framed white workers’ identity, including the right to 
organise. Certainly, the strike and subsequent fallout demonstrates the extent to 
which the settler government feared that white labour had a latent radicalism 
which could be stirred into frenzied industrial action; that they could join with 
African labour or simply give African labour “ideas”, and shows that the Rho-
desian government was prepared to use considerable force in disciplining white 
labour if it overstepped established boundaries. As such this chapter supports 
the contention of Jon Lunn and Ian Phimister that white workers engaged 
in struggles over the labour process and the organisation of work beyond the 
formalisation of the colour bar under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, but 
also militates against the tendency of existing research to present reified, albeit 
internally differentiated, white worker ideologies, beliefs and cultures by stress-
ing the dynamism of class formation and the ongoing and contested production 
of white worker identity.14
The RRWU
The 1954 strike was led by dissatisfied members of the largest European 
trade union operating on the railways, the Rhodesia Railway Workers Union 
(RRWU). The RRWU had been established in 1916 and sought to unite Euro-
pean men from all grades on the railways but favoured the employment of white 
British men and struggled against non-British Europeans, European women 
and most importantly, African men. It attempted to create a hypermasculine 
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identity based upon notions of respectability and pride in work and this pro-
fessed identity was most evident in the RRWU’s monthly journal, the Rhode-
sian Railway Review. The Review reported on local union news, political and 
economic developments in Rhodesia and the British Empire more broadly, 
trade union struggles and Labour Party developments in Britain as well as 
day-to-day railway life, individuals and their successes, deaths, and promotions, 
news of football leagues, picnics, dinner dances and social functions organ-
ised by railway wives. Importantly, the Review also acted as a medium through 
which the trade union bureaucracy attempted to shape and regulate white 
worker identity and behaviour. Editorials and articles in the Review most clearly 
represent the views and attitudes of the trade union bureaucracy. Although 
on occasion the editors of the Review noted that they had heavily edited or 
refused to print particular submissions from members that they either did not 
agree with or found to be libellous, dissenting voices were not entirely erased 
from its contents. The contestation over trade union politics and white worker 
identity more generally is evidenced most clearly in its letter pages and from 
notes written by locally elected branch scribes. This chapter also uses RRWU 
Conference minutes, internal investigations and correspondence of the Railway 
Administration, British and Rhodesian newspapers, correspondence between 
the Federation’s British high commissioner and the Commonwealth Office and 
Southern Rhodesian legislative assembly debates to analyse divisions within 
white labour as well as the competing responses of British and Rhodesian state 
officials, employers and the public to the strike and the idealised behaviours of 
white settlers more generally.
Overview of the strike
Envisioned as a barrier against majority rule and a route to independence and 
dominion status by white settlers and African critics alike, the short-lived Cen-
tral African Federation joined together the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1953. 
The Federation witnessed a period of unprecedented growth. European immi-
gration, African urbanisation and participation in wage labour had dramatically 
increased during the Second World War and continued apace in the post-war 
years.15 Established labour practices were destabilised by these interrelated phe-
nomena. Struggles over the demarcation of white and black work and the dif-
ferential racialised standard of living were reflected within industrial action 
taken by both African and white workers over the period.16 In Southern Rho-
desia European railway workers had not taken strike action since 1929 and the 
last significant European strike had taken place in 1932 in the building trade. 
Significantly, both of these occurred prior to the introduction of arbitration 
machinery under the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act, which, alongside formal-
ising the European monopoly of skilled jobs, had effectively prohibited strikes 
in the colony. The 1929 strike had been seen as the last whimper of a weakened 
European trade union movement which had faced a concerted onslaught from 
employers in the early 1920s after a period of successful militancy following the 
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First World War.17 Despite never fully recovering to its former strength, by the 
time of the strike in 1954, the RRWU had a membership of 5,728, which rep-
resented around three quarters of all European staff employed on the railways 
north of Bulawayo.18
In the lead up to 1954, tensions had been building amongst low paid work-
ers for a considerable period. The RRWU had entered arbitration in Febru-
ary 1953 and while a basic pay increase was won for all grades, the arbitration 
received a mixed response from RRWU members. In particular, married men 
claimed they were unable to support their families on basic rates of pay.19 The 
high number of resignations on the railways fuelled the belief that the Admin-
istration were bringing out experienced workers with families from the UK 
under false pretences. For white railwaymen, an appropriate wage was deter-
mined just as much by age and marital status as it was by race and gender. The 
RRWU argued that men with years of experience and skill were being hired in 
low skilled work.20 The existence of this layer of whites failing to attain white 
standards of living within the railway community threatened to bring down 
the prestige of railway workers more generally. White workers were keen to 
present an image of social mobility and respectability which demanded ensur-
ing that every white person employed by the railways was able to project an 
air of prosperity and achievement. Lower skilled and lower paid positions were 
often understood to be appropriate only for younger, single men from which 
they would gradually progress after gaining relevant experience. However, staff 
shortages had forced the Administration to hire older experienced men in the 
shunting grade, which was considered a “learner” grade. As a result the fireman’s 
wage of £39 per month did not match what many older Europeans expected 
as a basic rate.21
The Railway Administration and RRWU were forced to repeatedly state 
that the firemen could not take action outside the arbitration machinery and 
threatened that any man taking illegal strike action would be prosecuted.22 
Nevertheless, firemen continued to call for strike action and there were calls 
from some quarters to form a new independent railway union.23 As agitation 
over pay from the firemen’s section increased, Charles Robert Taylor, a Brit-
ish trade unionist and fireman who had been resident in the colony for thir-
teen months, was singled out as a ringleader of the continuing dissent and was 
expelled from the RRWU on the 31 May 1954. Particularly unnerving to 
the Administration and the government was the aptitude Taylor had shown in 
organising and rallying the men. On the first day of the planned strike the CID 
searched Taylor’s house and found what they claimed to be a ‘draft manifesto of 
standard communist type’ which provided grounds for his arrest on the 4 June. 
Another new arrival from Britain, W. Raeburn, was also arrested.24 On hearing 
this news, firemen voted to carry on with the strike at midday on the same day 
and Taylor was swiftly deported to the UK.
The strike went ahead in spite of interventions by the Railway Adminis-
tration, the RRWU’s executive and the government, and began in Salisbury 
where it was reported that all but two of the 125 firemen had joined the 
Labour and mobility on Rhodesia’s railways 139
strike. By the 5 June the strike had spread to Northern Rhodesia and police 
patrolled the railway line near Livingstone after it was claimed that railwaymen 
had attempted to sabotage the line. However, strike leaders claimed to know 
nothing of this and ‘offered to protect the railway from sabotage if necessary’.25 
At Bulawayo, while fewer firemen were reported to join the strike, rail traffic 
was reported to be at “a standstill”.26 While initially consisting solely of firemen, 
the strike gradually extended to include some sympathetic engine drivers and 
shunters who were angered by the heavy-handed response. They were particu-
larly ired by the arrests of Taylor and Raeburn and the reaction of the Admin-
istration who had automatically dismissed seventy-four of the firemen who had 
taken strike action.27 The firemen refused to negotiate with the president of 
the RRWU when he met with them to convince them to return to work and 
demanded separate representation as they distrusted the leadership who had 
seemingly aided the state to deport Taylor.28 Garfield Todd, on the other hand, 
refused to negotiate with the strikers and would only deal with official RRWU 
representatives. The strikers eventually agreed to return to work on conditions 
of no victimisation, a fair trial for Taylor and a special commission into their 
claims. While strikers at Salisbury eventually agreed to end the strike on the 
7th, men at Bulawayo refused to trust reports of men returning to work from 
the RRWU leadership and management, and as a result did not return to work 
until the 10th, only after Salisbury strikers had been flown out to Bulawayo to 
confirm the reports.29
Explanations of the strike
The Administration, RRWU executive and the rank and file provided compet-
ing explanations as to the strike’s causes. Management maintained that the ring-
leaders of the strike had no concerns over firemen’s pay.30 They were accused of 
taking advantage of ill feeling in order to have a holiday, and it was noted that 
it was not entirely ‘irrelevant that [the] strike came day or two after payment 
of wages for May and coincided largely with Whitsun holidays’.31 The RRWU 
Executive Committee asserted that the initial 1953 arbitration had been gener-
ally successful and claimed that despite winning concessions and pay rises for 
some of the men, the firemen would not listen to “reasonable argument”.32 Two 
Executive Committee members described their own attempt to intervene in a 
meeting of firemen to persuade them not to strike:
One [fireman] had got up and said: ‘Mr. Adams and Mr. Longden have 
persuaded us that we are wrong, but it is too late. Tomorrow we strike. 
Don’t we chums?’ and they had said yes. They would not listen to reason; 
the strike had all been arranged.33
The RRWU leadership repeatedly described the behaviour of the strikers in 
ways which served to create an image of an injudicious, malleable mob. The 
men, it was argued, had no real grievance but had been riled up by Taylor and 
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his communist propaganda. Taylor was portrayed as a demagogue who did not 
care about the firemen’s concerns and never turned up to branch meetings, 
but who was obsessed with striking and had deviously tricked the men into 
his own agenda which included ousting the general secretary and appointing 
himself as leader.34 Although Charles Taylor received support from the British 
National Union of Mineworkers and other trade unionists in Britain who had 
written to the secretary of state for the colonies to protest Taylor’s treatment, 
solidarity within Southern Rhodesia was less forthcoming. Certainly, many 
in the RRWU did not only refuse to support Taylor but actively cheered his 
deportation. The rapidity with which Taylor was deported without trial ema-
nated from deep-seated fears of the Administration and government that white 
workers could hold the country hostage through paralysing the railways. The 
strike was repeatedly framed in the Rhodesian press as an attack on Rhodesia 
itself. Addressing the annual congress of the British Empire Service League, 
Garfield Todd urged the audience to ‘fight the foe within our borders’ and 
declared that the strike had followed a ‘communistic pattern’.35 The govern-
ment belatedly justified the deportation on the basis that Taylor had lied to 
enter the colony; Taylor’s wife had confirmed he had been a member of the 
British Communist Party from 1943 to 1953 and a propaganda secretary for a 
local branch in Derbyshire, all of which were used to discredit Taylor and the 
firemen’s demands.36
The fireman’s strike had received widespread coverage in the British press. In 
the Daily Worker Taylor warned that
Rhodesian reactionaries haven’t heard the last of Charles Taylor. I shall do 
my best to tell as many British trade unionists as I can about conditions in 
Rhodesia. I promised the lads I left behind that I would do this, and do it 
I will.37
The publicity that Taylor had garnered in his defence was seen as having the 
potential to jeopardise essential recruitment of skilled workers from the UK. 
Taylor had returned to Britain and openly challenged the myth of social mobil-
ity in Rhodesia. He hit back at the RRWU leadership as ‘smug and lazy’, 
accusing them of ignoring the rank and file and effectively acting as part of 
management rather than as the representatives of labour. According to Taylor, 
part of the reason why firemen took action was due to the Administration’s 
offer for improved conditions being restricted to the “UK men”, while Afri-
kaans speaking men who made up half of the frontplate staff were offered no 
improvements. Taylor described the offer as a “disgraceful” suggestion which 
‘would have worsened racial feeling and destroyed all hopes of unity for a 
generation’ and he cheered that when the strike eventually came, UK and Afri-
kaans men walked out together. Taylor also vocally criticised the conditions of 
Coloured prisoners in the Cape where he was stationed before deportation to 
Britain. He described the prisoners being ‘stripped and whipped with metal-
tipped canes’ as ‘the most degrading sight I have ever seen’.38 He publicised 
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that men were in debt and that new arrivals were disgruntled at their low pay 
and often ‘did not know where their next meal would come from’. Taylor 
further described his own experiences in damning terms: ‘one day I did the 
unmentionable thing in Rhodesia: I borrowed money from my “houseboy” to 
buy milk for the kiddies’.39 Taylor understood that he was contravening white 
standards of behaviour and offered a view of reliance and dependence upon 
African domestic staff; an image Rhodesian white labour had put considerable 
effort into emphatically denying.
The Executive Committee used anecdotes of Taylor’s communism and lib-
eral racial attitudes to justify their actions towards the strikers and attempt 
to erode the fireman’s loyalty to him. Mr. Beirowski, a Salisbury delegate at 
the 1954 RRWU Annual Conference, recalled that he had met Taylor in the 
Zawi mess room where Taylor was talking about the recent strike of Africans 
at Wankie and had denounced the Government’s actions to break the strike. 
Beirowski reported that he had challenged Taylor and asked, ‘Do you realise 
what you are saying as regards the African? Do you want the African to upset 
the country like that and just do as he likes, violence and breaking the law and 
acting illegally?’ Yet according to Beirowski, Taylor had continued to defend the 
rights of Africans to strike and even declared that ‘my views about the African 
are these. When my daughter grows up, if the African is fit to have my daughter, 
he can have my daughter’.40 Protecting white women was an axiomatic ele-
ment of white masculinity within Rhodesia. By symbolically offering up his 
own daughter to an African man, Taylor had transgressed a constitutive element 
of settler manhood. Notably, it was not the physical occurrence of interracial 
sex which was being denounced by Beirowski, but rather Taylor’s utterance 
of its acceptability. Taylor’s beliefs and attitudes were as much on trial as his 
actions. As research into the production of settler boundaries has shown, settler 
colonial states desired not just to regulate the behaviour of their subjects; but to 
make them ‘think and feel’ in particular racialised ways.41 Taylor clearly knew 
the accepted boundaries of racialised interaction, recognising that his borrow-
ing money from his servant was “unmentionable”, yet he did not feel requisite 
humiliation to hide this transgression; neither did he apparently shy away from 
public declarations of support for interracial sex or African militancy. Whereas 
Lessing’s Tony Marston was successfully shamed into silence by established set-
tlers over the relationship between a white woman and African that he had 
seen, it was precisely Taylor’s lack of shame or sense of racial propriety which 
marked him out as dangerous. For the RRWU, their broader reputation was at 
stake by being seen to tolerate such views; Taylor was recognised ‘as a serious 
threat to union prestige’.42
Taylor’s refusal to act in ways expected of white men in Rhodesia was directly 
linked to his previous political association with the CPGB. Anti- communism 
was a central tenet of white Rhodesian political ideology throughout the 
period of minority rule.43 The 1922 Rand Revolt in South Africa made a lasting 
impression in white Rhodesia. In the first decades of settlement, white work-
ers and trade unions were repeatedly accused of revolutionary communism 
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by employers, MPs and the press.44 One of the first general secretaries of the 
RRWU, Jack Keller, was nicknamed the ‘Lenin of Rhodesia’ and European 
trade unions and the Rhodesia Labour Party had to repeatedly state that they 
harboured neither communist nor Bolshevist sympathies.45 This fear of white 
labour upheaval and international Bolshevism never entirely dissipated. Dur-
ing the Second World War the presence of European servicemen, refugees 
and enemy internees heightened suspicion of communist infiltration.46 When 
Communist Party recruitment propaganda surfaced in the colony during the 
late 1940s, it was blamed upon the increasing presence of “newcomers”.47
Communist ideas were dangerous not only because of the wider Cold War 
context and threat of industrial upheaval, but because they were perceived to 
encourage the erosion of racial boundaries. The propaganda which surfaced 
during the 1940s was particularly reviled as it embodied ‘the dangerous peculi-
arities of the communistic thinkers . . . they are firm believers in equality of race 
and colour’.48 The presence of communist individuals was thus seen as having a 
wider corroding effect on the racial order of settler society. Racial thinking had 
to be learnt and while white labour’s structural position engendered animos-
ity towards black workers and inhibited the likeliness of solidarity, such racial 
attitudes could not be taken for granted. The newcomer who had not yet been 
adequately drilled in the racial protocols expected of Rhodesian labour had to 
be prevented from diluting the union’s attitude to African workers. This in part 
reflected dominant ideas that established settlers had intricate ways of knowing 
the African population unobtainable to the newly arrived settler. This was reit-
erated by many new arrivals. Sam Wright, a railwayman employed from 1950 to 
1976, acknowledged that while recent settlers could achieve amicable relations 
with Africans they ‘never quite had the same association as those African born’ 
who possessed an ‘insight into the ways and nature of the Africans’. Wright 
commented that the more recent immigrants displayed an ‘unfortunate variety 
of attitudes’ with complete disregard for the ‘boundaries of personal contact 
that was acceptable’. Unlike the established settler, newcomers did not under-
stand the full implications and ‘dangers of too much familiarity which was not 
to the comfort of either party’.49
Accusations of communist ideas taking root amongst white workers may 
have been informed by real fears, but there is no evidence for widespread com-
munist sympathies amongst the white workforce. The strike had not been uni-
versally supported amongst rank and file railwaymen and some railway staff 
actively tried to break the strike. The Administration reported that virtually 
all clerical staff at Salisbury had volunteered to take on firemen’s duties and an 
appeal for volunteers had also attracted a substantial response from the pub-
lic.50 Moreover, liberal racial ideals found little receptive audience in the wider 
white worker community despite broader fears amongst settlers over the ero-
sion of racial boundaries. When an Executive Committee directive ordered 
that white drivers should work with unqualified firemen to break the strike, it 
was vociferously condemned as an attack on the colour bar. Initial reports sent 
between railway management suggest that railway authorities were keen not 
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to use Africans to perform work usually done by Europeans as they feared it 
would strengthen the strikers’ resolve and garner support for their action from 
other sections of the European workforce. However, rank and file members 
accused the Executive Committee of giving ‘the right to the Administration 
to place any human being of any colour on an engine and call him a fireman’. 
One delegate to the 1954 RRWU Conference argued in defence of the union 
that their role was to break up illegal strikes:
it even warranted the use of European convicts on the footplate. Every-
body would have been done out of a job. There was also the example to the 
African. They were putting it in their heads how to get rid of all Europeans 
in the country; if the illegal strike had been successful they would have 
“had it”.51
Threats of African industrial action could be used to discipline white workers, 
but also offered white labour opportunities to coalesce around race.52 Despite 
division between occupations, blue collar and white collar workers, skilled and 
unskilled trades, white workers could unite out of racialised solidarity when 
challenged by African workers. After an inadequate basic wage increase in 1956, 
the Railway African Workers Union (RAWU) called a strike which saw 7,500 
Africans lay down tools for three days.53 Police were armed with truncheons 
and used tear gas on striking Africans who had gathered in Bulawayo.54 Bula-
wayo Branch admitted candidly that ‘it has been our duty to do everything in 
our power to keep the job going which is nothing less than breaking the strike’ 
and accused RAWU of putting its members at risk.55
Nevertheless fears of trade union militancy and the erosion of racial bounda-
ries persisted. Rhodesia was seen as fertile ground for radicalism to take root 
and this was due, in part, to the transience of its settlers. The RRWU leadership 
argued that new arrivals had not fully adjusted to the Rhodesian trade union 
modus operandi or settler culture more generally, and were much more willing 
to revert to strike action.56 Management likewise reasoned that the cause of the 
strike was down to mass recruitment of new European staff. In 1954, of the 
8000 Europeans employed by the railways, 5,200 had less than eight years of 
service. Although recruits were screened, management admitted that with their 
huge recruitment drive it was inevitable ‘that some of the less desirable found 
their way into the country’. They further noted that
it was apparent for some time that many overseas recruits were fairly 
strongly influenced by socialist ideas and felt that labour should negotiate 
on more militant lines. This feeling among certain grades of recruits goes 
back some years.57
Sam Wright recalled that employees recruited from Britain were ‘the most 
vociferous, in union matters . . . it was a constant ding-dong between them 
and management’.58 European immigration was intended to maintain racialised 
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employment practices and ease skilled labour deficits, but this was conditional 
on new arrivals being socially mobile and on being able to perform a particular 
imagined white identity. The social mobility that Rhodesia promised its white 
workers was embodied in figures such as Roy Welensky who had risen from a 
position as a railwayman to the premiership. But this social mobility was neither 
universal nor automatic. In the year of the strike the Women’s Guild had dis-
pensed Government rations of 1s 6d per person to 16 European families and 29 
Coloured families every month for the preceding year. A further 96 European 
families and 74 Coloured families were given secondhand clothes and shoes by 
the Guild.59 In a bid to prevent radicalisation the Railway Administration set 
up a welfare fund for its European staff in 1956, whose purpose was ‘to give 
assistance for the relief of distress amongst railway employees by means of loans 
or grants in cash or kind’, and in its first year dealt with 1,532 cases of white 
distress.60 By 1957 28 percent of all European employees were approaching the 
Administration for financial assistance.61 From these statistics it is unclear what 
qualified as “distress” for European workers: whether this was an inability to 
provide for dependents, to pay African domestic staff, or to attain a social stand-
ing befitting of white skin. What is clear however is that many white workers 
felt themselves to be in a position of distress and invested in the idea that they 
impecuniously existed at the edges of white propriety.
To militate against continuing dissent, as well as initiating more stringent 
screening processes, it was suggested that railwaymen be forbidden from mar-
rying until they had reached a certain wage, something which was already 
in place for army personnel, policemen and bank employees.62 This, it was 
thought, would prevent the growth of impoverished families and dissatisfaction 
from married employees. The Department of Labour likewise expressed a pref-
erence for men to come out individually and establish themselves before bring-
ing out their families as the infrastructure could not bear added population.63 
Without the requisite housing and services, white recruits were living in condi-
tions below what they had anticipated and as a result were seen as being more 
susceptible to communist influences and involvement in industrial action. The 
settler state, Railway Administration and RRWU itself desired the settlement 
of white families; families were seen to engender stability and permanence. 
Yet economic conditions meant the immigration of families had a potentially 
radicalising effect and discontent surfaced when expectations of upwards social 
mobility failed to materialise.
Some strikers admitted that their primary concerns were not about pay. At 
Dett, railwaymen listed demands about street lighting, water shortages, short-
ages of electrical appliances and home conditions. They specifically complained 
about their Nursing Sister, who had caused a ‘certain amount of friction’ due 
to the fact she was ‘of a type above the average driver, fireman and guard and 
does not socially mix too well’.64 In a similar vein, Sam Wright, while usu-
ally at pains to emphasise uniformity amongst Europeans on the railways ‘in 
skills [and] social sophistication’, was forced to admit that ‘dotted in this rather 
homogenous crowd, were a few exceptions who stood out a bit like sore 
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thumbs’. Those he noted as standing out were not the poor, but those from 
the ‘higher class of society’, one a “pompous” superintendent and another a 
doctor, scarred from “duelling”, who walked around ‘with such an air of con-
ceit and self-importance as to become a figure of ridicule and mockery’.65 
Jon Lunn has fruitfully used the notion of the bailiwick – the area in which 
workers could assert their limited authority and independence within wider 
systems and boundaries – and argued this space should be understood as a fun-
damental area of expression for white worker identity in which gendered and 
racial hierarchies were enforced.66 Railway workers attempted to influence rail-
way spaces by controlling the movement and presence of particular racial and 
classed groups. Railways enabled settlement, influenced social identifications 
and produced hierarchies of labour in which racial status was constructed and 
proclaimed. Carriages and platforms marked out boundaries of class, race and 
gender and were sites of struggle over social identities.67 Numerous complaints 
over an unwanted African presence littered the Review and the management-
funded Rhodesia Railway Magazine which described ‘hordes of Africans, their 
beds, furniture and possessions that are daily to be found scattered all over the 
station’ and ‘the hordes of “loafers” who sprawl all over the station premises at 
all hours of the day and night’.68 Demands for separate African, Coloured and 
white railway stations and carriages abounded.69 Physical distance and separa-
tion reinforced claims to particular racial identities, but this animosity extended 
to upper class whites. Railwaymen attempted to cultivate the railways as a white 
space; but it was also fundamentally a classed space. The white families of the 
Dett railway community were angered by a middle and upper-class incursion 
into their delineated communities. Just as Charlie Slatter despised the middle-
class accoutrements of Tony Marston in The Grass is Singing, on the railways the 
presence of such figures was a reminder of many railwaymen’s social inferiority 
and the class divisions that many were trying to transcend, but also pointed to 
the limitations of white social integration and an inclusive Rhodesian identity.70 
Workers at Dett attempted to utilise the strike action to set forward their own 
demands regarding the white railway community and who was and was not a 
part of it.
Disciplining white workers
The strike itself was also a reaction to the treatment of Taylor; this was an asser-
tion of the right to organise and a flagrant challenge to the RRWU leader-
ship. There was particular anger over the perceived heavy handedness of the 
state in squashing the strike. The government argued that they could not let a 
European strike continue especially as they had acted with brutal force against 
recent African strikers at Wankie.71 Within hours of the firemen announcing 
their strike, a state of emergency was declared across the colony. The CID 
searched the homes of strike leaders and several were arrested, dismissed from 
the railways, or subsequently demoted. Jack Keller, former president of the 
RRWU and member of parliament for the railway constituency of Raylton for 
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the Rhodesia Labour Party since 1928, openly criticised the RRWU leader-
ship and complained of “gangster” tactics claiming that Garfield Todd and Roy 
Welensky had descended on his home to interrogate him and his links to the 
strikers.72 He claimed strikers had been “shadowed” by the CID, that letters 
sent to the Rhodesian press in support of Taylor were suppressed and that his 
own phone line had been tapped by the state.73 Keller outlined his treatment 
and accused Rhodesia of being a one-party state in a letter he sent to a num-
ber of British media outlets and statesmen including the BBC, Clement Attlee 
and Winston Churchill. More broadly, in the Legislative Assembly, Keller used 
the strike to curb state powers against white workers. Specifically he moved 
a motion to repeal section 8 of the Peace Preservation Act which allowed 
the governor to make regulations in the event of strikes. The Act allowed the 
Government to pass laws without parliament; to use forced labour, to hold 
people without trial, and to arrest without warrant ‘anyone whom they sus-
pect . . . merely suspect – of having said or done something which might in 
their opinion adversely affect the efficiency of an essential industry’.74 Keller 
denounced the Act as a fascist decree and claimed Rhodesia was a police state, 
reminding the Assembly that he had been assured that under no circumstances 
would the Act be used against white workers.75 Presumably he believed such 
measures were necessary to deal with industrial action involving African work-
ers, but impinged on the civil liberties of Europeans. The Legislative Assembly 
upheld that the Act should be used against both black and white workers in the 
interests of “freedom”. Europeans could not be seen to be openly flouting the 
law, and punishment had to be meted out.76 All union power had to be curbed 
and wildcat strikes in particular could not be tolerated. Europeans had a price 
to pay for their privileged position in the labour market. One MP reminded 
white labourers that:
The European artisan is not only in a specially favoured position under 
the law but he also in consequence has special duties to the community 
in which he lives . . . in the presence of an almost overwhelming mass of 
uncivilised and unskilled labour [his duty] is to act moderately and temper-
ately in industrial disputes.77
In the past public opinion had been mobilised against white industrial action 
through allusions to African rebellion. Employers, the government and the press 
had variously argued that white strike action was the height of irresponsibility; 
it not only threatened white unity but encouraged Africans to rebel against 
their bosses.78 Now the RRWU trade union bureaucracy also declared that 
strikes were counterproductive due to their potential influence upon African 
workers.79 They accepted principles of arbitration and came down heavily on 
any action outside its direct control. Yet what this episode demonstrates is pre-
cisely a lack of control over white labour on the railways. Many white workers 
were failing to display the outward signs of respectability which the RRWU 
strove to project. The Review condemned railway employees’ behaviour noting 
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that ‘the managers and European staffs of some canteens have been insulted; 
African servants have been assaulted; furniture and equipment have been bro-
ken, and utensils have disappeared at an appalling rate’.80 Letters to the Herald 
bemoaned the high expectations of new arrivals and pointed to the fact that the 
firemen’s wage reflected its low skill. While these newcomers would have had a 
lowly status in Britain ‘governed simply by the type of trade in which they were 
employed, not by the colour of their skin. After a spell in the colony it beats 
into their brains that they are Europeans and must therefore enjoy this so-called 
European standard of life’.81 Dissatisfaction was seen as a consequence of new 
arrivals’ unrealistic expectations. Another letter expressed shock at the behav-
iour of new immigrants and asked ‘if they are not satisfied then why do they 
stay, and upset others?’82 The accused ‘lawlessness and irresponsibility’ of Taylor, 
argued one letter, amounted to ‘the negation of those qualities which we term 
British’.83 Those defending Taylor on the other hand argued that the way Taylor 
had been treated ‘smacks of fascism’ and was decidedly “unBritish”.84 Within 
Rhodesia established settlers and newcomers offered competing definitions of 
who was, and who was not, authentically British. Accusing others of not being 
British was a way of positioning one’s views and beliefs as a legitimate expres-
sion of “Britishness” while marking others out as fraudulent or degenerate, but 
also points to the importance of this national identity in broader settler iden-
tification.85 These contests over British identity demonstrate competing claims 
to a superior character, politics and way of life which were themselves rooted 
in different class experiences; class divisions continued to undermine any sense 
of a cohesive racial and national identity.
Reasserting control over the rank-and-file
In the wake of the strike the RRWU Executive’s assertions of confidence and 
moves towards providing financial assistance to Europeans at the bottom of the 
wage scale failed to quell dissent. The close relationship between employer and 
trade bureaucracy fostered by the Industrial Conciliation Act was coming under 
greater scrutiny from rank and file members. While in the first decades of the 
twentieth century the trade union bureaucracy of the RRWU was considered 
to comprise the most radical and politically engaged section of white workers 
in contrast to a supposedly apathetic rank and file which lacked political edu-
cation,86 by the 1950s trade union bureaucracies were regarded as increasingly 
conservative and a barrier to militant action by sections of white labour. Large 
sections of the rank and file were also seen as failing to meet the standards of 
white respectability demanded by trade union leaders.
The general manager of Rhodesia Railways and the chief industrial officer 
of Southern Rhodesia were present at the RRWU Conference and congratu-
lated the RRWU leadership and its role in bringing the rank and file into line. 
The chief industrial officer further noted that the behaviour and respectability 
had generally improved due to the ‘grandfatherly attitude towards the young-
sters . . . you put the lads in their places’.87 The RRWU bureaucracy had built 
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an image of respectability based upon partnership with employers and the state. 
White monopoly of skilled jobs and racially exclusive trade unionism were 
justified through a language of responsibility and rights that white workers had 
earned through jettisoning radicalism and embracing conciliation. This close 
relationship and regulatory role taken by the RRWU leadership did not go 
unnoticed by rank and file members. There were reports of raucous meetings 
full of insults and jeering towards officials, and editorials in the Review were 
forced to repeatedly extol the virtues of the current leadership and list their 
accomplishments in fighting for improved conditions.88 Branch scribes, on the 
other hand, continued to submit notes to the Review which defended Taylor 
and denounced the leadership. The strike, in their opinion, was not a result of 
Taylor’s interference but of ‘bureaucratic administration . . . allied with clue-
less but abundant supervision on the part of many junior officials’.89 Branches 
also accused that the incumbent leadership had caused a wave of resignations 
from the union.90 The union bureaucracy in turn accused the branch scribes 
of disruption and of the ‘flouting of authority’, but the dissatisfaction failed to 
subside.91 A year on, Que Que Branch continued to call for a special confer-
ence and a motion of no confidence in the Executive Committee.92 Despite 
the RRWU’s 1954 annual conference passing several motions of confidence 
in the union leadership, branch scribes complained that delegates had voted 
against the prevalent feelings of their branch members. Certainly, transcripts of 
the motions and debates held at the conference reveal that many elected offi-
cials feared being held accountable by the rank and file members. One delegate 
made an impassioned plea in support of a motion which attempted to make 
conference voting anonymous as ‘in some instances if how he voted were to 
become known to his branch his life would be miserable’.93 The motion was 
lost but nevertheless reveals that some trade unionists did not see their roles as 
representing the wishes of their branch members, but as one of instruction and 
regulation.
During the 1954 Conference there were several failed attempts to remove 
this conservative layer from the union leadership. Lower grades in the union 
were keen to prohibit railway officials – including inspectors and instructors – 
from serving on the Executive Committee, under the contention that these 
higher grades were effectively working as part of management. The motion was 
lost by nine to fourteen.94 A motion to reduce the number of years a man had 
to be part of the union to be elected to the NIC from five to three years was 
likewise summarily rejected by the conference. In a revealing defence of the 
stipulation, one National Committee member asserted that lowering the num-
ber of years would introduce ‘foreign elements to disturb and distract them’ as it 
took more than five years ‘to become really domiciled as a Rhodesian’.95 Here, 
Rhodesianness and trade union principles were acquired through fixity; being 
sufficiently settled was a prerequisite for acquiring responsibility. Notably such 
notions of rootedness were also utilised in justifications of differential wages; 
white demands for higher wages were made through reference to European 
monopoly of skill and a white standard of living which was underpinned by 
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stress upon the permanence of white employees in contrast with the supposed 
transitory and seasonal nature of African labour which allowed them to be paid 
‘single man’s wages’, despite the long-term service and urban residence of many 
African employees. Where a person settled also proved important. To rise to the 
upper echelons of the RRWU bureaucracy a man had to live and work in Bul-
awayo. Despite disquiet over the dominance of Bulawayo, a motion to incorpo-
rate four more members from elsewhere in Southern and Northern Rhodesia 
was narrowly lost by two votes.96 In this way, the union sought to control the 
potentially radical elements of its membership. They recognised that this meant 
that many delegates to the NIC were disliked and not the first choice of its 
members but the RRWU leadership saw this as a necessary measure to prevent 
newcomers with dangerous ideas from holding positions of power in the union. 
Not all white workers were deemed to be fit representatives of Rhodesian 
labour. In particular, the RRWU sought to control infiltration from commu-
nists and militant trade unionists, but it also attempted to enforce a particular 
racialised respectability amongst its members. In both regards, it was only ever 
partially successful.
Conclusion
Railways have played a central role in forging new kinds of mobility and in 
articulating colonial identities. They increased the mobility of persons, goods 
and ideas which enabled empire and simultaneously disrupted the borders 
and the production of difference central to the imperial project. The mobil-
ity afforded to particular Europeans to traverse imperial locations destabilised 
established colonial practices and frustrated labour organisations’ attempts to 
cultivate a coherent white worker identity. The white labour upheavals during 
the period of Federation reveal the general weakness of a divided labour move-
ment, but also points to the ongoing struggles to determine the boundaries of a 
“white standard of living”. It is clear that despite the existence of the colour bar 
and a series of racialised welfare measures, not to mention the huge wage dis-
parities between African and European workers, substantial numbers of white 
workers continued to see themselves as hard done by and living either in or on 
the edge of poverty. Sections of white settlers had failed to achieve the elevated 
social status they expected through their racial identification. While European 
workers had a privileged position in the labour market, this was in exchange 
for a regulated apathy and hamstrung trade union power. For employers and 
state authorities the use of repressive force was not out of the question; policing 
settler boundaries was a constant process.
Doris Lessing would be deported from South Africa and declared a prohib-
ited immigrant by Rhodesian authorities two years after Charles Taylor was 
forcibly returned to the UK. Like Taylor, she was vilified not only because of 
her political leanings and attitudes to race, but because she had highlighted the 
hypocrisies of white society, the poor whites the settler state tried to hide from 
sight and, perhaps most damagingly, written explicitly about interracial sex and 
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white women’s sexual desire. Performing symbolic practices of differentiation 
was an essential part of maintaining the racial order.97 Lessing and Taylor not 
only failed to think and behave in properly racialised ways, but actively popu-
larised their transgressions. These thoughts, ideas and actions were envisioned 
to endanger the very racial boundaries which underpinned settler rule. In the 
broader context of decolonisation and anti-colonial nationalism, Rhodesian 
authorities sought to strictly control the movement of radical ideas within its 
borders. The Rand Revolt had made a lasting imprint; white workers could 
be stirred into frenzied radicalism and were capable of inspiring widespread 
revolt amongst Africans. Certainly, Taylor was not the first white worker to 
face deportation for militant trade union activity in Southern Africa.98 Pro-
nouncements on Taylor became a medium through which wider fears over 
the frailty of settler power were expressed. The RRWU expected white male 
workers to act in ways that supported internal boundaries of difference; but 
these behaviours did not occur automatically and white trade union bureau-
crats struggled to control their members and cooperated with the state to 
remove undesirable elements from their ranks. However, the notion of what 
constituted acceptable white behaviour was not simply imposed from above. 
Neither were the boundaries of whiteness completely obvious or uncontested. 
Competing ideas over appropriate racialised behaviours, wages and standards 
of living were central to the ongoing class struggles over white identity and 
privilege in Rhodesia.
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8  The dog that didn’t bark
The Mufulira strike and white 




This chapter is, in some ways, a history of why something did not hap-
pen, explained through the history of something which did. This is a way 
of approaching a historical problem inspired by one of the most memora-
ble scenes in Arthur Conan Doyle’s series of short stories about the detec-
tive Sherlock Holmes, which occurs in ‘The Adventure of Silver Blaze’. The 
scene features the ever-observant Holmes, who is investigating the disap-
pearance of the prize-winning race-horse Silver Blaze, patiently explaining 
to a Scotland Yard detective, Inspector Gregory, the significance of a dog not 
barking:
INSPECTOR GREGORY: Is there any other point to which you would wish to 
draw my attention?
SHERLOCK HOLMES: To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.
GREGORY: The dog did nothing in the night-time.
HOLMES: That was the curious incident.1
Holmes inferred that the absence of an expected reaction was significant, in 
this case the dog’s failure to raise the alarm.2 The aim of this chapter is to make 
inferences from the absence of an anticipated reaction, that is, the failure of 
whites on the Zambian Copperbelt to seriously and actively resist decolonisa-
tion. What does this tell us about white society on the Copperbelt? In many 
ways, the Copperbelt contained all the ingredients for a bloody, protracted 
struggle against decolonisation: an armed, racist white minority in a highly 
privileged social and economic position who, in the early 1960s, suddenly 
found themselves neighbours to newly independent African nations and close 
witnesses to chaotic decolonisation in Congo. Yet no such struggle occurred. 
Unlike what transpired in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa, 
the end of white minority rule in Zambia was relatively peaceful. Despite some 
bluff and bluster, when it came down to it, whites on the Copperbelt grumbled, 
but ultimately, and rapidly, surrendered political power and accepted life under 
an African nationalist government.
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Control over the Copperbelt was central to white political control over the 
region. In the early 1960s, colonial Zambia (or Northern Rhodesia, as it was 
then called) was part of the Central African Federation, linking the colony with 
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) to entrench white 
and British control over the region. The British Government had established 
this Federation in 1953 as a counterpoise to South African influence in the 
region, and to appease white settler politicians who sought greater autonomy 
from London.3 For settler politicians, the Federation was a way of becoming 
an independent white Dominion within the Commonwealth, granting them 
the same status as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, a sta-
tus which the British Government had vaguely promised in the late 1950s.4 
The Copperbelt was integral to this plan as the economic powerhouse of the 
Federation and tax revenues from the copper mines effectively bankrolled the 
project.5 Absent this, the Federation would scarcely have been economically 
viable. There was no other industry of comparable size or importance or, cru-
cially, which employed so many white workers in such a concentrated manner. 
The mines supported the only substantial white population in the Federa-
tion outside Southern Rhodesia’s urban centres: some 33,510 people lived in 
the Copperbelt towns in 1961, almost half of the resident white population 
in Northern Rhodesia.6 Preserving white minority rule was near-impossible 
unless the Copperbelt’s white population leant their active support.7
Exploring why they did not tells us something important about the opera-
tion and salience of race in different contexts, and about the roots of racial 
identity. For the first point, it draws our attention to the set of circumstances 
which make a race a more salient identity upon which people draw, building 
on Ann Stoler’s insight that seeing racism as “built into” the colonial encounter 
‘accords poorly with the fact that the quality and intensity of racism vary enor-
mously in different colonial contexts and at different historical moments in 
any particular colonial encounter’.8 For the second point, it raises the question 
of what did being white on the Copperbelt mean? How and where was racial 
identity generated?
It is often assumed that there was no substantive difference between how race 
operated on the Copperbelt and how it did elsewhere in Southern Africa, and 
in the wider literature the Copperbelt’s white mineworkers have been viewed as 
simply emulating the organisation and attitudes of white mineworkers in South 
Africa, who were amongst the staunchest supporters of apartheid.9 A major 
contemporary study of white mineworkers by a team of industrial psycholo-
gists concluded that ‘the transplantation to the Copperbelt of the essentially 
conservative and self-centred White attitude pattern prevalent elsewhere in 
Southern Africa, was historically inevitable’.10 It has been regarded as axiomatic 
that whites across Southern Africa not only actively supported white minority 
rule and the colonial racial order, but were prepared to offer determined vio-
lent resistance to African nationalist movements. ‘South African and Rhodesian 
whites refused to forego their privileged lifestyles’ and, following Portugal’s lead, 
‘stood firm against racial equality and majority rule’, argued Filipe Ribeiro de 
156 Duncan Money
Meneses and Robert McNamara.11 Similarly, Matthew Hughes has argued that 
the British Government’s changing colonial policy in the late 1950s, ‘encour-
aged the whites in the Federation to make common cause with fellow white 
settler communities in Angola and Mozambique, South Africa, and Katanga, 
in the hope that, by standing together’, they could resist African demands for 
political reforms and external pressure from newly independent African states.12
Many contemporary observers expected such resistance. Plans by the Brit-
ish Government to invade the Federation to suppress anticipated unrest by 
white settlers worried civil servants that British troops would refuse to fight 
‘the European mineworkers on the Copperbelt’.13 Statements of intent about 
resisting decolonisation are not hard to find. In September 1960, for instance, 
prominent settler politician Rex L’Ange, who had previously worked as an 
official on the mines, declared to a public meeting in the mining township of 
Nkana:
Here, on the Copperbelt, we are right in the front line of racial conflict. . . . I 
think we should make it very clear that we look upon this part of the world 
as our home and birthright, which we have no intention of relinquishing.14
Intuitively, then, it might be expected that the longest strike in the history of 
the Copperbelt mines, initiated in February 1963 by white mineworkers on 
Mufulira Mine, to be closely connected with decolonisation, an attempt to pre-
vent or wreck a smooth transition to independence under an African nationalist 
government. Yet this was not the case. The dispute was, in fact, triggered by a 
demand from the mine management that a group of white workers complete 
a new form providing information on the work they had undertaken during 
their shift. That this seemingly trivial issue provoked a major dispute is indica-
tive of the consciousness and priorities of the white workforce, and of the kind 
of racial identity which developed amongst this workforce.
White workers on the Copperbelt certainly were racist and regarded Afri-
cans as more or less permanent subordinates in all areas of life. Racist attitudes 
appear to have been no less common than elsewhere in the region, indeed the 
converse would have been odd as large numbers of white mineworkers had 
spent substantial portions of their working lives in South Africa or Southern 
Rhodesia. Race operated differently on the Copperbelt, however. Whiteness 
was not about attachment to geography or to the state. White workers’ access to 
jobs, high wages, housing, health care, education and leisure came via the work-
place, not from the state. Maintaining their privileged lifestyle depended less on 
the maintenance of the colonial political order and more on their capacity to 
extract high wages and generous fringe benefits from the mining companies 
through collective action and not, unlike elsewhere in Southern Africa, through 
legislation.
White employees on the mines thought of themselves as workers, with inter-
ests distinct and opposed to their white managers. They perceived that threats to 
their privileges emanated primarily from white managers, rather than African 
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workers, and directed their actions accordingly. These privileges, however, 
included control over African labour and restricting skilled jobs to people of 
European descent. Whiteness was therefore a core component of their identity. 
The aim of this chapter is not – in the manner of the alchemist – an attempt to 
separate out workers’ justifiable class-based demands made on their autocratic 
bosses from illegitimate racist demands. Instead, it argues that these demands 
were intertwined and were not regarded as separate by those making them at 
the time, and that this constitutes a form of “white labourism” that did not rest 
on explicit pronouncements of racial identity.15 The men who initiated and led 
the dispute at Mufulira did so as conscious members of a racially bound class. 
It is to this dispute, to the actual struggles occurring in white society during 
decolonisation in Zambia, to which this chapter now turns.
Labour and industrial strife at Mufulira mine
Production at Mufulira Mine had begun in 1933 and, thirty years later, it had 
become the world’s largest underground copper mine. The Rhodesian Selec-
tion Trust, a company domiciled in the Federation but owned by the New 
York-based American Metal Company, operated the mine and in the early 
1960s employed almost 10,000 people there, around 1,500 whites and 8,000 
Africans.16 The mine had expanded considerably during the 1950s as the post-
war economic boom and strategic stockpiling of copper by the United States 
boosted copper prices. A refinery was constructed at the mine in 1952 and a 
massive expansion of the underground workings, the Mufulira West Exten-
sion, began in 1956. Around half of the £14 million cost of the extension was 
funded by long-term debt, and the remainder by retained profits.17 However, 
copper prices and profits fell sharply while this expansion was underway and 
had not recovered by the time the Mufulira West Extension opened in 1962. 
Controlling costs therefore became crucial.
Production costs had increased steadily during the 1950s at all Copper-
belt mines and the single largest component of this increase was wages. The 
total wage bill for African workers increased from £2.11 million in 1950 to 
£9.32 million in 1960, while total wages for white mineworkers soared from 
£4.75 million to £16.12 million over the same period.18 There were, of course, 
substantially more African mineworkers than white mineworkers, but white 
mineworkers were paid vastly higher wages, higher both than African wages on 
the Copperbelt and higher than wages paid to white mineworkers elsewhere in 
the region.19 These higher wages were a particular problem for production costs 
as the Copperbelt’s white workforce was also comparatively larger than white 
mining workforces elsewhere in the region. In 1963, the 7,776 white employ-
ees on the Copperbelt mines constituted 17 per cent of the total workforce, 
whereas the 2,550 whites on Southern Rhodesian mines represented only 6.2 
per cent of the total workforce and the 47,352 whites on the Rand and Orange 
Free State gold mines formed 11 per cent of the total workforce.20 Better paid 
and proportionately more numerous than their counterparts elsewhere in the 
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region, the Copperbelt’s white mineworkers were in a position of remarkable 
privilege but, as will be seen, many also felt the position to be a precarious one.
Labour on all the Copperbelt mines was organised by a rigid racial hierar-
chy, one that in form was very much like the organisation of work on mines 
in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa. In these territories 
though, the industrial colour bar that restricted all jobs perceived as skilled 
and many semi-skilled jobs to white workers was enforced by legislation. In 
Northern Rhodesia, the colour bar had no basis in law but was enforced on the 
mines by agreements made between the mining companies and the two white 
trade unions: the Northern Rhodesia Mine Workers’ Union (NRMWU) and 
the Mine Officials and Salaried Staff Association (MOSSA). This meant that all 
work regarded as unskilled was performed by African workers, who undertook 
most of the manual work underground and in the surface plants: drilling ore in 
the stopes, removing blasted ore, clearing waste rock, loading skips, etc. Some 
African workers performed semi-skilled jobs such as driving underground 
locomotives and operating overhead cranes, while a smaller number held 
higher-status jobs that involved less manual labour including clerks and “boss 
boys”, who supervised African labour underground. All African mineworkers 
were supervised by a white mineworker, and the former could not be above the 
latter in the hierarchy of the mine, regardless of the job they performed.
There was also a clear hierarchy within the white workforce, which was 
divided into a daily-paid section and a monthly-staff section. Administrative 
and clerical workers, engineers and other professionals, and supervisors of white 
labour such as shift bosses, mine captains, and foremen were all graded as staff. 
The small number of white women who worked on the mines as clerks or 
nurses in the mine hospitals were also in staff positions. Most staff were mem-
bers of MOSSA. Daily-paid mineworkers were all men and were all union 
members, as the NRMWU had run a closed shop on the mines since 1942. 
Their numbers included artisans such as boilermakers, electricians and fitters, 
and semi-skilled workers such as operators, and they performed almost all 
skilled work on the mines: blasting ore, repairing machinery, operating pumps, 
and driving the winding engines that hauled men and ore up the shafts. Most 
also had responsibility for directly supervising a “gang” of African workers.
This was, in theory, what daily-paid mineworkers were doing at work. In 
practice, supervising workers dispersed throughout a vast network of under-
ground tunnels and shafts presents a unique challenge and white mineworkers, 
backed up by a union that bristled against “interference” from management, 
had a substantial degree of autonomy underground. From the late 1950s, the 
mining companies sought closer knowledge of and control over what their 
expensive white workforce was actually doing at work, as a part of control-
ling costs. At Mufulira, the mine management began implementing scientific 
management techniques then prevalent in British industry. Two study teams 
were deployed to examine jobs performed by white workers looking at ‘pro-
cess planning, work simplification, works organisation, layout planning, trans-
port, materials handling, administrations and clerical procedures’, insofar as they 
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affect the way a job was done. These techniques were an attempt to improve 
productivity and manage costs by linking pay to performance.21 In contrast, the 
NRMWU had always insisted on standardised basic rates of pay for the same 
jobs across all mines. With some friction, new bonus schemes were steadily 
expanded across Mufulira’s white workforce until late 1962, when timbermen 
were incorporated into the scheme.
Timbermen were daily-paid underground workers responsible for construct-
ing and maintaining underground structures of timber and concrete. Most of 
the manual work was done by groups of between two and six African workers 
who, in the derogatory language of the time, were employed as “timberboys” 
and the timberman’s role largely consisted of using specialised tools and super-
vising this group. For this, timbermen were paid 80/3 £/s/d per eight-hour 
shift, plus a two-shilling bonus if they were required to use a cutting torch, and 
an annual copper bonus, housing allowance, free electricity and water, subsi-
dised health care and leisure facilities.22 All other white employees of the mines 
received the same, or even better, benefits.
High wages and the provision of a ‘miniature Welfare State conceived on 
lines which made the similar arrangements in the United Kingdom seem parsi-
monious’ by the mining companies enabled white mineworkers to comfortably 
support families.23 Contrary to the conventional image of mining towns as a 
largely male environment, which was certainly true on the Copperbelt in the 
1930s, by the 1960s there was no pronounced gender imbalance amongst the 
white population. Most white mineworkers were married and had children, 
and could be confident that education, health care, welfare and leisure would 
be provided for their families by the mining companies, provided they kept 
their jobs on the mine and that these jobs continued to provide such benefits.
Timbermen, like other daily-paid mineworkers, were not actually paid each 
day and the term refers to the fact that they were employed on a daily basis. 
They could be fired or resign with 24 hours’ notice, which entailed not only 
losing their job but also the extensive fringe benefits. Refusing to follow the 
instructions of mine managers was a good way to get fired on the spot, unless 
groups of white workers stuck together. This is what happened when, on 31 
December 1962, Mufulira’s mine superintendent informed all timbermen that 
they would now be required to complete a new form providing details on all 
tasks undertaken during their shift, how long they had taken to do the task, and 
what materials had been used in order to receive their bonus. This was a time 
and motion study which would then be linked to a new categorisation system 
where all daily-paid workers underground would be rated by officials every 
six months and ranked as above merit, average merit or below merit. Further 
bonuses and promotions would be based on merit rating.24 Timbermen col-
lectively refused point blank to participate in this.
This was unsurprising. Precarious employment encouraged collective 
action – while one timberman could be fired easily, sacking all of them would 
disrupt the operations of the mine – but, beyond this, industrial relations at 
Mufulira, like all the Copperbelt mines, were poor. It had not even been a year 
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since the last strike by white mineworkers had shut down the mine.25 While 
the dispute with white timbermen was developing, mine management had to 
contend with a strike by some 800 African miners at Mufulira West in protest 
over the attitude of a white shift boss and a series of wildcat strikes by African 
smelter workers, in defiance of their union leadership. This is not to say the 
leadership of the African Mineworkers’ Union (AMU) were moderates. On the 
eve of the shutdown at Mufulira, the AMU declared an unrelated dispute with 
all mines to try and impose a closed shop on the mining industry.26
Most disputes by white mineworkers were generated by contestations over 
authority and skill with mine management; that is the self-belief of many white 
mineworkers that they were skilled workers who possessed the necessary skills 
to do the job with minimal intervention from managers. Carter Goodrich’s 
classic study of conflict in British industry following the First World War, The 
Frontier of Control, is instructive here.27 Goodrich used the idea of the frontier 
to understand the struggle between unrestrained management prerogative and 
increasingly assertive trade unions on the shop floor. “Control” was understood 
implicitly – the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain, when asked by a mine-
owner what they meant by control, replied ‘we mean just what you mean when 
you say we must not have control’ – and similarly on the Copperbelt “control” 
was not clearly defined but involved control over the production process, that is, 
for white mineworkers, control over time, tools, and African labour. Autonomy, 
for white mineworkers, was closely entwined with their freedom to control and 
instruct the African workers they supervised as they saw fit. In the hierarchy of 
the mine, greater autonomy for some meant increased control and surveillance 
for others.
The end of empire in Northern Rhodesia
It is difficult to exaggerate the speed of political developments in Northern 
Rhodesia during the early 1960s. In 1959, very few people, including African 
nationalists, white settler politicians or the British Government, could plausi-
bly have expected that Northern Rhodesia would become the independent 
nation of Zambia within five years, headed by a man, Kenneth Kaunda, then 
in prison, and governed by a party, the United National Independence Party 
(UNIP), then illegal. Yet by early 1963, the writing was on the wall for colonial 
rule. African nationalist movements in all three constituent territories of the 
Central African Federation had resolutely opposed its formation and consist-
ently agitated against it during the 1950s, with little success until the end of the 
decade. By 1963, however, both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been 
granted a substantial degree of internal self-government – Southern Rhodesia 
had been granted self-government in 1923 – and African nationalist parties had 
taken power in territorial elections. The British Government’s announcement 
in March 1963 that governments in individual territories could secede from the 
Federation therefore sounded the death knell for the Federation, if the decision 
was not reversed or obstructed.
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Unsuccessful efforts by the United Federal Party (UFP) – the white settler 
party which governed the Federation – to prevent the disintegration of the 
Federation had focused on the October 1962 territorial elections in Northern 
Rhodesia. The Malawi Congress Party had already won a convincing victory in 
the August 1961 territorial elections in Nyasaland and were pressing to secede 
from Federation, but the territory’s miniscule white population and comparative 
lack of resources meant the UFP were resigned to losing the territory and focus 
shifted to retaining control of Northern Rhodesia. In any case, for whites, the 
real impetus behind Federation had been the possibility of amalgamating North-
ern and Southern Rhodesia. White control over Southern Rhodesia seemed 
secure; the African nationalist movement there had not yet recovered from the 
 Federation-wide suppression of nationalist parties in February 1959.28 In North-
ern Rhodesia, complex franchise arrangements held out the slim possibility 
that the UFP could secure victory, despite the fact that African voters had been 
included on the electoral roll in substantial numbers for the first time. This was 
not entirely a forlorn hope. Franchise arrangements did deny UNIP, which won 
the popular vote by a large margin, an outright majority of seats, but UNIP con-
founded the UFP’s plans by forming an uneasy coalition with a smaller national-
ist party, the African National Congress (ANC), and ousted the UFP from power.
Any possibility that white settlers would retain political power relied on the 
UFP securing the support of nearly all white voters in the territory and attract-
ing a sliver of African votes, the latter thought possible as white politicians were 
convinced that genuine enthusiasm for Federation by Africans was suppressed 
by nationalist parties. The UFP therefore ran a campaign aimed at stiffening the 
resolve of white voters to resist African nationalism through a lurid portrayal 
of what life would be like for whites under a UNIP government. UFP leaflets 
distributed on the Copperbelt warned that, after years of prosperity, ‘a savage fist 
is pounding at the door, and the question is whether the benefits we now have, 
and those yet to come, should be exchanged for the petrol bomb!’ and claimed 
that UNIP supported a mass uprising like Mau Mau, which would see whites 
murdered in their beds.29
Interestingly, white mineworkers and the NRMWU had little discernible 
involvement in the 1962 territorial election, a noteworthy contrast to their 
South African counterparts who were a key constituency for those rejecting 
any reforms to apartheid. The UFP’s candidates included eight politicians, six 
businessmen, five farmers, five mine executives or senior officials, two lawyers, 
a doctor and a teacher, but no mineworkers though the party’s candidate in 
Roan Antelope, Hendrik Liebenberg, had been an NRMWU branch official 
at Roan Antelope Mine some years earlier. At Mufulira, the UFP candidate, 
Pieter Wulff, a South African who was chief underground surveyor on the 
mine, was opposed by Alec Stevens, a carpenter on the same mine who had 
been NRMWU president in the early 1950s. Stevens, though, fared poorly and 
secured less than 7 per cent of the vote.
The UFP’s campaign was, in one sense, successful. Dire warnings about Afri-
can nationalism resonated with white voters and across Northern Rhodesia 
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almost all whites voted for the UFP. The enfranchisement of some African vot-
ers makes it difficult to calculate the precise proportion of white voters who 
endorsed the UFP, but it appears that around 90 per cent of white voters in the 
territory did so on a turnout that exceeded 90 per cent.30 These figures, how-
ever, disguise the fact that many whites did not vote at all. Many were ineligible 
to vote as they had not been in the country long enough to fulfil the residency 
requirements or had not registered to vote. A total of 14,163 (overwhelmingly 
white) voters on the Copperbelt cast their votes, but the Copperbelt towns col-
lectively had a white population of around 34,000 in 1961. Although a sizable 
proportion of this population would have been children, substantial numbers 
clearly did not vote.
A regional comparison is instructive here. One obvious contrast is the fail-
ure of white politicians in Northern Rhodesia to prevent the inclusion of 
steadily larger numbers of Africans on the electoral roll. It is striking that the 
efforts of the UFP, and whites in the colony more generally, to hold onto 
political power were so lacklustre. In the early 1960s in South Africa, the 
National Party was tightening its grip on power and ruthlessly suppressed 
domestic opposition. Its policy of apartheid was a popular one with the white 
electorate, coloured voters having been successfully removed from the elec-
toral roll in 1956, and its vote had risen considerably since the 1948 elections 
in which the party first took power. Similarly, in Southern Rhodesia white 
voters swung behind the far-Right Rhodesian Front in the 1962 general 
election, setting the territory’s trajectory towards the Unilateral Declaration 
of Independence in 1965. Divergence between Northern and Southern Rho-
desia predated the elections in 1962. The Rhodesian Front’s predecessor, the 
Dominion Party, actually won the highest number of votes in Southern Rho-
desia’s 1958 General Election, though the complex electoral arrangements 
handed the UFP a majority of seats.31 In contrast, the Dominion Party fared 
poorly in Northern Rhodesia.
A more proximate and spectacular example of how to prevent decolonisa-
tion, or at least attempt to, was provided to whites on the Copperbelt by events 
in 1960 immediately across the border in Katanga. At Belgian Congo’s hastily 
arranged independence, Katangese politicians hostile to the distant, would-be 
national government conspired with white settlers and elements in the Belgian 
Government to form their own, separate state. Using the excuse of an army 
mutiny that occurred immediately after independence, the province seceded 
from Congo in July 1960.32 Several thousand whites fled Katanga after the army 
mutiny, streaming across the border into Northern Rhodesia and then into 
Southern Rhodesia. It might be expected that witnessing the sudden arrival 
of large numbers of whites fleeing a newly independent African state would 
have hardened attitudes on the Copperbelt. Roy Welensky, prime minister of 
the Federation, certainly thought so, identifying ‘the evacuation of the Belgian 
refugees from Katanga’ as the ‘major cause’ pushing white voters in Southern 
Rhodesia towards the Rhodesian Front.33 Yet if anything, the fate of Katanga 
seems to have discouraged attempts to resist decolonisation across the border.
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Separatist Katanga was bolstered by clandestine military support from white 
minority regimes to the south, including a steady flow of white mercenaries, 
and it took three years of fighting with forces from the new national Congo-
lese Government and the United Nations to crush the break-away state. The 
Federal Government identified the Katangese cause as vital to its own survival, 
and its involvement in Katanga has been seen as a precursor to the white Rho-
desian resistance to black majority rule that continued until 1980.34 Elements 
in the South African Government thought the same. As H.K.T. Taswell, the 
South African high commissioner to the Federation, explained to his superiors 
in Pretoria, ‘the Federal Government takes the view that Tshombe is fighting 
their battle for them’. Taswell himself was convinced of this view and urged 
South African military support for Katanga, because ‘if Tshombe fails, the drive 
to the south will be on. The Rhodesias, already in a shaky position, may collapse 
and we will be the main target’.35 However, as United Nations forces closed in 
on the Katangese capital Elizabethville in January 1963, a few miles across the 
border the whites at Mufulira Mine had very different ideas about what their 
interests were, and how best to protect them.
Shutdown at Mufulira
Outright rejection of management initiatives, with no negotiation or suggestion 
of compromise, had been a regular feature of industrial relations on the Cop-
perbelt mines for the previous 25 years. This history of white industrial unrest 
makes the timbermen’s decision and subsequent strike unsurprising, but what 
is surprising is that many participants in the Mufulira strike would not have 
been around to experience this history. Figures for 1963 are unavailable, but in 
both December 1961 and in December 1964, 46 per cent of the white work-
force had been on the mines for less than three years.36 The average length of 
white employment was only 5.6 years in 1964.37 Frequent disputes meant that 
newcomers were quickly socialised into confrontational industrial relations, but 
another factor is also significant: the international experience of this workforce. 
Almost none of the white workforce were from Northern Rhodesia. They had 
arrived on the Copperbelt with experience of life and work at mining and 
industrial centres in Britain, South Africa, and elsewhere around the world. This 
explains the knowledge of, and hostility to, scientific management techniques, 
even though these were new on the Copperbelt. Explaining why timbermen 
had refused to complete any forms, NRMWU President Emrys Williams – a 
winding engine driver originally from South Wales – explained that the men 
‘were concerned they were effectively conducting a Time and Motion Study 
on themselves’.38 There was close knowledge of events and trends in industry 
elsewhere.
It was this knowledge that prompted the timbermen’s action. During the 
final week in January 1963, timbermen refused to go underground or, if they 
did, refused to complete the bonus form at the end of their shift. Mine man-
agement immediately moved to discipline them, and on 4 February notice was 
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given individually to timbermen that there was no work available for them 
until they obeyed instructions. Effectively, they were laid off without pay. In 
response, artisans across the mine refused to complete their bonus forms and 
on 9 February took wildcat strike action. An artisan’s delegation to the mine 
manager, Noel Kenny from Southern Rhodesia, explained that they were not 
unhappy with their own bonus scheme but were supporting the timbermen.39
White managers, too, maintained a tough, intransigent stance and refused to 
broker any compromise. In meetings with the union, Kenny vowed ‘he would 
shut down the mine immediately, lay off the workers and run the mine on a 
care and maintenance basis for an indefinite period’ rather than accede to their 
demands.40 Once the strike was underway, Mufulira’s Canadian mine superin-
tendent Al O’Connell explained it ‘was correct and quite reasonable’ to close 
the mine. ‘Management’, he insisted, ‘must be allowed to manage’, and this 
meant white employees doing as they were instructed.41 Kenny was furious 
at his authority being flouted by artisans and timbermen. On 8 February, he 
made an unannounced visit to the change house at Prain Shaft and offered 
one of the new bonus vouchers to Schoeman, a shop steward who had just 
returned from holiday. Schoeman reached for the form but Kenny snatched it 
back, telling him ‘it’s just as well you were prepared to take that voucher from 
me, otherwise your feet wouldn’t have touched the floor you would have been 
fired so quickly’.42
This, unsurprisingly, resulted in a hardening of attitudes and preparation 
for a strike began. As usual, legal niceties were ignored, and no secret bal-
lot of union members was taken, as required by law; a law which had been 
passed in 1958 following wildcat strikes by white mineworkers. Throughout 
the dispute, decisions were put to a vote by a show of hands at mass meetings. 
Even the initial decision not to sign the bonus forms was taken on a show 
of hands. Shop stewards preferred conducting business in the open in this 
manner, as they knew they could usually rely on the macho culture of the 
mines and the tough, masculine self-image of their members. As one man who 
worked underground at Mufulira in the early 1960s later claimed, ‘the men 
who mined were as hard as the rock they fought underground’.43 Maintaining 
this self-image meant not backing down to white bosses or shying away from 
industrial disputes. Consequently, with sections of the white workforce either 
on strike or ignoring instructions from mine officials, the management shut 
the mine on 22 February.44 All 800 daily-paid mineworkers were immediately 
laid off without pay, and the African workforce was steadily reduced as avail-
able work diminished.
The fact that the mine had to be closed is worth exploring. Contemporary 
observers were convinced that white mineworkers did little, if any, actual work. 
Once underground, it was thought, they wiled away the hours and earned fan-
tastic wages by the sweat of the brow of the African workers they supervised, 
who did the real work. Andrew Sardanis, who operated a transport business 
in Nchanga in the 1950s, expressed the common cynic’s view that, as African 
“boss boys” supervised African workers, young white miners ‘had very little to 
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do except snooze, eat their sandwiches and listen to music on their radios’.45 
Cyril Dunn, foreign correspondent for the Observer, explained that while ‘min-
ers in other parts of the world do a great deal of hard manual work’, on the 
Copperbelt even the ‘humblest white worker . . . is a supervisor of blacks, who 
do all the shovelling’.46 In his 1963 book on the Central African Federation, 
the Guardian journalist Patrick Keatley offers a snapshot of a typical white 
mineworker, ‘Jacobus van der Merwe’: ‘Let us say that Jacobus is not, unhappily, 
one of Mother Nature’s most gifted creatures, and that because of his limited 
intelligence . . . he has been assigned the simplest sort of job and has never 
been promoted’. Keatley contrasts “Jacobus” with an imagined African miner, 
“Moses Chona”, ‘sweating it out with a drill in humid, choking conditions 
underground’, for substantially less pay.47
The forced shutdown of the mines whenever white mineworkers went on 
strike suggests that they did fulfil an important role in production, as well as 
in the supervisory hierarchy. The mines could not function without them and 
white mineworkers had, for over two decades, used this to their full advantage.48 
This, however, was changing, as the dispute at Mufulira would reveal. Changes 
in the organisation of work during the 1950s had steadily reduced the propor-
tion of daily-paid mineworkers, even as the overall size of the white workforce 
had grown. Increasing numbers of whites were employed as officials.
There were still enough daily-paid workers at Mufulira to cause serious 
problems though. A Board of Enquiry was hastily arranged by the colonial 
administration to resolve the dispute. This Board, headed by Sir Charles Hart-
well, formerly chief secretary to Uganda’s colonial government, was mystified 
about the dispute. White workers who appeared before the Board expressed a 
deep-seated conviction that the mine management would use any information 
supplied in the forms against them.49 Another objection was made to the Board 
as well: filling in forms was not their job. NRMWU representatives explained 
that a mining official could note down the time it took to complete a job, 
but timbermen could not, as ‘a daily-paid Timberman is not in the same cat-
egory’.50 It emerged that a version of these forms had previously been filled by 
shift bosses, an arrangement which timbermen and other white workers were 
happy with. This points to their self-identification as workers and an under-
standing that workers were white men who performed manual tasks. Timber-
men, as one explained to the Board, would only do the job they were employed 
to do and ‘they were not employed as clerks’.51
These arguments made little impression on the Board, who recommended 
an immediate return to work.52 In turn, this made little impression on the 
strikers, who voted at a mass meeting to reject the report entirely. The Board 
had no way to enforce their recommendation as, while not exactly maintain-
ing a laissez-faire attitude, the colonial administration and Federal Government 
had comparatively little involvement in industrial relations on the Copperbelt. 
African trade unions, for instance, were not illegal, and the kind of industry-
wide machinery for conciliation and collective bargaining brought in by the 
Industrial Conciliation Acts in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was never 
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established in Northern Rhodesia. Consequently, trade unions were not incor-
porated into the state, as white trade unions elsewhere in the region had been. 
White mineworkers’ leaders carefully guarded their autonomy and successfully 
opposed any attempt to implement a version of the Industrial Conciliation Act 
in Northern Rhodesia.
The strike was largely a trial of strength between the NRMWU and Mufu-
lira Mine. Despite the seemingly low stakes, disputes between the mining com-
panies and their white workforce were often discussed in existential terms. ‘Let 
there be no doubt in anyone’s mind’, NRMWU branch chairman Mieczysław 
“Frank” Rzechorzek, informed his members, ‘the Company would like nothing 
better than to see this Union wiped out. This is a naked, calculated move to fur-
ther this end’.53 Rzechorzek was a firebrand. A 38-year-old miner, Rzechorzek 
had been born in Poland but left at the outbreak of the Second World War and 
made his way to Britain, via Algiers, where he joined the RAF as a pilot while 
still a teenager. He left Britain for the Copperbelt after being demobilised and 
arrived at Mufulira in mid-1953.54 By the time of the Mufulira dispute, he had 
spent ten years working underground and had been involved in innumerable 
disputes, including two Copperbelt-wide strikes.
Rzechorzek and other union officials were not ignorant of the greatly altered 
political context in the early 1960s. From early on, they had sought to reach 
out to the African Mineworkers’ Union (AMU) as an acknowledgement that 
the dispute impacted a much larger number of African mineworkers. While 
white timbermen thought of themselves primarily as manual workers, much 
of the manual work was performed by African workers, who were directly 
supervised by white workers and whose bonuses were calculated using the 
same form under dispute. Information provided by white timbermen deter-
mined a component of African workers’ wages. At the outset of the dispute, 
union officials had been at pains to emphasise that they ‘wanted to remove any 
impression of their provoking conflict with the Africans’.55 The union branch 
also attempted to use the connection between white and African timber work-
ers to their advantage by declaring ‘we have a common cause with the African 
employee in this matter’ and attempting to enlist the support of the AMU at 
a joint meeting.56 AMU officials were non-committal, presumably because the 
interests and perspectives of their members had not been taken into considera-
tion when white timbermen refused to fill in a form, resulting in hundreds of 
African workers being laid off.57
White-owned businesses on the Copperbelt were more responsive to appeals 
for support. As a Methodist minister in nearby Chingola described it, the Cop-
perbelt towns were ‘abjectly dependent upon the copper companies to which 
they owe their existence’.58 Fifty-five per cent of all white employees in Mufu-
lira worked on the mine and many of those who did not work on the mines 
were dependent on the incomes of those who did.59 From mid-March, the 
union sent appeals for assistance to around 300 businesses and responses came 
back with offers of free meals, free petrol, specially reduced prices and extended 
credit for laid-off white mineworkers. With the mine closed, however, other 
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economic activity in the town slowly came to a halt. By the end of March, 
dozens of local businesses – including general stores, garages, car dealers, fur-
nishers, beauty parlours, jewellers, cycle shops, cafes and the Mufulira Chamber 
of Commerce – had contacted the Ministry of Labour to urge intervention to 
end the dispute as business was at a standstill.60
The weeks-long stalemate gradually turned against white mineworkers. 
Their power relied on the capacity to inflict a heavy financial penalty on the 
mine-owners by disrupting production. When mine managers were prepared 
to wait out the dispute, there was little they could do. The union leadership 
could not make good on their threat to expand the strike by pulling work-
ers at other mines out on strike, as they had done in previous disputes. Other 
threats were equally empty. Emrys Williams declared that he was prepared to go 
to London to give the British Trade Union Congress a first-hand account of 
how the company had locked out their members and have Copperbelt copper 
declared “black”, so British dockers would not unload it.61 Nothing came of 
this. Amongst the white workforce, belief that they could win against an intran-
sigent management was diminishing. On 11 April, the Mufulira branch voted 
232–136 against returning to work.62 The mine management, clearly sensing 
a wavering of resolve, decided to reopen the mine, and approached daily-paid 
workers individually asking them to return to work.
Rzechorzek singled out anyone who returned as ‘deliberately injuring him-
self, his community and his Union’.63 This did not prevent a trickle of his mem-
bers returning to work. The first went back on 11 April and two weeks later 
53 were at work.64 NRMWU members began picketing the shafts and work-
shops and some were spotted taking down the numbers of cars so that those 
who were working could be identified. Mine management claimed that people 
returning to work had received threats that their cars and property would be 
damaged.65 Indeed, seven daily-paid men wrote to the minister of Labour, Reu-
ben Kamanga, claiming that intimidation had kept them away from work and 
requesting emergency legislation to make the closed shop illegal; appealing to 
an African politician for the state to take action against fellow white workers.66 
Wavering resolve was evident in other ways. Many white mineworkers simply 
resigned from the mine and left. By late April, one colonial official estimated 
that around 156 daily-paid mineworkers had resigned from the mine since the 
beginning of the dispute, and most had left the Copperbelt.67 One timberman, 
for instance, hopped on a cargo ship to New Zealand. ‘We have decided to give 
New Zealand a year’s trial’, his wife explained, and if they didn’t like it then 
they would move to South Africa.68
The decision to reopen the mine was a turning point. There were 650 white 
staff at Mufulira by 1963, almost as many as the 800 daily-paid workers, and 
the staff returned to work when the mine reopened. Copper production was 
restarted, though at a lower level. The position for white mineworkers was 
becoming unsustainable. Many freely admitted that they were only on the 
Copperbelt to make money, and by 1 May they had been out of work for 
over 12 weeks.69 Moreover, by this time, it was obvious that there would be no 
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solidarity strikes at other mines. The NRMWU Mufulira branch capitulated on 
1 May and timbermen agreed to complete the required forms, in exchange for 
a slightly higher bonus.70 This was a serious defeat in two ways: the NRMWU 
were forced to concede the principle and had incurred a crippling financial 
cost. The dispute cost the union almost £60,000, mostly strike pay, and strikers 
collectively lost around £250,000 in wages.71
Although defeated, most union members didn’t seem to think there was any-
thing fundamentally wrong with the approach they had taken. A month after 
the end of the strike Rzechorzek was returned unopposed as chairman for a 
third term at the annual branch elections.72 Moreover, there were further wild-
cat strikes by white mineworkers across the Copperbelt in November 1963, 
including at Mufulira, where there was a walkout after a white miner was 
disciplined for allegedly contravening blasting regulations. This was the seventh 
wildcat strike by white mineworkers on the Copperbelt mines that month, 
and again no ballot was taken. Mine management strongly suspected that the 
reasons for the strike had been “trumped up” because there had already been 
a strike at every other mine and so ‘Mufulira were the “odd men out” on the 
Copperbelt’ if they did not organise one.73 Mufulira’s NRMWU branch had a 
militant, combative reputation to maintain.
The AMU’s patience with white industrial unrest had finally worn through. 
While at best noncommittal during the Mufulira’s timbermen’s dispute, the 
union denounced the wildcat strikes during November. Matthew Mwenda-
pole, an AMU official, accused white strikers of attempting to blackmail the 
new government, and pointed to the dual nature of their demands. White 
mineworkers were seeking guarantees from the mining companies ‘in respect 
of pensions and savings, but also in respect to other preferential and discrimina-
tory practices to which they have been accustomed for a long time’.74 Although 
striking white workers ‘denied categorically’ that their aim was blackmailing 
the government – it was the companies they sought guarantees from – Mwen-
dapole was entirely correct in identifying the intertwined nature of their 
demands.75 Protecting their financial rewards from their employers was, for 
white mineworkers, not separate from preserving racist working practices. They 
were a privileged, racially delineated class and wanted to keep things that way.
Conclusion
The Copperbelt of the early 1960s occupied an intriguing chronological and 
geographical position. Quite suddenly, and unexpectedly, its white inhabitants 
found themselves on the northern edge of white-ruled Southern Africa, with 
the British Empire unravelling around them. It might reasonably be expected 
that these racist mineworkers would have fought tooth and nail against an 
African nationalist movement about to upend white minority rule and take 
power. They did not and, reflecting on the vignette that opened this chapter, 
the existence of an absence can be significant. That white workers on the Cop-
perbelt did not actively resist decolonisation tells us something about how they 
White mineworkers at Zambian independence 169
saw themselves and how they saw their place in the world. It does not suggest 
that these whites were a quiescent population, generally happy with their lot. 
There were serious industrial upheavals on the copper mines prior to Zambian 
independence.
White mineworkers constituted a transient population tied to an extractive 
industry and had no real abiding interest in Northern Rhodesia, the territory 
they happened to be in. This was important. Consequently, the fortunes of these 
white workers were much less tied to the state and to the land than elsewhere 
in the region. Whites on the Copperbelt were prepared to go no further than 
marking “UFP” on a ballot paper to defend white minority rule, and many 
could not even be bothered to take this step. Yet at the same time, white mine-
workers were willing to initiate a lengthy struggle over the seemingly incon-
sequential issue of who should complete a bonus form. The apparent triviality 
of this issue, especially in contrast with the magnitude of the political events 
occurring at this time, should not detract from the seriousness with which par-
ticipants at the time regarded this struggle, both white mineworkers and Mufu-
lira Mine’s management. These were the kinds of issues that white mineworkers 
on the Copperbelt were prepared to fight over.
This lengthy and bitter dispute locates the origin of the privileged position 
of these workers as the workplace. It was here that their considerable privileges 
were obtained and defended. The organisation of the labour process on the 
mines made white workers a racialised labour aristocracy. This position was 
based both on the skilled work and supervisory functions they performed on 
the mines and on their collective willingness to engage in bruising encoun-
ters with their employers. Demands by white mineworkers for better pay and 
conditions were de facto racialised because of their position in the mines, even 
when they did not make explicit racial appeals and even consciously sought 
to enlist the support of African mineworkers. Resistance to encroachments 
from management was an important part of this dispute and, in this sense, it 
had much in common with disputes in British industry over the application of 
scientific management techniques. Yet part of the autonomy that they sought 
to retain was control over the African mineworkers, who almost all white 
daily-paid mineworkers supervised, and maintenance of the racial hierarchy 
on the mines.
Despite this, timbermen and other white mineworkers had a strong self-
image that they were working-class because they were male manual workers, 
something that was resistant to the fact that the African workers they super-
vised performed most of this manual work. The bonuses that white timbermen 
received were based, in part, on the work performed by African workers they 
regarded as their subordinates. Generally, white mineworkers had little inter-
est in the Africans they worked alongside, who, of course, experienced much 
harsher and more arbitrary treatment from mine managers. The opponents 
were the mining companies and their local managers whose actions threatened 
their position as a racialised labour aristocracy whose work was crucial to the 
operation of the mines.
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9  Social engineering and 
scientific management
Some reflections on the apartheid 
public service and historical process
Neil Roos
The apartheid public service: some historiographic frames
There is a burgeoning literature on apartheid South Africa. Much of it focuses 
on black experiences, the struggle and the uneasy and ambiguous transitions 
to post-apartheid society. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995–
2002) spawned a genre of confessional accounts. And more recently, a range 
of memoirs written by former white male conscripts into the South African 
Defence Force, apartheid’s army, have begun to appear on the bookshelves of 
the upscale Exclusive Books. By and large, the history of ordinary whites under 
apartheid is left homogenous and monolithic in all of these traditions, and it is 
premised often on the incorrect dichotomy between conservative Afrikaans-
speakers and more liberal English speakers.1 The historiographic failure to 
tackle issues of white class and race formation, identity and everyday life leaves 
unasked other political and ethical questions clustered around complicity, par-
ticipation (including knowledge and denial by perpetrators), coercion, agency 
and its limits.
The National Party’s 1948 election victory came as something of a surprise, 
even to many of the Party faithful. Almost as soon as it assumed office in 1948, 
the new government had to contend with rising tides of resistance to racial 
segregation. Deploying all branches of the state ruthlessly, if never entirely sys-
tematically, in response to these challenges, the National Party (NP) govern-
ment did little during its early years to legislate and implement the political 
geography of separate development for which it would later become infamous. 
Elements within the NP and those close to it did, however, show their will to 
surveil certain classes of whites. This imperative applied equally to women as 
to men and it demonstrates something of the historical distrust and disdain 
extended by Afrikaner elites to the white poor; the advent of apartheid in 
1948 was at best only half a generation removed from poor whiteism and the 
economic, cultural and psychological ravages of land evictions, unemployment, 
social dislocation and malnutrition. These interlocking traumas affected not 
only the white poor but also the middle-class custodians of Afrikaner nation-
alism, who feared both a dilution of the Afrikaner volk (people) as well as a 
blurring of the lines between black and white. Working-class (or potentially 
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working, or ought-to-be-working) whites were important for the development 
of apartheid society. At one level whites, especially Afrikaners, needed to fit the 
volk-ish imagination of Afrikaner nationalism. At another, more practical level, 
there was a demand for these whites to provide the labour for the expanding 
apartheid state machinery and also for racially stratified industrial capitalism. 
And in the late-1940s there did not seem to be much confidence amongst Afri-
kaner nationalists in government, state departments or universities that whites 
generally were up to the task. By the early 1960s these issues were more or less 
resolved and the government under Verwoerd was able to turn to matters closer 
to his heart, elaborating and applying the broad strokes of separate development 
and its legitimating ideologies.
This chapter forms part of a broader study into the history of whites under 
apartheid which investigates historical processes of accommodation in a racial 
state. In the bigger project I ask firstly how and why white elites, for the pur-
poses of this study, NP politicians, state bureaucrats and Afrikaner national-
ist intellectuals, sought to engineer and manage ordinary whites. Far-reaching, 
elaborate and sometimes invasive instances of reform and regulation took place 
across a wide topography of institutions and locations and were given effect 
by the law, by school curricula, by religious homilies and, as we shall see in 
this chapter, institutional procedures for regulation and discipline. Secondly, 
I investigate how these subaltern whites, all some distance from the centre of 
official power and authority, responded not only to the material opportunities 
and ideological blandishments of apartheid society, but also to the ways that 
they were regulated and subject to various schema for improvements and sanc-
tion.2 Part of my objective is to assess how the histories of these processes help 
us understand the everyday world of whites, at least those in the lower social 
classes of apartheid society, and some of the diverse ways in which they were 
bound into and participated in the maintenance of apartheid society as well as 
the nature and impact of transgression, defiance and indocility.
The bulk of this chapter concentrates on the development of the public 
service (staatsdiens), with an emphasis on the role of the Public Service Com-
mission (PSC), which was a permanent Commission whose major responsibility 
lay in recommending public service appointments and promotions, but which 
evolved under apartheid into a kind of supra-bureaucracy. Most scholarship on 
the apartheid bureaucracy comes from the fields of management and public 
administration.3 Those from the critical social sciences are few in number, but 
significant for the ways that they locate the public service in the framework of 
the apartheid state, as well as contemporary class and race relations. Probably the 
most well-known is Dan O’Meara’s magisterial history of the ‘forty lost years’ 
represented by the NP’s occupation of office.4 He included a substantial section 
on the apartheid state machinery, and at the time, his work marked a notable 
departure from state/capital analyses of apartheid society. He did however con-
fine his interest to the upper echelons of the civil service, and the power of 
senior bureaucrats to “run” their ministers and shape the policy-making pro-
cess.5 In another departure from the then-dominant Marxist historiography of 
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South Africa, sociologist Ivan Evans used a case study the Department of Native 
Affairs to situate that bureaucracy at the very centre of the development of 
apartheid between 1945 and 1960.6 And in an essay that bore the imprint of the 
Wits History Workshop, Deborah Posel sought signs of class-based conscious-
ness and organisation amongst white public servants. Despite dissatisfaction with 
their conditions of service, she argues, public servants were not able to “resist” 
due to the weakness of their representative body, the Public Service Associa-
tion, and its unwillingness to challenge the government. Consequently, these 
officials were unable to enjoy fully the ‘wages of whiteness’, since they were 
stigmatised within broader white society as incompetent and the beneficiaries 
of party political favouritism. Like Posel, I concentrate on the experience of 
white public servants, linking these to the operation of race in apartheid society 
more broadly.7 By the late 1950s, the public service employed around 30 per 
cent of all working whites, making it the largest single employer of whites in 
the country; and between 1946 and 1969, the number of Afrikaner civil servants 
increased by a staggering 98.5 per cent.8 Without any doubt, racially reserved 
access to fairly well-paid work represented the major foundation for accommo-
dation and complicity on the part of white civil servants; in the idiom of sociol-
ogist Michael Burawoy, these jobs were the methodology by which consent was 
manufactured, at least between those white beamptes (officials) and the apartheid 
state.9 But by itself, the idea of co-optation and “manufactured consent” is too 
simplistic a rendering of the sociologies of work- race- and state-making that 
took place in the staatsdiens. I shall argue that attention to the ideologies, regu-
lations and forms of discipline and convention to which white public servants 
were subject in the workplace helps us understand with greater nuance some of 
the terms of their incorporation into both the staatsdiens and apartheid society.
While developments in the public service labour process do shed light on 
large-scale structural features of accommodation that were inscribed in law, 
in the transformation of the public service and the regulations which gov-
erned it, they do not account for diverse white working-class formulations 
of race and racial identity. In short, more top-down institutional histories are 
unable to connect the racism of a society and that of a class, or to acknowledge 
the  working-class agency in race-making. Drawing on material yielded by the 
 official archives as well as from interviews, I shall tease out several of these his-
torically constituted strands that existed within the broader parameters of the 
state and the NP’s unfolding apartheid project.
These fragments, including both racial violence and flickers of humanity 
shared across the colour line, are significant historically and historiographi-
cally.10 They reveal how subaltern iterations of race did not always coincide 
with the kind represented by the apartheid state, and thus challenge the useful-
ness of generic assumption of “whiteness”, even when these are refined to, say, 
“apartheid whiteness”. This observation is by no means intended as any kind of 
apologia. To the contrary it reminds us that race was made not only from the 
top, but also from the bottom, and it invites us to theorize and speculate how 
state and subaltern racism were connected.
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The NP and the public service
Apartheid-era Afrikaner nationalism cohered around the notion of volksge-
bondenheid (unity of the people) and the aim of uplifting and securing the 
future of the volk. In the romantic logic of volksgebondenheid, the major purpose 
of the state was to serve the volk.11 O’Meara goes on the claim that in light 
of the principles of volksgebondenheid, the Westminster-derived culture of civil 
service neutrality, and the ‘mythology of the state-as-arbiter’ had little appeal 
in the NP. The Party hierarchy understood the state, including the civil service, 
as an instrument to serve the volk, itself embodied in the volksfront of the NP.12
Despite the NP’s preference for large government and an interventionist 
state, a sensitivity nurtured by the resilience and complex legacies of white 
poverty, the public service establishment initially expanded slowly. In 1948 the 
number of whites employed in the public service (excluding the military and 
the police) grew by 6,652 to 105,051, compared to a growth of 9,566 in 1947.13 
And initially at least, the advent of a new administration in the Union Buildings 
was not matched by wholesale changes to the upper ranks of the bureaucracy: 
during the NP’s first year in office, only three new heads of department were 
appointed.14 Nor was there much sign yet of the new ethos for the public 
service described by O’Meara. The sidelining of Major-General Evered Poole, 
next in line to become chief of the general staff and the resignation of W. Mar-
shall Clark as general manager of the South African Railways in 1949 gener-
ated a myth amongst non-Nationalist whites, especially English-speakers, that 
the NP purged its political opponents from the public service, but there is little 
evidence of a systematic eviction of non-Nationalists from the senior ranks of 
the public service.15
Beyond the installation of a new government in 1948, the key to under-
standing the apartheid-era modernisation and expansion of the civil service is 
the role of the five-man Public Service Commission (PSC), an institution that 
predated the NP government. In the immediate aftermath of the political tran-
sition in 1948, there emerged some tension between the executive and the PSC 
on the role of the bureaucracy. While the former envisaged a public service 
that would support its political ambitions and its hope to entrench Afrikaner 
nationalism as the dominant ethos for (white) public life in South Africa, the 
PSC commissioners, all veterans of the service and schooled in the tradition of 
public service “neutrality”, favoured one that was less susceptible to executive 
influence.
An important battle in the turf war between the executive and the PSC 
took place in 1950, when the post of secretary to the PSC, described by 
the PSC as ‘one of the most important key positions in the Public Service’ 
became vacant.16 The minister of the interior recommended one D.J.C. Steyn, 
employed then in the Department of Justice, but the Commission, ever wary 
of executive intervention, rejected his nomination. The new secretary of the 
PSC, it insisted, needed to command the kind of knowledge and experience 
that could only be acquired through years of ‘close contact with all departments 
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and administrations’, implying presumably that Steyn lacked such gravitas.17 
Eventually, the minister appealed successfully to the governor general.18 While 
it is difficult to demonstrate convincingly that Steyn’s “political” appointment 
brought the PSC manifestly closer to the executive of government, it did chip 
away at the Westminster-style tenet that hitherto governed the relationship 
between the executive and its administration. Steyn’s appointment arguably 
helped to position the PSC as an institution with the political will to surveil 
the new class of white beamptes who were central to the development of the 
apartheid state but not entirely trusted by its political and bureaucratic masters.
Afrikanerisation and the re-making of the white working 
class in the public service
Recruiting for the staatsdiens as a whole fell to the PSC, and was a major prior-
ity. Histories of recruitment during the early apartheid years expose some of the 
ongoing tensions generated between ideological and political pressures from 
the government, and the PSC’s more bureaucratic obligations to manage staff 
and stretch staffing budgets by accelerating the drive for “efficiency”. They also 
yield some insight into the gradual Afrikanerisation of the service.
Employment for whites in the civil service was characterised by a distinction 
between policy-making (populated increasingly by members of the Afrikaner 
Broederbond, a secret society of influential white Afrikaner men) and policy-
implementation jobs. The latter were associated with procedural, routine and 
red-tape tasks. This structure, which was imperial in origin and had been refined 
in the Indian Civil Service during the early twentieth century, permitted a 
high degree of centralisation.19 In the staatsdiens it was manifest in four basic 
divisions of work: administrative, or managerial; specialist or technical; clerical 
(whose staff performed skilled white-collar work with few decision-making 
responsibilities); and a large general division where workers were assigned to a 
range of low-level manual, administrative, technical and sometimes supervisory 
tasks.20
Anticipating that the heaviest labour demands would be in the general bands, 
the PSC initiated “special measures” to solicit applications for these posts in 
1948, sending circulars and brochures to all magistrates and school principals. 
While the PSC persistently distanced itself from cruder forms of interventions, 
the focus of recruiting drives for general staff did shift to the platteland, which 
was the heartland of the NP’s support. The PSC report for 1948 did find it 
worth reporting that, of 2,004 applications for entry positions, 73 per cent were 
from smaller centres and country districts.21
Overall however the results were disappointing, especially with respect to 
male applicants.22 In its attempts to increase the pool of recruits into the general 
bands, the PSC was forced to tamper with age limits for entry into the service. 
Under the 1923 Public Service Act, male candidates appointed to the general 
division had to be between the ages of 16 and 25, while females between 18 
and 25 were considered; the PSC and the minister of the Interior agreed to 
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a suspension of the regulations to allow temporary eligibility to the general 
division of any white man under 50 years of age.23 These regulations were not 
altered for women, testament to the gendered ways that both the PSC and the 
minister imagined the civil service.
During the first years of NP administration the PSC also tried to recruit 
staff into the more prestigious clerical bands. Reflecting numerous European 
and colonial legacies, the most common route to entry into the clerical grades 
of the civil service was via the Public Service Competitive Examination.24 In 
1949, 1,864 men and women passed the exam, but to the consternation of the 
Commission, 1,495 candidates failed to respond to letters informing them of 
their appointment.25 Responding in much the same way as the Indian Civil 
Service did when it was faced with a shortage of prospective candidates for the 
upper divisions of the service, the PSC decided in 1950 to do away altogether 
with the exam.26 Instead, it would concentrate on recruiting a bigger pool of 
white school leavers for entry into the general division, and from this group, 
identifying candidates for future promotion into the clerical bands. It con-
tacted 5,000, emphasising the gross salary they would earn on appointment.27 
This, too, was met little success. More saliently, the PSC’s vacillation about 
where precisely to target its recruiting efforts might also have reflected the 
change in the public service from one dependent upon a relatively large layer of 
self- consciously professional civil servants to a larger entity structured, as I will 
argue, on centralised authority, hierarchical order and ultimately the work of 
large numbers of relatively junior staff.
Under apartheid the PSC incorporated women into the staatsdiens more 
comprehensively than before. Thus in early 1950 the PSC overrode the advice 
of the Public Service Commission of Enquiry and ruled that women could 
progress to senior clerical or administrative posts, in other words, enter the 
management bands.28 The proviso, which kept patriarchy in the public service 
intact, was that ‘staff controlled by the [female] incumbent should be predomi-
nantly women’.29
It is however noteworthy that just as the PSC expanded the permanent 
employment of women and made provision for their training and advance-
ment, it envisaged that this would occur largely within particularly junior ranks 
of the service.30 Revealing the myth amongst the PSC that women represented 
short-term and expedient help in the staatsdiens, the number of women on the 
permanent roster remained consistently lower than those deemed “temporary”. 
Nevertheless, the trend towards the permanent employment of women was a 
cause of concern to the PSC, as by 1958 it insisted that Departments not only 
report on the number of women on their respective establishments, but also 
motivate and explain any increases.31
Complaints about the paucity and quality of white applicants was a recur-
ring theme in the PSC’s annual reports for much of the decade as it noted 
repeatedly that the number of applications for employment fell far short of 
requirements.32 In its own analysis, the PSC attributed the critical shortfall of 
applicants to ‘competition for the services of a work seeker’.33 The conditions 
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of competition noticed by the PSC were rooted in a rapid growth of the 
national economy after the Second World War. After the war, new goldfields 
were opened up in the Orange Free State, as well as to the east and west of the 
original Witwatersrand goldfields. Wartime import substitution had provided 
a spur to manufacturing, and there was substantial expansion in the metals, 
engineering, textiles and chemical industries. Net National Income was on an 
upwards trend.34 In an economy with a segregated labour force, this growth 
spread thin the available pool of white recruits.
In a tight labour market for whites, the public service was poorly posi-
tioned to attract as new recruits those able to access more lucrative private 
sector employment. The class and social stratification of South African society 
and respective histories of proletarianisation amongst Afrikaans- and English- 
speaking whites meant while English-speakers were generally better-positioned 
to enter the private sector, the bulk of the new white public servants were 
Afrikaners. These structural and cultural factors, more than the operation of 
Tammany Hall-type interventions, contributed to the Afrikanerisation of the 
civil service. The particular ethnographies of recruitment into the public ser-
vice, overseen by the PSC, confirm Posel’s observation that public servants 
under apartheid developed into a disrespected stratum of white society. And 
more important for the purposes of this chapter, expansion during the first 
decade of apartheid brought into the fold of the public service a large number 
of people, already exposed at the town hall and the pulpit to certain ideologies 
about progress, the volk, godsdienstigheid (religious observance) and the races. As 
discussed later, the structured world of the staatsdiens added layers of regulation 
and methods of discipline to these ideologies, and sometimes modified them.
In the late 1940s and early 1950s the PSC’s recruiting measures were based 
on posters spelling out the salaries and terms of employment in the civil ser-
vice, as ineffectual as they were unimaginative. The PSC blamed the failure of 
successive recruiting campaigns on ‘a great deal of ignorance about the Pubic 
Service at universities and schools as well as among members of the general 
public’, yet it persisted with this approach until 1953,35 after which it engaged 
the services of an advertising agency to produce publicity material.36 This mate-
rial is useful in the ways that it offers a tableau of how the PSC imagined the 
world of work in the civil service.
In 1955 for instance it published a brochure titled Successful Careers in Service 
of Your Country.37 This began by enunciating the civic and personal dimensions 
of work in the service. It was a golden age to serve South Africa, and the civil 
service represented a golden opportunity to serve the country and its people. 
The service presented young people with the prospect of personal develop-
ment, and ‘gaining insight into all realms of die volkslewe’ – the life of the volk. 
In an appeal that was rather off the mark given the ways the public servants 
were in fact seen by the white public, it declared that the public service was 
well-suited to those who cared for their community and were ‘willing to accept 
the status of leadership within the community’.38 Hard work could bring quick 
advancement and would constitute ‘service of the nation, work that could not 
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possibly be uninteresting’ – an observation that demonstrated the author’s prox-
imity, ideologically and discursively, to Afrikaner nationalism. Touching on the 
ideal of stability central to emerging middle-class whiteness, it pointed out to 
potential candidates that their position and future were protected by law, that 
they could expect regular salary increments and also assistance with insurance 
and the purchase of a house. This brochure was distributed to all high schools, 
and elicited an ‘encouraging’ number of applications.39
The expansion of the public service effectively ended poor whiteism and 
erased at least the material traces of the Great Depression from white society: 
in a sense, the state was the creator of a large clerical white working class. But 
this growth stimulated other contradictions in white society at times of growth 
and of war: a shortage of white labour. The PSC was thus obliged to rely sub-
stantially on “temporary units”, usually pensioners or married women. In 1958 
for instance, the public service engaged 2,109 men along with 2,567 temporary 
male employees; 942 women were taken on, as against 916 temporary appoint-
ments.40 Ironically, just as the PSC’s recruiting practices and promotions policies 
sought to consolidate Afrikaner nationalism’s gendered hierarchies, the growth 
of the public service to meet the needs of the apartheid state obliged it to rely 
increasingly on the labour of white women.
Scientific management and a “Non-Political” 
public service
In addition to recruiting, the PSC’s most significant work during the first dec-
ade of apartheid was to reform the organisational sociology of the public ser-
vice. These changes brought centralisation, which positioned the public service 
well as the bureaucratic counterpart to ideologies of Afrikaner nationalism and 
corporativism. In the early twentieth century American engineer Frederick 
Taylor’s principles of scientific management, with their siren song of efficiency, 
were implemented in much of the industrial world, including South Africa.41 
By the 1940s the novelty of scientific management had worn off, but it received 
a boost following the success of the quality control movement, pioneered in 
Japanese industry by W. Edwards Deering. South African industrialists like 
Albert Wessels, founder of the local affiliate of the Toyota Motor Corporation, 
were immensely impressed by the possibilities of quality control, and no doubt 
discussed its merits amongst their peers back home.42 It was however something 
of an innovation for the management of bureaucracies that the PSC applied 
some of the principles of quality control to the reorganisation of the staatsdiens.
Scientific management was introduced to the public service piecemeal, and 
in rather unconventional ways, beginning not with the usual organogram and 
description of posts, but with the introduction of new techniques for report-
ing on individual staff performance and systems for merit assessment. And it 
targeted white public servants. This approach might have reflected not only the 
current popularity of quality control but also contrary demands on the PSC: just 
as its commissioners and technocrats were developing strategies to implement 
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scientific management, they were also expected by government to absorb into 
the public service workforce large numbers of fairly unskilled whites. Working 
to an organogram, analysing the posts and measuring the work outputs ascribed 
to it, would surely have exposed these contradictions, whereas the implementa-
tion of individual merit assessment and “quality control” allowed officers to be 
evaluated and some sort of rank order for advancement be established; as the 
PSC later explained, to ‘eliminate the whispering campaigns so prevalent in 
the Service today’, presumably the belief that those close to the NP received 
preferential treatment.43
For much of the twentieth century white South African elites asserted the 
European genealogies and connections of white South African society, part of 
an ongoing project to invoke Europe’s intellectual legacy and so lay claim to 
European versions of modernity.44 Thus as the PSC announced a new ‘standard 
staff report form’ it was proud to report that this was developed after intensive 
investigations of promotions practice in Europe and North America.45 The aim 
of the new reporting form was to arrive at a “score” of each public servant’s 
performance. Yet just as the new system sought to silence “whispering cam-
paigns”, it created a bureaucratic framework for surveillance, for discipline and 
other versions of favouritism. For behind the illusion of fairness and objectivity 
it asked probing and intimate questions about the use of intoxicants and nar-
cotics, dress, personal demeanour, personality, physical appearance and “special” 
qualities.46 In addition to these substantial written reports, each staff member 
had to be interviewed to ‘place before the Committee such facts as may have 
a bearing on their merit assessment’.47 In December 1952 it emerged however 
that the Department of Inland Revenue refused to implement the new system. 
Noting that Department’s refusal to carry out a ‘full scale personal inspection’ 
the secretary of the PSC prepared a report insisting that it carry out ‘full scale 
merit assessment’ and warning that further defiance would warrant Cabinet 
censure with serious consequences for the senior officers of the Department.48 
Merit assessment sought primarily to standardise procedures for management 
of individuals in the public service. But it went beyond measuring individuals’ 
work, as it also created an objective criterion to monitor and regulate those 
departments who resisted the tendencies towards centralised control implicit 
in merit assessment and scientific management. And quite plausibly, it provided 
a screen behind which other networks of influence, activated by the Broed-
erbond, operated to advance the careers of favoured mid- and senior-level 
bureaucrats.
In August 1954 a conference of all heads of department, to discuss merit 
assessment, was held under the chairmanship of Donges, the minister of the 
interior who had Cabinet oversight for the PSC.49 Although the subject was 
merit assessment, this gathering represented a significant event in the pub-
lic service’s history of centralisation: heads of department had not previously 
been successfully summoned together, and the PSC’s capacity to convene the 
meeting also signalled its evolving role as a supra-bureaucracy. By that year, 
“good progress” had been made in extending and implementing properly merit 
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assessment, and in its report to the heads of department, the PSC pointed out 
that the “difficult periods” in the introduction of the system, which it hinted 
darkly were inspired by party political allegiance to the old United Party gov-
ernment, had ended.50
In 1957 it reported that 8,561 officers were assessed, and that the system had 
been extended to those who did not normally qualify for merit assessment.51 
Numbers continued to grow: 9,059 in 1958, 8,904 in 1959 and 10,549 in 
1960.52 The PSC attributed the steady increase in the number of officials who 
were assessed to the shortening of the qualifying period of service, and this 
in turn might have represented a drive by the PSC to promote the upwards 
social mobility of public servants, which coincided with the broader Afrikaner 
nationalist imperative to advance the interests of the volk. The merit system 
did however contain at least one contradiction. As we shall see, the staatsdiens 
was expected to provide employment for whites who would otherwise strug-
gle to find work in the “open” market, even one circumscribed by a colour 
bar. They, along with other whites in the lower bands, and of course women 
retained in “temporary” positions were unlikely or unable to qualify for pro-
motion. This lessened the impact of merit assessment as a tool to regulate 
these officials.
Merit was the first dimension of the PSC’s reform of the operation and man-
agement of the public service around principles of scientific management, and 
it gave early momentum to discourses within the service about efficiency. As 
the PSC later observed, merit allowed it to identify and then discipline, demote 
or in some cases, dismiss those who performed poorly.53 In its early days, heads 
of department were reluctant to connect the new assessment system to sanc-
tioning officers for inefficiency and the PSC noted that instead of leaving this 
task to the discretion of departments, it would have to develop the means to 
prosecute inefficiency under the 1923 Public Service Act. The existing Act, 
legislated long before the drive to efficiency, was however cumbersome, and by 
1953 the PSC had managed to secure an amendment. In that year, it reported 
that one female officer had been reduced in rank and her salary reduced by 
£20 per year, while a male officer was dismissed.54 It boasted later that those 
subject to merit assessment showed a marked improvement in the quality of 
their work, although there may have been an element of self-justification in this 
claim, given the energy and resources allocated to developing its procedures and 
application.55
Although it was seldom enunciated explicitly, public servants were expected 
to know a cultural curriculum primarily made up of knowledge about race 
but also gender, and sometimes, class. As the racial and gendered struts of apart-
heid society were bulked up, the racial and gendered knowledge required of its 
servants receded to the background of the archive, evidence of the taken-for-
granted presence of these hierarchies in white South African society. At times, 
however, the official archive does reveal quite clearly the demand for such 
knowledge. ‘What is your knowledge of coloureds’, asked a 1951 memorandum 
setting out the questions for merit assessment.56
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The demand for bigger government as apartheid’s imprint on South African 
society became larger and more complex, along with a government decision 
to suspend increases in the public service establishment, pushed the PSC to 
engage more deeply with scientific management. Moving from monitoring of 
the individual, it began to pay increasing attention to ‘methods and systems of 
work’.57 In other words, greater efficiency.
By 1954 the PSC had deployed management experts at the State Sawmills 
in Pretoria and with great delight, it reported that this experiment, on a very 
small scale, had yielded remarkable efficiencies: production increased by 14 per 
cent, productivity of “European” and “native” staff by 218 per cent and 201 per 
cent respectively, and a saving of £54,741 effected that year.58 In what became 
a model for the training of public service werkstudie (work-study, or efficiency) 
officers, eighteen were trained at the Pretoria Sawmill site in the methods of 
analysing and improving workplace efficiency.59
After its early successes, the PSC proposed that Organisation and Methods 
Study (O&M) sections be established in every state department.60 During that 
year already it designated 100 staff members as O&M officers.61 By the fol-
lowing year it had in place a curriculum of training courses. These courses 
covered the fundamentals of scientific management like techniques of work 
measurement, analysis and improvement of organisation, calculation of staff 
requirements and office mechanisation.62 The PSC’s enthusiasm for scientific 
management was unwavering, and by 1961 it had trained 169 O&M officers, 
and had decided to send several O&M inspectors to Canada and the USA to 
study the latest innovations.63
Reflecting the growing international interest in human resource manage-
ment the PSC in the late 1950s added this feature to its repertoire of man-
agement instruments. Its particular interest was in ‘occupational adjustment 
problems’, and between 1959 and 1961, vocational psychologists investigated 
442 public servants. The reporting categories used by the PSC were vague: per-
sons misplaced (158); persons who needed psychological therapy and occupa-
tional guidance (179); and persons with other problems (105).64 Given however 
the extent to which merit assessment roamed into the reaches of the personal, 
the overarching ideological framework of the bureaucracy and the extent to 
which the PSC sought to standardise work and eliminate dissidence, it is not 
implausible to presume that in addition to more conventional cases of people 
being in the wrong jobs, or suffering more universal psychological disorders, 
there were included in this number officials who were “misplaced” or “prob-
lematic” in terms of the cultural strictures of apartheid society. In a novel study, 
Will Jackson draws on some of Frantz Fanon’s key claims to demonstrate how 
conditions of colonialism created certain psychopathologies amongst whites in 
colonial Kenya.65 Quite possibly, similar dynamics were at play within the occu-
pational adjustment scheme. Moreover, it became another tool for discipline, 
regulation and the production of sameness amongst civil servants.
The drive for efficiency in the staatsdiens was not without its contradictions, 
and it often clashed with the apartheid policy of “civilized labour” for whites, 
184 Neil Roos
and the Afrikaner national ideal of providing livelihoods for otherwise unem-
ployable whites. Referring to staff outside the administrative sections, in 1951 
Minister of Labour Ben Schoeman announced that
we should not create a permanent stratum of unskilled European labour. 
We should . . . take out those unskilled Europeans who are adaptable, who 
have the necessary aptitude . . . [and] give them training. That is how we 
will get the movement from the unskilled, right up to the skilled.66
Effectively his declaration re-located the colour bar to a higher level, and 
nowhere were the principles of civilised labour applied with greater vigour 
than in the staatsdiens. Between 1948 and 1959 for instance, whites working in 
the railways were steadily re-assigned from labouring to supervisory  positions – 
during that decade the number of white “railworkers” (labourers) fell from 
17,407 or 17.7 per cent of the total number of white employees to 12,131 
or 10.7 per cent.67 The tasks which the men performed hardly changed, yet 
their wages were significantly improved. Native Representative in the House 
of Assembly Margaret Ballinger tartly noted that “non-Europeans” were being 
engaged from 2s 6d to 3s 6d a day, while “Europeans”, doing the same work, 
were paid at supervisors’ rates and taken on from 8s 6d to 14s 6d per day. ‘This is 
going to mean a very considerable increase in the burden of the Public Service’, 
she concluded.68
Since at least the advent of Union in 1910, whites had found the state a 
source of sheltered employment. After the NP took office, however, it tried 
to expand protected employment to cater specifically for disabled and poorly 
educated whites, with the Ministry of Health and Welfare its greatest champion. 
Numerically these whites were not a significant source of electoral support 
for the NP, but culturally, they struck a chord with Afrikaner elites who held 
a deep dread of whites being reduced to pecuniary, beggary and the socio-
economic status of South Africa’s subject races. Plans to provide sheltered work 
took two forms. Firstly, the Ministry proposed the idea of establishing factories 
and workshops to employ physically and mentally handicapped whites, espe-
cially the blind and ‘the type who won’t find work easily’, and to this end in 
August 1949 the minister convened a Commission of Enquiry into Protected 
Work. The PSC’s submission to the Committee revealed differences between it 
and the government on the role of the state in supporting these whites. Present-
ing as a case study two state-run factories for the disabled, one at Pietersburg 
and the other at Potchefstroom, the PSC showed that while the Potchefstroom 
factory cost the fiscus in 1948/9 £9,546, the provision of pensions for the 
entire complement in sheltered work at the factory would cost only £4,000 
per year. Faced with these wretched statistics, the Commission recommended 
that it was neither sensible nor economic to implement a system of workshops 
and factories for the white disabled, and if the government wished to pursue 
the idea, it should do so in collaboration with private business.69 The PSC won 
this round, as the minister quietly dropped his proposal.
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Secondly the minister prevailed upon his colleagues in other departments 
to employ another category of whites that ‘wouldn’t find work easily’. These 
men and women were not physically disabled but were described in the brut-
ish language which Afrikanerdom’s elite sometimes used towards its subalterns 
as halfgeskooldes – half-educated people. His directive was interpreted by senior 
departmental functionaries to also incorporate ‘idlers, hoboes and similar types’, 
or as they were described in some official directives as blanke tsotsis, a racially 
loaded term implying that they were not-quite-white thugs.70 Those who 
were employed were incorporated into the public service, and in the sanitised 
“bureaucratese” of PSC reports, their jobs were listed as ‘non-prescribed posts’, 
in other words, jobs that lacked formal job description. This was an anomaly in 
an increasingly regulated public service, and in 1949 they numbered 1,122, 
in 1952, 1,748, 1955, 1,510 and by 1961, 1,361.71 These workers were used as 
bag-carriers in the post office, porters in hospitals and railway stations, and as 
sub-wardens in work colonies and psychiatric facilities. In the work colonies it 
was halfgeskooldes who marshalled the grinding routines that constituted “reha-
bilitation” and they were also responsible for punishing detainees. In short, 
the halfgeskoolde public servants, although few in number, stood at some of the 
apartheid state’s punitive edges, a site where the state was “made real” for South 
Africans, both black and white.
Scientific management in the public service is important for our argument. 
It changed substantially the structure of work in the staatsdiens, and it created 
a framework for the introduction of new and expansive disciplinary interven-
tions. Effectively these measures provided some of the structural conditions 
to mark out the fields of agency available to public servants in their work-
place. Through its efforts to standardise work procedures, the PSC organised 
the labour process in ways that were not crassly nor explicitly “political”, but 
which brought to it centralisation and an emphasis on hierarchy that served 
well the interests of a corporativist-type state. And the PSC’s reforms made 
efficiency the language of the staatsdiens. The archival record gives few exam-
ples of reference by public servants to, or commentary on, apartheid’s projects, 
grand or little, but it is replete with anxious references to “efficiency”. This 
suggests that public servants – with the obvious exception of those more senior 
officials responsible for policy-making – were not compelled to enter the dif-
ficult political, ideological and moral terrain of apartheid, but needed instead 
to make regular and consistent choices about “efficiency”. In addition, behind 
their rational and scientific guise, the standards for merit assessment included 
criteria associated intimately with the type of knowledge required for govern-
ance in a racial state.
If the organisation of the labour process, the mechanisms for monitoring 
and correction offered by scientific management and seldom-specified cultural 
imperatives were measures designed to manage the dispositions and everyday 
world of public servants, so too was induction. In 1956 the PSC reported that 
it was ready to implement an induction training programme that aimed to ‘ori-
entate the young public servant for his career and broaden his public service 
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background’.72 A year later it reported that it had laid on 14 part-time induc-
tion courses, each lasting three weeks. It gave details of the courses:
i The constitution, organisation and functions of the State;
ii How the State operates;
iii The place and role of the public servant in the scheme of the State’s 
activities;
iv The public servant and his conditions of service;
v The public servant and his work;
vi The public servant and the citizens of South Africa.73
In addition to its explanation of the detail of public service work, the empha-
sis that induction training placed on the state, and the public servants’ duty to 
the state and “his” role in connecting citizens (white ones) to the state tied in 
neatly with the concerns of Afrikaner nationalism. By the following year the 
PSC could report that clerical assistants on probation, as well as the majority of 
clerical assistants appointed over the previous two years had undergone induc-
tion training.74 Clearly younger and more junior entrants were targeted for 
training. The way that the public service induction training was conceived and 
implemented as well its timing is significant. It suggests that in the face of rising 
consumerism, as well as growing instances of youth rebellion, manifest most 
alarmingly amongst white youth in South African by the increasing visibility 
of “Ducktails”, the PSC management was showing signs of anxiety that young 
white public servants’ steadfastness, their sense of purpose and their commit-
ment to the volk needed reinforcement. Through the rest of the decade, and up 
to the late 1980s – maybe beyond – this anxiety simmered across elite echelons 
of white society.
During the early apartheid years, the white staff establishment of the pub-
lic service became increasingly Afrikanerised. The innovations and structural 
reform of the staatsdiens initiated by the PSC made it centralised, installed 
sophisticated management tools to advance, or retard, individuals’ progress, and 
discouraged public servants from seeing beyond the range of their immediate 
jobs, or in the case of more senior officials, those of their subordinates. The 
public service during the first decade of NP rule developed as a formidable 
“steel frame”, not only for the administration of apartheid society but also for 
the management of beamptes.75
Beamptes’ agency and everyday race-making
As far as its ambitions went, and in the self-assessment of its senior officials, the 
apartheid state was sturdy, coherent and rational, with an efficient administra-
tive machinery. A turn to the social history of beamptes lower down the public 
service hierarchy does however indicate tremors and limits in the state’s capac-
ity to manage whites. For instance, these excursions reveal beamptes iteratively 
developing their own understanding not only of racial hierarchies but of social 
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ones within the body politic of white society. They show officials acting “com-
passionately” in a system otherwise premised on the impersonal and immutable 
banalities of bureaucratic regulations rather than any measure of empathy or 
humane-ness. They demonstrate unexpected instances of history across the col-
our line. And they expose an underbelly of popular racist violence that even the 
apartheid state, itself built on many layers of violence, would repudiate.
Thus, we are witness to an escalating disagreement between two bureau-
crats, both white men, which had one of the antagonists issuing something of 
a monologue on race relations, social class, and the kind of etiquette neces-
sary to mediate interactions between people of different race and social ori-
gins. It started with a water dispute between the state entomologist and the 
medical superintendent of Tower Hospital in Fort Beaufort and boiled over 
into an angry complaint of how a Mr Yorke, head male nurse at the hospi-
tal, addressed the entomologist. In the hospital dining room Yorke ‘hectored 
and brow-beat’ the entomologist, in front of junior staff. This ‘high-handed 
action and attitude’ to a superior was unacceptable, wrote the entomologist; 
moreover, Yorke’s demeanour and tone were more suitable for ‘addressing a 
non-European labourer’. The entomologist’s outrage seemed most piqued at 
Yorke’s disregard for the multiple hierarchies of apartheid society (although 
he was silent on gender), and it suggests that he had a clear vision of the social 
order that was beginning to coalesce under apartheid. His understanding was 
cast in a grain markedly finer than the broad racial categories that had currency 
amongst apartheid elites in the early 1950s.
Then, the strange case of the “Mauritians”. This is a case of greater histo-
riographic significance than political, for it challenges the idea of a state as 
all-powerful, and it also offers an instance where officials were able to resist 
and overturn not just the letter of the law but its very intent. One of the 
foundations of apartheid legislation was the 1950 Population Registration Act 
which obliged each inhabitant of South Africa to register according to racial 
characteristics as white, African, coloured or Asian. For state officials the log-
ics of bureaucratic work meant that they could not tamper with these racial 
categories. There is however evidence that at least some of them acted with 
what amounted to compassion. In Durban they did so by making use of the 
sub-category “Mauritian”. “Mauritian” was a designation devoid of any par-
ticular or unique racial characteristics: no one knew what a “Mauritian” should 
look like, at least according to the grammar of apartheid bureaucracy, except 
that “Mauritians” were a sub-category of the white racial group, and there 
were examples where officials subverted the Act by reclassifying families, usu-
ally coloureds or Asians, as “Mauritian”. This measure enabled them to become 
white and so claim access to better wages, education, health care and subsidised 
housing. Examples like this are few and far between, and they hardly tell against 
the relentless inhumanity of apartheid. But they do offer a counter against the 
totalising assumption of the staatsdiens as a wholly effective cypher for apartheid 
ideologies, an institution that completely stripped from its officials any possibil-
ity of agency, defiance or human solidarity.
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Apartheid society was premised not only on white privilege, but also on 
violence. It was important for the sort of “order” imagined under apartheid that 
violence was bureaucratic and regulated, sometimes juridical, and always the 
prerogative of the state. Lynch-type violence, exercised by individuals, was not 
tolerated. In 1957 one G.O. Opperman, a clerk in the Department of Labour 
was riding his bicycle inside the corridor of an office, ‘when his progress was 
impeded by [a] native who was walking through the doorway at the time’. It 
appears that this annoyed Opperman, who ‘there-upon assaulted the native’. 
The archive yielded no pronouncements or regulations on violence although 
it does show swift punishment for those white public servants who presumed 
for themselves. Opperman found himself discharged from the public service 
and charged by the police.76 Of the assaulted African, nothing, after his brief 
and painful vignette as the object of Opperman’s unacceptable assault. That this 
episode attracted such detailed correspondence suggests that violence of the 
sort demonstrated by Opperman was probably quite uncommon, a tremor that 
unsettled the style of race and social relations, the form of white supremacy, that 
underlay apartheid.
Work in the public service and belonging in  
the apartheid state
The history of the staatsdiens during the formative years of apartheid supports 
arguments made by Posel that apartheid state-making was not ‘an essentially 
cumulative process’ that developed according to some grand ideological blue-
print, but was rather the product of struggles within and beyond the state.77 
Much the same argument applies for race-making and the idea of what it 
meant to be white. Given the long history of elite Afrikaner anxiety about the 
cultural and political reliability of working-class and poor whites, it is hardly 
surprising that the new government invested so much attention surveilling, 
policing and where necessary reforming whites in the lower strata of society, 
including those who occupied “policy implementation” posts in the staatsdiens. 
As we have seen, these intentions were the subject of contestation from lower-
level beamptes. It is an irony that the very whites who caused Afrikaner politi-
cians, bureaucrats and intellectuals such distress, and were the subjects of official 
attention, were sometimes relatively unaffected by the battery of public service 
regulations because possibilities for upwards mobility offered by the merit sys-
tem were simply beyond them.
While Posel points out that public servants were not able to enjoy in full 
the “wages of whiteness”, racially privileged work, and a public service that 
expanded its corps of white employees was the most important means by 
which the consent of white public servants for the apartheid state was reaf-
firmed. This consent however was for a general principle of racial supremacy 
and job reservation for white workers, notably those in the public service, and 
it left open questions about the particular form of the state or the specifics of 
white citizenship. This imprecision represented the realpolitik of building an 
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electoral base, but it also enabled the articulation of a variety of ideas about 
what it meant to be white: these differences gave the grounds for many of the 
instances of “defiance” by whites.
The public service underwent major reform during the early years of NP 
rule, and in trying to elucidate the terms of this accommodation, I have con-
centrated on how these reforms contributed to managing the beamptes. I have 
also argued that to understand the ethnography of work in the public service, 
we must appreciate the role of the PSC in managing its expansion and re-
organisation, and how, incrementally, the apartheid-era staatsdiens broke with 
earlier traditions of the service.
Although the PSC resisted clumsy political interference in appointments, 
it did oversee recruiting practices that shifted the public service closer to the 
demographic and ideological heartland of Afrikaner nationalism. The progres-
sive introduction of scientific management standardised work across depart-
ments and reduced the possibility of departments or individuals acting in 
renegade ways. It provided systems to monitor public servants and measure 
them on aspects of their work that related to both the technical requirements 
of the job as well as the new elite’s frames of ideological and cultural reference. 
These matrices furthermore provided the basis for advancement, for the identi-
fication of those with ‘occupational adjustment problems’ and also for punitive 
action. Collectively, the role of the public service labour process in managing 
whites suggests that just as the development of the apartheid state was a hap-
hazard and contradictory process, there was in fact evidence of the kernel of a 
project to re-imagine society in ways beyond the pragmatics of white suprem-
acy. While the full horrors of apartheid state planning and its efforts to manage 
populations through social engineering would be visited upon blacks from the 
1960s, this kind of state-making vision was manifest earlier in endeavours to 
manage whites, at least those employed by the state and thus at easy reach.
The expansion of the public service was responsible for the emergence of a 
new, increasingly Afrikanerised, class of whites employed in clerical jobs. And 
given the size of the staatsdiens, it was the major institution whereby whites 
participated in the production of apartheid society, without having to act in 
specifically racist ways, or demonstrate any explicitly political partisanship. This 
condition prevailed for much of the apartheid period and arguably, it enabled 
many whites to assert, after the fact, that they “did not support apartheid”. Such 
claims, however, are built on bad faith as they consciously ignore the privilege 
and racial supremacy that lay at the heart of apartheid society, and they dem-
onstrate the self-deception and lack of thinking invoked by Hannah Arendt to 
describe everyday morality in authoritarian societies elsewhere.78
As we have seen, white public servants demonstrated significant agency in 
the ways in which they staked their place in apartheid society, and the kind of 
identities, behaviour and racial rules they assumed. Even in the workplace, the 
planes and affective currents of the archive suggests that they were indocile, and 
as the case studies suggest, they were occasionally defiant. The beamptes’ asser-
tion of some autonomy and their transgression is significant – and it isn’t. It 
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should not for a moment descend to the kind of cynical revisionism that seeks 
to put a human face on apartheid’s beneficiaries or moves these whites into a 
column headed “opposition”, and at every turn these beamptes’ history reminds 
us how they too participated in race-making, that race was made not only from 
the top, by the state, but also from the bottom. It does however challenge some 
of the moral and historiographic certainties about apartheid history: about the 
coherence of the apartheid project, about the stability of racial categories and 
about the existence of riposte and challenge from within white society, and 
its limits. And the shards of humanity which they sometimes showed should 
serve as a pedagogy against essentialised whiteness, a tool in unmaking the his-
tory of whites as one exclusively of racial domination, self-interest and decep-
tion, accommodation and complicity. Yet the examples represented in these 
case studies also reminds us that just as these public servants occasionally acted 
compassionately or crossed the colour line, they did not repudiate apartheid. 
The Durban officials used the very language and categories of apartheid to 
help a few families “cross”. Testament, perhaps, to the observation that while 
there were many currents of racial supremacy in apartheid South Africa, and 
that some of these jarred against each other, few whites were either immune or 
hostile to racist ideologies.
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Historians of South Africa recognise the 1970s as an important turning point 
for apartheid. The growth and stability which had characterised the post-war 
economy was replaced by stagnation and inflation which would last until the 
regime’s demise in 1994. Rising living costs and growing unemployment hit 
the disenfranchised African population hardest, fermenting enduring discon-
tents about the race-based exploitation and subjugation suffered under white 
rule. In January 1973, strikes erupted in the factories around Durban as African 
workers demanded wage increases and industrial representation. Within weeks, 
strike action had spread across South Africa’s industrial centres and by March, 
160 work stoppages involving 60,000 workers had taken place. The strikes were 
typically of short duration as employers scrambled to respond to wage demands 
and instituted factory-based negotiations structures. Workers returned to the 
factories – but the collective power and new confidence of the semi-skilled 
African labour force operating the country’s most important industry had been 
forcefully demonstrated. When from June 1976 violent clashes between school-
children and police in Soweto sparked revolt throughout South Africa’s black 
townships, the possibility of African workers throwing their weight behind 
community-based demands for rights and political freedom threatened politi-
cal and economic instability the country could ill afford.1
These developments provoked a crucial shift in the white regime’s rhetoric 
and strategies of dominance. Even as the government set out to sharpen its 
repressive tactics – pumping money into defence and counterinsurgency, flood-
ing black townships with military vehicles and young white conscripts, and 
expanding the powers of the security apparatus – the realisation dawned that 
stability and economic growth could not be restored through repression alone.2 
Reform was needed.
The industrial arena was the obvious starting point for forestalling a full-blown 
crisis. In July 1977, Prime Minister Vorster appointed the Wiehahn Commission 
of Inquiry into Labour Legislation to investigate and make recommendations 
regarding all existing labour legislation in South Africa. The Commission was 
requested to submit interim reports ‘in view of the urgency of the matter’.3 
White workers and racial citizenship 195
After nation-wide consultation with stakeholders from industry, organised 
labour, government and civil society, the Commission tabled its first and most 
important report in Parliament on Labour Day 1979. In a historic move, it rec-
ommended the dismantling of the apartheid labour dispensation, starting with 
the abolition of race-based job reservation and the legal recognition of African 
trade unions. These proposals envisioned, for the first time in South Africa’s his-
tory, an integrated system of labour relations in which African workers would be 
given a seat at the table in labour negotiations and industrial councils.4
These recommendations were celebrated – not least of all internationally – 
as major reforms.5 But local labour observers, and scholars subsequently, were 
quick to point out the limitations and underlying political objectives of the 
new labour dispensation. Centrally, the reforms sought to forestall the radical 
politicisation of the African labour force. In order to gain legal recognition and 
admittance to the industrial conciliation system, African unions were required 
to register with the newly created Department of Manpower, and subject their 
activities and finances to its scrutiny. In this way, the state sought to gain con-
trol over the unions, prohibiting direct association with political movements, 
donations from foreign anti-apartheid organisations or liberation movements 
in exile, and restricting labour mobilisation to the workplace so workers would 
not unite with other groups to challenge white rule. In this way, labour rela-
tions would be depoliticised. Moreover, the state initially sought to grant labour 
rights only to Africans permanently residing in the cities, while continuing to 
exclude the bulk of the black labour force seen as migrant workers from the 
black homelands. This new politics of inclusion, it was hoped, would give so-
called urban Africans a stake in the system, secure their allegiance to the state 
granting them industrial citizenship, and consequently see them relinquish any 
further claims to full citizenship.6 In this sense, labour reform foreshadowed 
later constitutional changes, which sought, in turn, to co-opt South Africa’s col-
oured and Indian minorities by granting them the political power to elect their 
own representatives and preside over certain circumscribed community affairs. 
This aimed to imbue the system with some much-needed legitimacy while still 
leaving overall white political dominance in place.7
White capital, too, stood to benefit from labour reform. While the conditions 
created by racial oppression had long suited capitalist interests, the economic 
slowdown of the 1970s saw the constraints of racial capitalism shift to outweigh 
its benefits: the exploitation of the majority black population not only inhib-
ited the development of wider domestic markets but increasingly led to labour 
unrest. Moreover, racial discrimination obstructed the effective utilisation of 
labour. While awareness of the political and economic hazards created by racial 
capitalism came unevenly to South African capital, the business community had 
become a major advocate of reform by the time Wiehahn was appointed.8 From 
this point of view, the Commission’s recommendation to scrap race-based job 
reservation would finally remove statutory obstructions to the reorganisation 
of labour, while industrial citizenship would deliver an acquiescent and more 
productive black labour force – and hence get the economy back on track.
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Scholars have since labelled these reforms “neo-apartheid” attempts to 
‘remodel thoroughly the foundations of white supremacy’;9 a “scheme” to 
‘share power without losing control’;10 a new politics of inclusion and exclu-
sion, reformulating the terms on which certain “non-whites” participated 
in the state in order to bolster the legitimacy of the apartheid regime and 
gain control over the elements challenging it.11 In his analysis of the Wiehahn 
inquiry, Ashforth argues that reform constituted a redefinition or reimagining 
of the status of urban Africans, redefining them as not in the first place black, 
but as workers. This served to neutralise the political nature of their demands 
by focusing on labour rights.12
There is a larger literature outside South Africa on labour struggles and 
the redefinition of citizenship in the period leading up to decolonisation and 
majority rule. From the mid-1930s, French and British colonial regimes were 
confronted with increasingly forceful strike action and political movements 
amongst African workers. Consequently, colonial bureaucrats were forced to 
reimagine African labour and implement reforms in order to pre-empt labour 
crises with the potential to spill over into other spheres. Cooper explains how 
both ‘British and French governments, in quite different ways, were trying to 
construct some kind of junior citizenship through which colonized people 
could partake of some, but not all, of the qualities of a metropolitan citizen’.13 
These reconceptions would provide new legitimacy for colonial governments 
by incorporating labour into the post-war colonial system, while at the same 
time serving to regain control over African workers and to separate them from 
other groups with which they might unite to challenge colonial rule. Ultimately, 
this project of reimagining labour in such a way as to serve colonial interests 
failed as African labour organisations seized upon the discourses and redefini-
tions colonial officials were employing to claim rights and entitlements.14
In South Africa, decades later, labour reforms, like later constitutional 
reforms, served only to highlight Africans’ continued political disenfranchise-
ment and exclusion from full citizenship. And like their British and French 
colonial counterparts earlier in the century, black workers seized upon the new, 
albeit restricted, opportunities accorded by the legalisation of African labour 
organisation to mobilise resistance to white domination and claim full politi-
cal rights. The proliferation of black trade unions from the late 1970s led to 
the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
in December 1985, which united over half a million black workers around 
the ‘inseparability of shop-floor struggles and the broader political struggle’.15 
COSATU took up a central role in the liberation struggle, thus proving deci-
sively that state efforts ‘to prevent trade unions from becoming agents for politi-
cal transformation in South Africa had failed’.16
But absent from such considerations of reform-era South Africa are the 
experiences of the country’s white industrial workforce. By the 1970s, some 
400,000 white workers – 29 per cent of the economically active white popula-
tion of 1.4 million – were organised in trade unions.17 A substantial number of 
Afrikaners, in particular, remained in blue-collar occupations throughout the 
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apartheid period, with 38 per cent working in blue-collar positions in 1970.18 
Although they certainly formed a minority of the labour force in primary and 
secondary industry, these white workers represented a crucial and historically 
powerful part of the workforce: they held the majority of supervisory and 
skilled jobs, as well as a significant proportion of semi-skilled positions, and 
effectively controlled the organised labour movement. Within the racial state, 
they were also the only workers with political rights.
These white workers had long reaped the benefits of race-based citizenship 
in the workplace and South African society at large. Yet scholarship on the late-
apartheid period examining the conflicts and interests of the white state, capital 
and African workers has not taken account of the implications of reform for 
white workers in the industrial arena. Focusing on evidence brought before the 
Wiehahn inquiry, this chapter investigates white workers’ response to efforts to 
placate black political demands and accommodate the shifting needs of capital 
by reimagining black workers’ status. This provides new insights into issues of 
race, labour and citizenship in the late apartheid racial state.
White workers in South Africa’s racial order
Although racially discriminatory practices had long characterised colonial 
South Africa, the mineral revolution of the second half of the nineteenth cen-
tury effected the formation of racial capitalism and the racial state. White work-
ers’ material and subjective position was closely bound up with these processes. 
White miners saw both the Africans, alongside whom they worked, and the 
mine owners, eager to substitute them for less expensive labour, as threats to 
their position.19 These conditions, argues Krikler, were crucial to the racial for-
mation of white working-class identity. In the presence of a large black labour 
force, white workers defined themselves in relation to ‘that which they were 
not’: rightless, exploited and racially despised blacks. Threats to their position 
thus raised interconnected fears of being thrust into poverty and of losing their 
racial identity.20
Efforts to replace white with black labour led to violent industrial conflict 
in the first two decades of the twentieth century, with white workers demand-
ing race-based protection from capital’s efforts to undermine the colour bar.21 
In 1924, the Industrial Conciliation Act established an industrial relations sys-
tem through which employers’ organisations and trade unions could negotiate 
the peaceful resolution of industrial conflicts. The Act expressly barred Afri-
cans from these structures by excluding them from joining trade unions. Thus, 
unionised workers – whites, but also other minority race groups – were given 
the power to negotiate for the racial allocation of the most favoured jobs and 
working conditions. In subsequent years, governments expanded social security 
and job opportunities reserved for whites, and legislated for the payment of 
higher “civilised labour” wages to unskilled white workers.22 These develop-
ments are understood as serving to co-opt white labour into formal, state-
controlled structures of power. Thus emerged the outlines of a moral economy 
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in which political elites bestowed protection and privilege on white workers 
in exchange for their political support.23 This served to diffuse class tensions 
within the white population, binding white workers into a social order which 
emphasised their racial identity and elevated them on this basis.
This process was given a particular ethnic character when the National Party 
(NP) came to power in 1948. Described as a “class alliance” between Afrikaner 
petty bourgeois, working classes and farmers,24 the NP rose to popularity with 
its calls for greater racial segregation and “apartheid” in the wake of growing 
concerns about poor “whiteism” during the Great Depression, and the accel-
eration of African urbanisation as South Africa’s manufacturing industry grew 
during the Second World War. Once in power, the NP set out to bolster racial 
privilege in the labour arena.25 Its 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act extended 
existing provisions for race-based job reservation and forbade the registration of 
new multiracial trade unions. Existing multiracial unions were ordered to split 
into separate branches for white, coloured and Indian workers, with only whites 
serving on union executives. These measures secured white leadership of the 
organised labour movement while weakening the bargaining position of other 
workers included in the industrial relations system.26 Key sections of organ-
ised white labour, such as mining production workers, enjoyed ready access to 
government ministers and party executives,27 reflecting the moral economy of 
mutual obligation and reciprocity between white workers and the dominant 
classes of the apartheid state.
These labour determinations formed part of the NP’s broader efforts to 
statutorily impose a social hierarchy in which racial identity determined every 
aspect of political, economic and social life and formed the basis of inclu-
sion and exclusion in the racial state. The NP’s policy of separate development 
entrenched the correlation between race and citizenship.28 The 1950 Popula-
tion Registration Act divided the South African population by race, subdivided, 
in turn, into ostensibly distinct ethnic units, and the 1959 Promotion of Bantu 
Self-Government Act determined that separate black ethnic “nations” would 
be led to “full development” and “full authority” in their “own areas”.29 This 
scheme sought to split the black majority into a collection of ethnic minorities, 
depriving those in the rural areas of their South African citizenship through 
self-government, and thus securing white political dominance in the Republic. 
It made no provision for Africans residing in South Africa’s “white” cities, or for 
the country’s coloured and Indian communities.30 This policy, explains Dubow, 
saw apartheid evolve ‘from the pronouncement of white domination . . . to an 
elaborate and obfuscatory ideology of “multi-national” development’.31
In 1970s, the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act sought to expedite this pro-
cess. Africans residing in the cities were now also deemed to belong to a spe-
cific ethnic homeland, and hence deprived of their South African citizenship. 
The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act, passed in 1971, placed all homelands 
on track to political, executive and judicial self-government. In the course of 
the next seven years, eight homelands achieved this status. In this way, Pretoria 
sought to further safeguard white power by engineering an artificial white 
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majority.32 By 1978, Minister of Plural Relations Connie Mulder could confi-
dently state in Parliament that
[i]f our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as black people are 
concerned, there will be not one black man with South African citizenship. 
[. . .] Every black man in South Africa will eventually be accommodated 
in some independent new state in this honourable way and there will no 
longer be a moral obligation on this Parliament to accommodate these 
people.33
By the 1970s, therefore, the South African government was more forcefully 
than ever promoting a politics which ‘embedded ideas of differential nation-
hood and citizenship’ based on race.34
In the labour arena, racial citizenship translated into established privileges 
and protection for white workers. This is not to say, however, that all white 
workers supported this system fully. Factionalism along racial and ideologi-
cal lines had long characterised the South African labour movement. While 
the NP’s exploitation of white working-class fears, as well as the legislation it 
implemented once in power, had been quite successful in suppressing socialist 
tendencies amongst organised labour, different views remained on the desirabil-
ity of a multiracial labour movement. The 1956 Act’s restrictions on multiracial 
unions consequently saw organised labour fracture into two main camps. The 
Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) represented mostly multiracial 
industrial unions and craft unions in the commercial and manufacturing sec-
tors. Membership was restricted to registered unions, but TUCSA maintained 
liaison ties with African workers. The South African Confederation of Labour 
(SACLA), in contrast, represented the racially exclusive industrial unions in 
older industries such as mining, steelworks and the railways, as well as a number 
of predominantly Afrikaner craft unions in construction and state employment. 
The NP-supporting SACLA opposed multiracial industrial unions and any 
form of African labour organisation.35
By the time the Wiehahn Commission was appointed in 1977, SACLA rep-
resented some 200,000 white workers, or about 31 per cent of the organised 
labour force. TUCSA, in turn, represented around 223,000 workers, of whom 
the majority were coloured, some were Indian, and about 58,000 were white. 
As per statutory determinations, TUCSA was white-led, even though the com-
plexion of its leaders was representative of only 27 per cent of its members.36
This chapter focuses on SACLA and its affiliated unions’ response to the 
prospect of labour reform – not only because SACLA was the most substan-
tial representative body of white workers at the time, but also because a focus 
on this section of organised labour offers the opportunity to investigate how 
those white workers historically most invested in South Africa’s racial order 
responded to the prospect of labour reform. Given existing scholarly under-
standings of how white workers contributed to the making of the racial state, 
and how their identity formation and material position was intricately bound 
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up with the conditions of its making, this chapter seeks to investigate how these 
workers responded to the possibility of reform as the unmaking of racial privi-
lege in the labour arena. Faced with the crescendo of African resistance and the 
changing needs of capital in the late 1970s, how did white workers articulate 
their identities and claims? What does this reveal about the politics between 
dominant and subaltern white classes at a time when the very basis of white 
supremacy was being reformulated? And what can this tell us about race, labour 
and citizenship at this crucial historical juncture?
This chapter addresses these questions by examining SACLA workers’ 
testimony before and participation in the Wiehahn Commission of Inquiry 
into Labour Legislation. It draws on the Commission’s extensive documen-
tary archive, comprising written representations and comments received from 
various stakeholders, as well as some 10,000 pages of verbatim minutes from 
the oral testimony and deliberation meetings of the Commission, conducted 
between 1977 and 1980.37 This evidence offers new insights as to the class 
conflicts produced within white society in the political economic context 
characterising the late apartheid era, and into the entanglement of race, labour 
and citizenship in South Africa. This contributes to the intellectual project 
of rethinking white societies in Southern Africa by probing the shifting for-
tunes of white subalterns vis-à-vis changes in the structure of capitalism and 
the nature of the state under white minority rule, moving towards a deeper 
understanding of the manner in which class position coloured racial standing 
in the racial state.
Race, labour and citizenship in international perspective
A body of scholarship on white workers in the United States, emerging from 
the work of a new generation of labour historians in the 1990s, highlighted 
white working-class investment in republican citizenship amid black disenfran-
chisement. David Roediger’s landmark 1991 book, The Wages of Whiteness, is 
representative of these scholars’ approach which sees “white” itself as a racial-
ised ideology, socially and historically constructed and hence in need of criti-
cal examination. Roediger, examining industrialising America in the period 
between the Revolution and the Civil War, tracks the ways in which white 
working-class identities took shape in this context marked by capitalist labour 
regimes, black enslavement and the revolutionary ideals of independence and 
freedom. White workers compensated for their anxieties about becoming 
dependent on wage labour by forming a self-image which brought together 
race, free labour and citizenship, framing themselves as the antithesis of the 
disenfranchised black slave. White working-class opposition to abolition, for 
instance, was therefore not simply a factor of anxieties surrounding potential 
job competition from emancipated slaves, but reflected a commitment to the 
equation of whiteness and citizenship. Roediger thus highlights ‘the construc-
tion of identity through otherness’38 and encourages scholars to connect, rather 
than separate, race and class in considering identity formation and the dynamics 
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of race relations. Jeremy Krikler’s work on white working-class identity in early 
industrial South Africa, mentioned earlier, draws closely on Roediger.39
David Montgomery’s Citizen Worker is also focused on antebellum America 
and shares the attention to white working-class agency evident in Roediger’s 
work. With universal manhood suffrage preceding industrialisation in the USA, 
Montgomery investigates what advantages democracy and political rights pro-
vided workers in resisting the exploitative and restrictive aspects of emerging 
free market relations. Of course, political rights were the privilege of white men 
in this context – and while Montgomery notes that workers’ claims to political 
rights and the equality of men were ‘framed a nascent awareness of class conflict 
in the vocabulary of patriotism, race and rights’,40 his analysis has little to say 
about race relations and the racialisation of working-class identity. Rather, its 
strength lies in examining working-class appeals to citizenship and rights as a 
response to the conflicts and tensions generated by capitalism, both inside and 
outside the workplace.
Appeals to citizenship were still a productive recourse a century later dur-
ing the Great Depression, as Eric Meeks’s work demonstrates. Examining the 
Arizona cotton industry between 1929 and 1945, Meeks shows how unem-
ployment and poverty produced an influx of poor whites into low skill low 
wage jobs traditionally associated with Mexican labour. Resultant anxieties 
about these whites’ ability to maintain their racial status saw the emergence of 
appeals to citizenship legitimising anti-immigration campaigns, as well as gov-
ernment support and employment favouritism for poor whites. This conflation 
of national identity with race was highlighted in cases where Mexican Ameri-
cans were cast alongside immigrant Mexican workers as foreigners – indicating 
the importance not just of birthplace or political loyalty, but of race and culture. 
Arizona’s ‘white citizen workers’ sought to distinguish themselves from Mexi-
cans of similarly low socio-economic status by casting themselves as “good 
citizens”, that is, independent men capable of providing for their families, and 
imagining Mexicans as lazy, dependent and unreliable. Such distinctions not 
only sought to mitigate class, race and gender anxieties, but also served to legiti-
mate a broader racialised social order.41
Issues of citizenship have also recently attracted close attention in the field 
of African Studies, both in historical and contemporary perspective. Two edited 
volumes capture this well. Dorman et al. place the dynamic of ‘making nations 
[and] creating strangers’ central to analyses of the politics of nationalism and 
ethnicity shaping citizenship contestations in post-colonial Africa. In a context 
marked by economic distress, state failure or reconstruction, contestations over 
material resources such as land, opportunities or jobs are often ‘potent and 
meaningful for their contestants because they are framed and understood in 
terms of identity and belonging’.42 The construction of citizenship as defin-
ing who is included in the body politic, the authors argue, is therefore neces-
sarily entwined with processes of othering and exclusion – the creation of 
strangers. Most recently, Africanists have raised an argument against a narrow 
understanding of citizenship which invariably casts African colonial history 
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in terms of a minority of citizens and a majority of subjects. This common 
dichotomy needs to be destabilised, they argue, by looking beyond merely 
formal legal definitions to everyday experiences and expressions in the engage-
ment between people and the state.43 This may reveal how citizenship is more 
than a legal category, but a ‘political condition that is constructed and contested 
by agential political subjects’,44 revealing that ‘there have always been different 
sorts of subjects’.45
Insights from this broader body of scholarship may be brought to bear pro-
ductively on this investigation into white workers’ response to the prospect of 
reforms to the race-based labour dispensation of late apartheid South Africa.
Separate development: race and rights converge
For the first two decades of its existence, the all-white SACLA was the NP’s 
sweetheart labour confederation, supporting and enjoying the benefits of the 
government’s racist labour policies.46 But in the course of the 1970s, the Con-
federation grew increasingly concerned about the threat that escalating eco-
nomic and political challenges posed to white workers’ interests. During his 
address at the Confederation’s annual congress in June 1976, SACLA presi-
dent Attie Nieuwoudt stated that white workers feared an ‘onslaught’ on their 
positions amid efforts to facilitate African advancement.47 Minister of Labour 
Fanie Botha, guest speaker at the congress, responded with the assurance that 
white workers would not lose their privileged position. Although some labour 
reforms were being planned, Botha reassured the Confederation’s members that 
job reservation would be retained, and reaffirmed the established relations of 
mutual obligation binding politicians and white workers: ‘Any developments in 
the future will be something we plan together’,48 he promised.
The very next year, however, Botha appointed both an Industrial Tribunal, 
to report on the functionality of all existing job reservation determinations, and 
the Wiehahn Commission, to investigate the entire labour relations system. The 
Tribunal reported as the Commission was still finding its feet: 18 of the 25 job 
reservation determinations in force in 1976 were cancelled, and two suspended. 
Only five reservations remained in force – apparently where strong whites-only 
unions had been able to lobby for their retention. In the mining industry, for 
instance, both the Mineworkers’ Union (MWU) and Underground Officials’ 
Association (UOA) had argued against the removal of determination number 
27. The UOA represented the 1,600 white workers responsible for the sam-
pling, surveying and ventilation work reserved for whites by this determination, 
while the MWU’s members, in the production side of mining, worked under 
these officials.49
Amid escalating local and international pressure for the abandonment of 
apartheid, these developments created a climate of expectancy and uncer-
tainty.50 For the white workers of SACLA, these reformist moves stood in stark 
contrast to established practices and Minister Botha’s promises of continued 
white protection and partnership. Hence, as the Wiehahn Commission started 
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its inquiry, it was perceived as a real moment in which the future shape of South 
Africa’s labour dispensation was at stake.
SACLA’s deputation before the Commission was led by its general secre-
tary, Wessel Bornman of the South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries 
Union. In addition to Bornman, the deputation included workers from the 
railways, public service and mining industry. A number of these unions also 
testified individually. The written submissions and oral testimony presented by 
SACLA and its affiliate unions were united around the retention of the exist-
ing race-based labour legislation. As the Commission’s questioning returned 
time and again to the two most contentious issues characterising the apartheid 
labour dispensation – race-based job reservation, and the exclusion of African 
workers from the machinery of industrial conciliation through the denial of 
trade union rights – SACLA workers consistently based their arguments on the 
policy of separate development and its objective of creating black states sepa-
rate from ‘’white South Africa’’. SACLA workers drew a distinction between 
themselves, as citizens entitled to state protection and privilege in their own 
country, and Africans as “gasarbeiders” – guest workers or foreign labour tem-
porarily employed in the Republic without any claim to rights or residence. 
White workers insisted that even Africans permanently residing in South Africa 
remained ‘connected to their homelands’ and hence foreigners who could not 
exercise rights in the Republic or insist on inclusion within its industrial con-
ciliation machinery.51 This did not amount to discrimination, SACLA insisted, 
but accurately reflected separate development and the government’s intended 
blueprint for the country’s future. ‘[T]his is the ultimate goal in white South 
Africa, that no Bantu will have any right in South Africa’,52 explained Arrie 
Paulus, general secretary of the MWU. Paulus pointed the commissioners to 
pronouncements in Parliament to support his claim: ‘[I]t was repeated [in Par-
liament] the other day that, once separate development has been fully imple-
mented, there won’t be a single Bantu that can claim South African citizenship’, 
he stated, paraphrasing the minister of plural relations. The MWU was prepared 
to accept the full consequences of such a political dispensation:
I will go a step further, should a mine fall within a homeland, [. . .] that 
independent government makes its own laws, and if there should come a 
day when it decides to change its legislation so that a certain job becomes 
reserved for blacks, then I won’t go argue that whites are being discrimi-
nated against, because it is their privilege to amend those laws.53
But in “our country”, insisted Paulus, black workers remained outsiders with-
out any claim to citizenship.54
This politics of inclusion and exclusion – framing themselves as citizens 
included in the body politic and blacks as outsiders with no claims to rights – 
formed the foundation of SACLA workers’ arguments against reform. When it 
came to the question of whether African trade unions should be legally recog-
nised in South Africa, these white workers consistently called for the banning of 
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African trade unions in the Republic: black workers could exercise their labour 
rights ‘in their own country’, and any efforts to organise in South Africa should 
be criminalised and prosecuted.55 One SACLA delegate demanded that Afri-
can unions should be outlawed in South Africa because the country’s political 
and legal arrangements should not be made subservient to employers’ desire 
to negotiate with black workers.56 Similarly, when it came to the question of 
whether labour legislation should make provision for race-based job reserva-
tion, these workers again appealed to racial citizenship. The SACLA deputa-
tion stated that it considered job reservation a ‘matter of the principle of the 
protection of interests’57 and the ‘self-preservation of the white worker in his 
own country’.58 The MWU, whose members had long benefitted from the 
reservation of blasting certificates for white miners, also forcefully defended 
job reservation, denying that it discriminated against black workers who were 
immigrants to ‘white South Africa’ with no claims to rights in the country.59 
Bornman’s metalworkers’ union expressed similar convictions. It testified to 
receiving a mandate from its members to call for the state to give ‘absolute 
preference to the utilisation of all available whites’. Thereafter, the state should 
prioritise matters of automation, and only then should it attend to the needs 
of “other” workers.60 It is clear that for these workers, neither the interests of 
capital, nor those of black workers, should take precedence over the interests of 
whites as citizens of the racial state. Given the reality of separate development, 
in which race and rights converged, this did not amount to discrimination but 
fulfilled the function of labour law and obligation of political elites in white 
South Africa of protecting citizen workers.61
Interestingly, white workers’ rhetoric of inclusion and exclusion departed 
from the established racial logic of apartheid. For decades, opponents of trade 
union rights for black workers argued that Africans were not “ripe” – suffi-
ciently mature, educated or civilised – to “handle” industrial citizenship.62 But 
by the late 1970s, white workers could no longer invoke this racial logic to 
oppose reform: representing black workers as unfit for labour or political rights 
would undermine the policy of separate development which sought to grant 
Africans independence in their own countries. While older ideas of black bar-
barism did occasionally crop up in some testimonies – the MWU character-
ised black mineworkers as ‘from the bush’63 – these were few and far between. 
Rather, the centrality of separate development to white workers’ defence of 
the racist labour dispensation meant that, for the most part, they were firmly 
committed to an understanding of blacks as citizens – but only outside ‘’white 
South Africa’’. Such claims demonstrate the limits of apartheid’s efforts to engi-
neer a white majority in South Africa – white workers were clearly extremely 
aware of their minority status in the workplace.
Class and racial citizenship
During their testimony to the Commission, white workers outlined the dan-
gers which removing protective legislation would pose to them as worker 
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citizens. The SACLA deputation explained that job reservation offered protec-
tion from ‘exploitation’64 arising from ‘the capitalist businessman and his pursuit 
of maximum profit at minimum cost [which] will always seek out the cheapest 
labour’ in the form of ‘some other races’ with ‘lower living standards’.65 For the 
MWU, too, protection was necessitated by the presence of a large cheap black 
labour force:
Employers have but one goal namely to secure ever greater profits. The 
easiest way to accomplish this is to make use of cheaper labour. The living 
standard of the non-white in South Africa is much lower than that of the 
white, making it easy to employ non-whites for lower remuneration. Should 
job reservation be removed, this will be to the advantage of the employer.66
Asked whether unions would be able to protect minorities, should job reser-
vation be abrogated, SACLA’s Bornman answered with a resounding ‘no’.67 
Crucially, therefore, these threats which white workers perceived were not in 
the first place racial, but capitalist in nature.
A further dimension of this was revealed during the testimony of Bornman’s 
metalworkers’ union in its own capacity. This deputation defended job reservation 
particularly on behalf of lesser-skilled economically vulnerable white workers:
As far as the job reservation determination is concerned [. . .] it is [protect-
ing] specifically those people who do not have a trade that are rooted in 
these industries and who, should they leave, would be completely incapable 
of finding a similar income off [sic] their own accord anywhere else in the 
job market.68
This statement seems reminiscent of the policy of “civilised labour” – offering 
inflated wages and insulation from competition to white workers with relatively 
few skills. Indeed, the South African Iron, Steel and Allied Industries Union his-
torically represented unskilled and semi-skilled white workers, many of whom 
were employed as production workers and operatives in the parastatal steel com-
pany Iscor, established in 1928. By 1976, this union represented some 38,000 
workers across the industry.69 For them, job reservation concretised the state’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens – particularly those who were vulnerable.
As a member of the Wiehahn Commission, SACLA president Attie Nieu-
woudt also displayed concern with the economic vulnerability of some of the 
workers he represented, and their consequent dependence on statutory pro-
tection. This was tellingly demonstrated during a deliberation meeting on the 
Commission’s draft Report when Nieuwoudt objected to references to poor 
whiteism in its historical overview of South Africa’s labour legislation:
NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, down here we refer to the poor white question, is 
it really necessary to mention this?
WIEHAHN: But this poor white question was part of our history, Mr Nieuwoudt.
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NIEUWOUDT: It can become part of [our] history again.
WIEHAHN: Sure, it can always become part of history and then other commis-
sions in a hundred years can refer to it again.
NIEUWOUDT: Mr Chairman, it might be within ten months.
WIEHAHN: It is but history, Mr Nieuwoudt, simply a factual statement in historical 
interest.70
The SACLA president knew that within the fold of his organisation, white 
poverty featured prominently in the historical consciousness of white workers – 
particularly in older industries which had earlier in the century absorbed large 
numbers of unskilled and impoverished whites as “civilised labour”. Indeed, 
Nieuwoudt’s words show that the spectre of white poverty was perceived as 
a present reality. For SACLA workers, the prospect of labour reform suggested 
that the racial order could be reversed. This conjured up not just the prospect 
of job insecurity, but the very conditions of their class formation, which saw 
their whiteness and inclusion in the racial state offer them protection from the 
degradation of white poverty and the exploitation of capitalist employers. In 
this social order, it was their very citizenship which distinguished them from 
blacks and warranted their privileged position. Labour reform imperilled this.
In his study of white working-class identity in antebellum America, Roedi-
ger argues that racism was not just about economic position, but also about how 
white workers saw the world and themselves in it. In the case of late apartheid 
South Africa, white workers’ opposition to reform clearly reflected their class 
interests and investment in the protection they enjoyed from capitalist exploita-
tion. But it also reflected how they perceived the world and their position in 
it: they were whites, citizens, and therefore entitled to rights, while blacks were 
foreigners and had no claim to whites’ country. This doctrine was not just their 
own; it was the official mantra of the South African government. For white 
workers, their class position rendered the rights and privileges of racial citizen-
ship all the more precious, and the conditions of their class formation meant the 
distinction which racial citizenship drew between whites and blacks was fun-
damental to their identity and self-image. Recall Krikler’s argument that white 
workers defined themselves in opposition to rightless, exploited and racially 
despised blacks.71 Reforming the county’s race-based labour dispensation by 
granting Africans industrial rights would not only threaten white workers’ job 
security, but their very self-image. Just weeks before the Wiehahn Commis-
sion released part one of its Report, MWU president Cor de Jager, speaking 
at the union’s annual congress, expressed the fear that ‘we [white workers] will 
become gasarbeiders in our own country’.72 White workers’ anxieties around 
poor whiteism, exposure to capitalist exploitation, and of themselves becom-
ing gasarbeiders all point to instances of their relegation to social positions his-
torically and contemporarily associated with precarious whiteness, or blackness. 
More than just material and political implications, reform thus went to the 
heart of white working-class identity. Nic Wiehahn, in his exchange with Attie 
Nieuwoudt, seemed oblivious to this class dimensions of racial citizenship. He 
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dismissed Nieuwoudt’s objection as a matter of historical semantics, and did 
not register the much more fundamental, long-lived anxieties which it revealed.
The politics of reform and the disruption of  
the moral economy
In their testimony to the Wiehahn Commission, SACLA workers consist-
ently emphasised that labour reform was not in the first instance an economic 
matter – it was a political one. The SACLA deputation insisted, for instance, 
that any issues around the employment conditions of African “guest work-
ers” should be dealt with as matters of “interstate relations” – that is, addressed 
at a political level, between the government of South Africa and the relevant 
bantustans and employers involved.73 Later, when asked whether job reserva-
tion should be abolished, as this arrangement was detrimental to the national 
economy, the SACLA deputation responded that the economy was ‘an entirely 
different matter’74 – under discussion were matters of citizenship and political 
entitlement, rather than economic considerations. Recall, similarly, the met-
alworkers union’s demand that the state make the utilisation of all available 
whites its first priority, followed by automation, and then ‘the needs of others’. 
When this submission elicited an animated round of questioning regarding the 
state’s responsibilities towards its coloured and Indian population, general secre-
tary Bornman responded by stating that the testimony simply reflects existing 
government policy and the union’s own priorities. ‘We are not experts on the 
economy’, he added.75 As with the view that African trade union rights were a 
matter of “interstate relations”, this comment demonstrates how white workers 
regarded labour policy as a political rather than an economic issue. And as far as 
SACLA workers were concerned, the political arrangements of separate devel-
opment should be replicated in all spheres of life, including labour arrange-
ments, irrespective of economic imperatives.
By continuously asserting their position as citizens of the racial state, appeal-
ing to the policy of separate development, and repudiating efforts to represent 
labour reform as a primarily economic issue, these white workers were resisting 
the depoliticising thrust of the reform process. When the MWU deputation was 
asked to consider alternative measures which might replace statutory protection, 
Paulus refused to participate in such efforts to depoliticise the matter. Alternative 
measures would still amount to job reservation and therefore still attract the ire 
of the international community. It would be much better for South Africa to 
‘call a spade a spade’ and defy the foreign opinion, which has ‘no business here’.76 
Paulus and the workers he represented accepted that the maintenance of racial 
citizenship would have political ramifications, and found these to be preferable 
to the alternative. Claims to white workers’ entitlement and belonging to the 
white body politic reflected their insistence that the existing practices of obli-
gation and reciprocity between different parties in this body politic be upheld.
The fundamental entanglement of labour and politics meant that these work-
ers’ testimonies highlighted the contradiction inherent in attempts at labour 
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reforms, namely that African workers could be granted industrial without 
political citizenship. Indeed, white workers in the SACLA fold were the only 
group to impress upon the Commission the potential political ramifications of 
this strategy: granting industrial rights to Africans would be the thin end of the 
wedge and offer Africans avenues for demanding and seizing full citizenship. 
This was expressed most clearly by SACLA president Nieuwoudt. As a member 
of the Wiehahn Commission, Nieuwoudt echoed his confederation’s views, 
similarly stressing that labour matters and potential reforms functioned within 
a broader political context and had to adhere to official state policy. Already at 
the outset of the inquiry, he had stated his commitment to this social order,77 
and throughout the investigation, he was unwilling to debate any measures 
deviating from it.78 In the closed deliberation meetings following the Com-
mission’s testimony hearings, we find Nieuwoudt continually defending his 
commitment to job reservation for ‘the white worker in his own country’ and 
the denial of union rights for African workers in the Republic as arrangements 
which South Africa’s policy of separate development demanded:
[M]y Prime Minister [Vorster], who is now retired, had me in his office 
where I had a long conversation with him and he explained everything 
very clearly. Mr Chairman, he said that the black man would get his own 
republic where he would be master and have the vote and where he could 
govern in the way that the world wishes him to govern, as a sovereign 
nation.79
For Nieuwoudt and the workers he represented, labour went hand in hand 
with matters of political power and citizenship so that rights and privilege 
in the industrial sphere could not be divorced from rights and privilege in 
the political sphere. By pointing to Africans’ imminent “mastery” in their own 
countries, Nieuwoudt’s statement suggests his anxiety about the implications 
for white rule in South Africa, should Africans be granted labour rights. Thus, 
as the Commission’s deliberation meetings continued, Nieuwoudt continu-
ally and urgently directed his fellow commissioners’ attention to the potential 
political ramifications of labour reform: on one occasion he implored them 
to consider ‘where are we going with this fatherland of ours’;80 on another, 
he warned that ‘we are busy deciding about the future of South Africa here, 
because the labour force will determine our direction, and politics will just 
have to follow suit’.81 These same concerns underlay SACLA unions’ insistence 
on the political nature of reform and its consequences. The South African Iron, 
Steel and Allied Industries Union even concluded its testimony by drawing the 
Commission’s attention to the role of black unions in the liberation struggle of 
various African countries.82 White workers recognised and warned that labour 
reform would mark the beginning of the end for the racial state. Many years 
later, Wiehahn commissioners drawn from academic and business circles admit-
ted that white workers had been much more attuned to the possible political 
ramifications of labour reform than commissioners from other social spheres.83
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It is unsurprising that white workers would have been most sensitive to the 
possible ramifications of reform. Industrial citizenship for Africans called the 
established convergence between race and rights into question – if blacks could 
be given rights, whites could have them taken away. This understanding is evi-
dent throughout SACLA workers’ testimony to the Commission: they did not 
see potential reforms as awarding black workers rights alongside white workers, 
but as blacks gaining rights at the expense of white workers. For white work-
ers, the uncoupling of race from rights implied the potential of exclusion from 
racial citizenship. To be sure, there were no indications that the political system 
was going to change fundamentally and overall white rule was set to continue 
in South Africa. For white workers, the prospect of labour reform therefore 
placed both their position of economic vulnerability as well as their identities 
as citizen workers at risk in a context in which other whites would retain their 
privileges within the racial state. Hence it was this citizenship to which they 
appealed unceasingly. Towards the end of the metalworkers’ union’s testimony, 
chairman Wiehahn posed a final question:
WIEHAHN: But suppose there would be overwhelming evidence in a different 
direction [to that presented by the union, for the retention of a race- based 
labour dispensation], do you expect your union’s views to be decisive, or 
do you expect the Commission to simply take cognisance of your union’s 
views? [. . .] I would just like to know your general view on the matter.
BORNMAN: Mr Chairman, I suppose every person would like to see his views 
upheld, and this is the case for us also. If we should be in the minority on 
the issue – PAUSE
WIEHAHN: Not that this would necessarily be the case.
BORNMAN: We have always been good citizens.84
These statements concluded the session. Confronted with the real prospect that 
white workers might lose their privileged position, Bornman appealed to the 
established moral economy. He implored the Commission, as proxy for the state 
and the political elite, to consider the political loyalty and industrial discipline 
white workers had shown the National Party, their role in maintaining the 
key pillars of a racially ordered society and bolstering white power in South 
Africa – this, in exchange for state support and protection of their position as 
part of this racial order. White workers had ‘always been good citizens’, Born-
man reminded the Commission, and this relationship had to be honoured.
But the government had other plans. Shortly after the Commission released 
its first report, the NP accepted recommendations to scrap job reservation 
and legalise African unions. In a revealing statement which echoed Bornman’s 
appeal, MWU general secretary Paulus lambasted the government for betraying 
white workers: ‘in accepting the Wiehahn report, the government has commit-
ted the greatest act of treason against the white workers of South Africa since 
1922, when hundreds of miners were shot because they rebelled against the 
Chamber of Mines’ efforts to force them to share their work with blacks’.85 For 
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the MWU, reforms thus recalled earlier struggles for recognition, protection 
and status as white citizens in the racial state. The state had withdrawn its sup-
port for working-class whiteness.
Rethinking reform
Of course, as indicated earlier, not all sections of the organised labour move-
ment sought the maintenance of the apartheid labour dispensation. The 
multiracial labour federation TUCSA claimed to welcome moves towards 
reform – although the Council suffered from a great deal of internal division 
on the subject. Overall, its leadership took a reformist stance, supporting the 
removal of discriminatory legislation and the granting of trade union rights to 
Africans, subject to strict state regulation. TUCSA representatives did not draw 
the same links between labour rights and citizenship as their SACLA counter-
parts, and generally echoed the depoliticising rhetoric of reformist politicians.86 
It has been suggested that TUCSA was hoping to incorporate African workers 
into its structures, thereby gaining control over African unionism in this way 
instead of through legislative means, as SACLA wanted.87
This different strategy may be ascribed to the different kinds of workers 
represented by the two federations. Not only did SACLA represent far more 
whites than TUCSA, but its members also ‘owed their privilege – sometimes 
their very jobs – to direct government intervention. It was strongest either on 
the railways and in state-owned steel plants, which were created partially to 
offer whites protected jobs, or on the mines where white workers relied on job 
bars in the law to bolster their privilege. Its members had no skilled trade to 
protect them’.88
SACLA workers’ resistance to reform, as articulated in the course of the 
Wiehahn inquiry, provides new insights which challenge existing understand-
ings of reform-era South Africa. Scholars regard late apartheid reforms as part 
of a “scheme” to remodel the foundations of white supremacy – yet it clearly 
did not enjoy the support of all whites. The scheme’s new politics of inclu-
sion and exclusion threatened white workers’ position and identity as citizens 
of the racial state. Indeed, if reform constituted a redefinition or reimagining 
of the status of urban Africans, as Ashforth argues, it follows that this would 
also entail the redefinition of the status of white workers whose very position 
relied on the exclusion of Africans from the privileges of industrial citizenship, 
and whose identity was intimately bound up with the rightlessness of blacks. 
Reform heralded the start of the withdrawal of state support for working-class 
whiteness. As a “scheme” to ‘share power without losing control’, it did not 
include white workers. Moreover, in the context of economic and political 
crisis and the shifting priorities of capital and the state, this “scheme” instigated 
the destruction of the established moral economy.
This alerts us to the class conflicts produced within white society by the polit-
ical challenges and shifting capitalist imperatives of the late apartheid period. 
Existing scholarship is mainly focused on the tensions between the white state 
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and the black populace. And while scholars recognise that by the 1970s the 
NP’s priorities had drifted away from its original agricultural and working-class 
support base towards middle-class suburbanites and business interests,89 little 
sustained attention has been paid to the intra-white class conflicts and implica-
tions of this historical juncture. Contestations around inclusion and exclusion 
evident in SACLA workers’ testimony to the Wiehahn Commission therefore 
point us towards previously overlooked dynamics of the politics of reform and 
the process of state remaking and status renegotiation it entailed. Scholars have 
suggested that by the 1970s, whites no longer needed a racially discriminatory 
framework to maintain their privileged position.90 Yet SACLA workers’ reac-
tions to the prospect of reform during the Wiehahn process reveal the contin-
ued importance of racial privilege and protection to a substantial part of the 
white working class. By pointing to capitalist exploitation, the economic vul-
nerability of lesser-skilled whites and the threat of white poverty, white workers 
demanded continued state protection. Their commitment to separate develop-
ment and their anxieties about reform reducing them to gasarbeiders expressed 
very different priorities to those pursued by the white state and business leaders. 
Historians therefore need to reconsider their understandings of white interests 
in the late apartheid period to include the continued importance of whiteness 
to subaltern whites.
In considering the entanglement of race, labour and citizenship in late apart-
heid South Africa, white workers’ response to the prospect of reform reveals 
how class position impacts citizenship. Hunter, commenting on the misleading 
notion of a minority of citizens versus a majority of subjects in understandings 
of African colonial history, points out that ‘there have always been different sorts 
of subjects’91 – and, as this chapter shows, different sorts of citizens.
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